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Baltic Council Holds Session in Poland

Kozyrev Arrives in Gdansk

LD1905085495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0020 GMT 19 May 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Dmitriy Gorokhov and Aleksandr Potemkin]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Gdansk, 19 May — The development of political and economic cooperation among the countries of the region, questions of the observation of human rights and ecological problems — this is by no means a full list of the subjects that will be discussed by the participants in the latest session of the Council of Baltic States that opens in Gdansk today. [passage omitted on aims of council]

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev arrived in this large city on the Baltic late on Thursday evening. The Russian minister, as well as taking part in the session at which he is to speak, will also have bilateral working talks with his Polish counterpart Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, present Russian medals commemorating the 50th anniversary of Victory to a group of Polish veterans, and lay a wreath at the Russian servicemen's cemetery. Andrey Kozyrev and the heads of the other delegations will meet Polish President Lech Walesa.

The ITAR-TASS correspondents have learned that during the Baltic Council session Andrey Kozyrev is also expected to meet German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel.

The Russian delegation to the Baltic Council also includes the heads of the Administrations of St. Petersburg, Kalinin, Leningrad, and Novgorod Regions.

Kozyrev Addresses Baltic Council

LD1905130395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1304 GMT 19 May 95

[By Dmitriy Gorokhov, Aleksandr Potemkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GDANSK May 19 (Itar-Tass) — Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has urged foreign ministers of countries of the Baltic Region to continue efforts, aimed at creating Europe, that would be free from new splits and division lines. He spoke today at a regular session of the Council of Baltic Sea States, which is under way in Gdansk, the largest industrial and port city on the Polish coast. The Council, created in 1992, is made up of foreign ministers of ten countries of the region, as well as a representative of the European Commission.

Russia supports the Council, because it regards regional cooperation as one of the elements of a new model of security for Europe, Kozyrev said. Cooperation between our countries should provide answers to real and non illusory challenges to European stability, should serve the interests not only of the countries, but also of their citizens.

Kozyrev welcomed the beginning of active work of the Commissioner of the Council for democratic institutions and human rights, including the rights of people, who belong to national minorities. He pointed out that the need for protecting the rights of the minorities and countering aggressive nationalism continued to be rather acute. He said Russia continued to be seriously concerned over the situation with ensuring civil rights of the Russian- speaking population of Latvia and Estonia in full volume. This is a problem not only of regional, but also of European importance, the Russian foreign minister stressed. He expressed readiness to create all the necessary conditions to the Commissioner of the Council for assessing the situation with human rights and the rights of the minorities in Russia, and to invite the Commissioner and his representatives to the forthcoming parliamentary elections in Russia as observers.

Kozyrev urged to look for more flexible and original forms of economic cooperation within the framework of the region. Although the working bodies of the Council stepped up their activities, many promising projects remain on paper or are not implemented in full volume. These include such projects as the Via Baltic highway, the UNIDO [UN Industrial Development Organization] plan for the development of industry in the Kaliningrad Region, and the creation of the Baltic energy network, which are important for the whole region. Potentialities of direct ties on the level of border areas and local government bodies are far from being exhausted. The fact that heads of local administrations of St. Petersburg, of the Leningrad and Kaliningrad Regions were included in the Russian delegation at the session, shows that Russia is attaching much importance to those ties.

Cooperation between border areas, along with joint efforts within the framework of the anti-crime struggle, became one of the main topics for discussion at the session today. Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski pointed in his report to the great importance of ties between border areas for the development of relations between countries of the region. He is concluding a one-year term of chairmanship of Poland in the Council. He stressed that the Council could become an important element of the process of the expansion of the European Union and the admission of new member countries to it.

Representatives of Sweden, who is going to take over the chairmanship in the Council, and Polish representatives came up with the initiative to convene next year a conference of heads of state and government of the region. Participants in the session voted for the admission of Iceland to the Council, in which it will become the 11th member.

Kozyrev Cited on Chechen Radio

LD1905164595 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1500 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] There is no tension between Poland and Russia, the Russian foreign minister thinks. Andrey Kozyrev and nine other foreign ministers took part in the Council of the Baltic Sea States in Gdansk.

[Unidentified reporter] Kozyrev said that the Polish and Russian authorities are continuously talking. The minister is of the opinion that there is no longer a problem over the Chechen Radio Free Caucasus, which was to have been opened in Krakow. Kozyrev cited a statement by Lech Walesa who is supposed to have said that the setting up of such a radio station in Poland is impossible. [passage omitted]

Meets Polish Foreign Minister

LD1905203295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1947 GMT 19 May 95

[By Dmitriy Gorokhov, Aleksandr Potemkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Gdansk, May 19 (ITAR-TASS) — Interaction of Baltic Sea states should be a model of cooperation for the whole Europe, Polish President Lech Walesa said here today when receiving Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and heads of other delegations that attended a regular session of the Council of Baltic Sea States.

The Baltic region is a region of common problems and common opportunities, said the president. The regional states should progress along the path of confidence and cooperation in order to use the potential of the 70 million-strong region with a high industrial and cultural level. An important step in this respect may be a conference of Baltic Sea government heads to be held on decision of the Council of Baltic Sea States.

Working negotiations between Kozyrev and his Polish counterpart Wladyslaw Bartoszewski were held in Gdansk tonight to discuss a broad range of bilateral relations.

Comments on Talks With Walesa

LD1905202595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2008 GMT 19 May 95

[By Dmitriy Gorokhov, Aleksandr Potemkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GDANSK, May 19 (Itar-Tass) — A meeting of Polish President Lech Walesa and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev was held here today to discuss building of a new and well-balanced Europe and bilateral economic cooperation.

The Russian minister told correspondents about the meeting upon the completion of working negotiations with Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski held before the departure of the Russian delegation from Gdansk. Kozyrev is currently in Poland to attend a regular session of the Council of Baltic Sea States.

"We must find a formula of common security in Europe. Today we are able to organize such a dialogue to include no suspicion," said Kozyrev. His opinion is shared by Bartoszewski. He said this meeting is the beginning of an intensive professional dialogue between the Russian and Polish foreign ministries to be continued in the near future.

In the words of Kozyrev, the meeting with Lech Walesa and the foreign minister were friendly and business-like. The Polish President confirmed that the Polish law excludes the creation of a radio station with a nature and range of the Free Caucasus station which is planned to be open in Krakow by representatives of the so-called Chechen information center.

Kozyrev, Germany's Kinkel Hold Talks

LD1905193295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1917 GMT 19 May 95

[By Dmitriy Gorokhov, Aleksandr Potemkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GDANSK, May 19 (Itar-Tass) — A meeting of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and his German counterpart Klaus Kinkel was held here today to discuss a new security and partnership architecture in Europe.

The ministers visited Gdansk to attend a regular session of the Council of Baltic Sea States.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Quoted

LD2105103295 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 21 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Cooperation between the states of the Baltic Sea is expanding and strengthening: Mutual confidence has emerged and concrete cooperation has started. These processes are positive and aimed at maintaining stability in the region, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys told an ELTA correspondent in Warsaw, commenting on the Conference of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, which took place in the Polish port city of Gdansk.

According to the minister, cooperation among the Baltic Sea states includes various levels: from cabinets to local municipalities. [passage omitted]

Defense ministers of the Baltic states and the Nordic countries will hold their second meeting on 22 and 23 May on the island of Bornholm in the Baltic Sea. Apart from other matters, the possibility to expand cooperation between the Baltic and Nordic countries in all areas of military relations will be discussed. The ministers are expected to reach agreement on coordination of individual assistance to the Baltic countries by Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The ministers of the Nordic countries will also discuss the possibility of supporting the Baltic peacekeeping battalion.

Lithuanian National Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius, Estonian Defense Minister Andrus Oovel, and Maris Gailis, Latvian prime minister and minister of defense are expected to take part in the meeting.

Foreign Ministers Urge 'More Action'

WS2205103795 Tallinn BNS in English
1940 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Gdansk, Poland, May 20, BNS — Foreign ministers of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, gathered in the Polish port city of Gdansk for their fourth annual meeting, agreed that the activity of the body needs to be concretized and that there should be less talk and more action.

"Many projects remain on paper as before or are not fully implemented," Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev told the meeting. Cooperation of the countries bordering on the Baltic Sea must become much more effective, he said.

The Russian foreign minister was the most critical of the council's activity among the participants. "Despite the apparent activization of working organs of the council and talks about cooperation, there is unfortunately more of this than of actual cooperation itself," REUTERS quoted Kozyrev as saying.

He cited the slow-moving Via Baltica highway project for a route with easy border crossings linking Finland, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Russia, and Poland.

Meanwhile, Kozyrev underscored that the council's activity needs strong support in the light of its part in Europe's new security structure.

The foreign ministers of the three Baltic states emphasized that the council plays an important role in achieving the goals of their countries, providing security guarantees, and developing regional cooperation. "Regional cooperation is, after all, much more than a cliche, especially considering the eastward expansion of the European Union," Estonian Foreign Minister Riivo Sinijarv stated.

Sinijarv cited several projects being implemented thanks to cooperation with the council. He named the activity of a nuclear safety working group in solving the problems of the former Russian nuclear submarine training center of Paldiski as an "excellent example of international cooperation." The minister also mentioned successful collaboration in developing the economic potential of the states bordering on the Baltic Sea, as a result of which the world has come to view the Baltic states as a quickly developing business region.

The Council of the Baltic Sea States was founded in 1992 and it includes Finland, Germany, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Sweden, and Norway. At Friday's meeting the group decided to admit Iceland, which like Norway has close ties with the Baltic Sea states.

Poland, which held the council's rotating presidency over the past year, handed Friday over to Sweden. The new chair plans to organize next year a meeting of prime ministers of the member countries. Sweden pledged to pay special attention to environmental protection and reducing pollution.

Agenda for CIS Leaders' Minsk Meeting Outlined

MM1905145195 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 95 p 1

[Report by Vitaliy Strugovets: "CIS Leaders' Minsk Meeting: Collective Security on the Agenda"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The rumors of a possible postponement of the Minsk meeting of CIS state and government heads were clearly an exaggeration. The summit will take place, as planned, on 26 May. As was confirmed on 17 May in Moscow by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Commonwealth Council of Heads of State, and CIS executive secretary Ivan Korotchenya.

There will be eight items on the summit agenda. But attention will be focused on problems of collective security, the blueprint for which was signed in Almaty. It is understandable that this topic should attract such close attention: The territory of the CIS is currently among the most explosive in the world. Conflicts in the Transcaucasus and Tajikistan, in southern Russia and in the Dniester Region have graphically demonstrated that it is impossible to address economic, cultural, and any other state development without halting the bloodshed. Moreover, gunfire and explosions result in refugees, a stream of weapons, and rampant crime in all of the Commonwealth states.

The heads of state will also be asked to sign the blueprint for a treaty on the protection of CIS states' borders with states that are not members of the Commonwealth. The idea behind the treaty is to ensure the protection of CIS external borders through the concerted efforts of all states. Remember that the work on this document was a difficult process. The reactions of the leaderships of Ukraine, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan varied, as KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported. There is no guarantee that all the CIS states will sign the document in Minsk. But the main think, Ivan Korotchenya stressed in conversation with journalists, is that the treaty should "go through."

Two summit items are directly linked to the situation in Tajikistan. The heads of state will examine the problem of extending the stay of the Collective Peacemaking Forces in the region and of their commander, and also the comprehensive plan for a settlement of the situation in the Tajik-Afghan border. In connection with the expiry of the mandate of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Abhazia they will examine a proposal on a possible extension of the Force's stay there. These three questions have already been discussed by the councils of defense and foreign ministers of the CIS states and there were no objections. Which cannot be said about the problems of financing and implementing the provisions of the Collective Security Blueprint. At the Almaty summit in February these questions were postponed until the Minsk meeting.

Other problems the Commonwealth leaders will be discussing include questions of the creation of an Interstate Currency Committee, a CIS Convention on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, a Convention on an Interparliamentary Assembly, and the procedure for awarding citizens of Commonwealth countries the Zhukov medal. The questions that were proposed envisage the stage-by-stage formation of a payments union to develop the Treaty on Economic Union, the single customs area, and a common market for goods, services, capital, and manpower. In short, the meeting is expected to be a busy one. Nonetheless there is also provision for bilateral conversations in Minsk between heads of state, the central one of which will certainly be the meeting between the presidents of Russia and Belarus. According to Ivan Korotchenya, a document may be signed then which will create an "entirely different basis" for future integration between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. It is not inconceivable that Kazakhstan will also endorse this document, which might be the prologue to a European-Asian Union.

Minsk OSCE Group Discusses Karabakh Situation

LD2005173095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1651 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 20 (Interfax) — The participants in the two-day consultations between the delegations of the states participating in the Minsk OSCE group, which were closed in Moscow Friday [19 May], stated that the ceasefire agreement had been observed in the zone of the Karabakh conflict for over a year. They said in the statement that this became possible "due to the conflicting parties' restraint".

The participants in the conference spoke against possible renewal of military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh, and urged "to use comprehensive mechanisms for direct contacts between the conflicting parties for regulating possible incidents. The Minsk group welcomed the talks on the political agreement to end the military conflict renewed without preconditions and the constructive atmosphere at the talks".

The delegations urged the acting OSCE chairman to appoint and send his envoy to the region.

The co-chairmen of the Minsk conference decided to hold the next round of talks in Helsinki, starting from June 15, 1995.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 20 May

LD2005071195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0508 GMT 20 May 95

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW May 20 Tass — While the general elections are approaching, Russian journalists pay growing attention to maneuvering of political forces to organise various election movements.

In this connection, the PRAVDA newspaper carries today an interview with State Duma (Russian parliament lower house) speaker Ivan Rybkin, reporting particulars about the establishment of an election bloc. Rybkin ducked the question whether he will head the new association.

"I think that the bloc will decide who will be its leader," the speaker noted, also refraining from direct confirmation of recent information given by the leader of the Agrarian Party Duma group that Rybkin had already made his final choice and would run during the election campaign together with the Agrarian Party.

Asked about his personal intentions, Rybkin replied that "the election bloc Agrarian Party of Russia has the right to live, since it showed its high efficiency. It should exist." The speaker cautiously noted at the same time that the fate of the emerging inter-party election bloc which, according to his information, will be joined by 25 mass and political associations and parties, "will be decided by its founding conference", "about which it is too early to speak".

In this connection, the NAZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper runs a front-page article sarcastically entitled "Second 'party of power' still missing. There is much fuss in left-wing centre but without Ivan Rybkin".

The ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI newspaper prints polemical notes about activities of another Agrarian Party member, Agriculture Minister Aleksandr Nazarchuk. The daily censures bloated financial claims by the minister.

"It was noticed long ago," the newspaper writes, "as soon as the agro-industrial complex receives money from the budget, prices of industries producing resources for it immediately rise. What flows along the peasant's mastache, gets into somebody elses' mouths."

Speaker of the Federal Council (Russian parliament upper chamber) Vladimir Shumeyko expressed his ideas about military service in an interview with the army newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. "The army is a school which should be attended by every man," he told the daily. The speaker sceptically referred to the idea of developing Russian partnership with NATO. Turning to his own election plans, Shumeyko said that he will not run for the lower house. Neither will he take efforts to collect one million signatures to join the future presidential race.

Today's IZVESTIYA newspaper opens a peephole for its readers on "Kremlin secrets", describing how "the president restored the rights of the press service, thereby, showing his place to his security chief".

The point in question is Boris Yeltsin's decree of May 18 on forming a presidential press service with the rights of an administration, which, in IZVESTIYA's opinion, helped to avoid a scandal inside the President's office, that was brewing over the past few months.

The newspaper states that the signing of the decree, the draft of which was compiled by recently appointed presidential press-secretary S. Medvedev, means, in actual fact, separation from a direct contact with journalists of S. Nosovets, the head of the earlier established information administration of the president's office.

According to IZVESTIYA, the security chief, "powerful general" A. Korzhakov, helped Nosovets to take this post.

Another article in IZVESTIYA entitled "Very expensive comrades" has something in common with the above topic. It divulges cherished secrets of present-day Moscow civil servants.

The newspaper gives a very disquieting forecast: "In the next few years, Russia will increasingly suffer from problems connected with the bloated, corrupt and inefficient state apparatus".

The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper invites its readers to participate in an unprecedented telephone talk right with 20 its reporters. The topic of its three-hour dialogue is the coming 70th anniversary of the popular daily.

The TRUD newspaper writes about another salient anniversary: the birth of prominent human rights activist Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov, which is marked on May 21. The daily features some secret materials showing how "competent organs" tried to prevent the international public from celebrating the 60th birthday of the world-famous figure in 1981.

Baltic State Concerns, 'Feliks' Comments

954F0074A Moscow ZAVTRA in Russian Apr 95 No 17, (Signed to Press 25 Apr 95) pp 1, 4

[Unattributed article: "Will Russian Troops Enter the Baltic Region?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The article published here appeared in the ZAVTRA editorial offices in the traditional way—by fax, for, as is frequently the case, the source did not wish to disclose his name. Most likely the author of the article is cooperating with the analytical services of one of the power structures or is working with the political or economic intelligence of one of the large commercial corporations. The Baltic region, which is the particular focus of this discussion, is causing growing instability on the northwestern borders of Russia, is becoming a strategic base for NATO, and unbridled mafia activity, which is dangerous for Russia, is not abating. Moreover the anti-Russian thrust of the domestic and foreign policy of these aggressive dwarves is merged with the antinational policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and with the policy of Kozyrev, who has done everything possible to bolster the military and economic status of the Baltic Lilliputians. In the article entitled "Shumeyko, Yakubovskiy, and Weapons" we have already written about the criminal operations for the sale of Russian automatic weapons and combat ships to the Baltic countries. Next to the name of the notorious speaker of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation was the name of the former defense minister of Lithuania, Audrius Butkevicius, which comes up repeatedly in this article as well.**

Recently the Estonian president stated that for his country the war ended in 1994 with the departure of the Russian troops. Possibly he was wrong in making this statement—the war for him is not over yet.

Let me report to you that during the course of my visit to London I had a meeting with the former minister of defense of Lithuania, Audrius Butkevicius, during which he made the following statement:

Responding to a question on the situation in Lithuania, Mr. Butkevicius stated that he gave an extremely negative evaluation of Lithuania's current leadership headed by Mr. Brazauskas. In his words, the current republic leadership has no precise and clear policy, above all with respect to the Russian Federation and also in the area of economics and foreign policy. In Mr. Butkevicius' estimation, the current regime in Lithuania will not last more than two or three years and will be replaced by a government based on the current opposition. In Mr. Butkevicius' opinion, for Russia it would be preferable to deal with a government which in the eyes of the population of Lithuania is not burdened by the so-called "guilt-over-the-communist-past complex" and, consequently, would have a chance to implement the predicted policy and to maneuver widely in bilateral relations with Russia without fear of being accused of "betrayal."

On his own initiative Mr. Butkevicius told in detail about the way the political decision to arrest Comrades Burokiavicius and Yermolivicius on the territory of Belarus was perceived. In his words the operation was prepared for and conducted by workers of his ministry. By the same token, however, he himself (as was repeatedly emphasized in the conversation) was categorically against the arrest, fearing negative reaction from Belarus and Russia. At the same time Mr. Butkevicius and the chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Mr. Gylys, based on the objectives of the domestic political struggle in Lithuania, personally insisted on the arrest of Comrade Burokiavicius and Comrade Yermolivicius and, consequently, bears full responsibility for this action. In the words of Mr. Butkevicius, the former leader of Belarus, Mr. Shushkevich, was informed ahead of time of the intended arrest.

Responding to the corresponding statement, Mr. Butkevicius stated that the intelligence activity against Russia and Belarus from the territory of Lithuania involved gross violation of Russian and Belarusian legislation, and also that criminal activity against Russia and Belarus, conducted under the cover of intelligence activity, was being carried out with the complicity of Mr. Brazauskas and with the actual instigation of Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Vaitiekunas (who, in the words of Mr. Butkevicius, is corrupt) and the current leader of the Lithuanian special services, Mr. Jurgalis, (who, in Mr. Butkevicius' estimation, is incompetent). He limited his role in the organization of intelligence activity of the Department of Regional Protection under the Ministry of Defense of Lithuania to the gathering and analysis of information. Still, he admitted, however, that frequently military intelligence activity in Lithuania during the time he was leader of the military department got out of control and led to gross violation of Russian and Belarusian crime legislation.

Mr. Butkevicius responded to a question about the prospects for the development of the situation in Latvia and Estonia. In his opinion, in the context of the overall change in Russian policy in the so-called "near abroad" during 1996-1997, it is possible that Russian troops will be brought back into Latvian territory under the pretext of protecting the Russian-speaking population and preventing a possible civil war and ethnic purges, or a large number of volunteers could come from Russia in order to participate in the anticipated civil war on the side of the local Russian-speaking population. Moreover, because of the inequality of the forces of the sides, it is expected that the Latvian government forces would be defeated and, as a result, the Latvian armed formations and civilian refugees of Latvian nationality (numbering 500,000-1 million) would move to the territory of Lithuania.

In Lithuania, beginning at the end of 1992, on the personal initiative of Mr. Butkevicius, operational plans of the government and Defense Ministry were prepared, and they are periodically updated in case of such a development of the situation. These plans envision, in particular, the following:

Establishing strict control on the Lithuanian-Latvian border, disarming and interning all armed individuals who arrive on the territory of Lithuania from the direction of Latvia, and turning all confiscated weapons over to Russia (if Russia requires this).

Keeping internees and refugees distant from the Latvian-Lithuanian border, mainly in pioneer camps and recreational facilities in the central part of Latvia, maintaining the given category of individuals there, which, especially during the fall and winter period, will require material assistance from the UN, and subsequently organizing evacuation of the internees and Latvian refugees from Lithuania across the border to Poland and Sweden through the port of Klaipeda. Mr. Butkevicius especially emphasized that under no circumstances would Lithuania allow the creation of Latvian refugee bases on the territory of Lithuania or any other kind of anti-Russian actions on its territory.

Organizing of conflict-free movement of military units of the Russian army and combat equipment from the territory of Kaliningrad Oblast of Russia into Latvia. In Mr. Butkevicius' words, formally Lithuania will not give its consent to this and will protest negatively. But if the Russian troops conduct their relocation openly, Lithuania cannot and will not stand in the way. On the contrary, Lithuania will informally cooperate with us in this issue, for which it will request ahead of time information on the time and routes of our movements through its territory in order to prevent possible incidents.

In Mr. Butkevicius' opinion, within the same time periods as with Latvia it is also possible either to bring Russian troops into the territory of Estonia in the section from Narva to Kohtla-Jarve or to Tallinn, inclusive, or to bring volunteers from Russia into this region to participate in the anticipated civil war on the side of the Russian-speaking population. At the same time, because of the inequality of the forces of the two sides, it is expected that the Estonian armed formations and Estonian national refugees will depart from this region into the internal regions of Estonia. Some of the armed Estonians could then make attempts to attack Russian troops and also the formations of local Russians and volunteers from Russia, which would inevitably evoke retaliatory measures, as a result of which the flow of refugees of Estonian nationality (estimated at 900,000) would rush through the territory of Latvia into Lithuania. In Lithuania, in order to prevent such a possible situation with Estonian refugees, on the personal initiative of Mr. Butkevicius, plans have been developed by the government and the defense ministry in case the situation should develop according to this scenario. These plans envision, in particular, the dispatch, in coordination with Russia, into central Estonia of peace-keeping forces (desirably, also from Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) to prevent armed attacks of Estonians on Russian units, which, in Mr. Butkevicius' opinion, would make retaliatory measures of the Russian army and volunteers outside the northern part of Estonia superfluous. The Lithuanians will find the power for this. But they do not have, in Mr. Butkevicius' words, a sufficient quantity of light weapons and APC's which, in his words, could be provided by the Russian side for these purposes.

Similar sets of measures prepared by the Lithuanian leaders while Mr. Butkevicius was head of the military department certainly did not show his sympathies for Russia. Mr. Butkevicius frankly emphasized that these plans were conditioned by bare pragmatism and the fear of Russian actions directly against Lithuania. Moreover he expressed the conviction that with such a development of events, the West would not render any practical assistance and would confine itself merely to symbolic sanctions against the Russian Federation and the unleashing of another propaganda campaign in the world mass media.

I suggest continuing contacts with Mr. Butkevicius. He could also become an important source of information on drug operations, contraband operations with Russian raw material resources, operations with counterfeit currency, and connections between the Baltic mafia and special services of Western countries. I can also report to you that in London I had a meeting with an adviser to the president of Romania, Kornel Kodita [name as transliterated]. Certain interesting points were revealed during the course of this conversation.

Responding to a question about the Romanian view of the path to regulation of the situation surrounding Moldova, Mr. Kodita stated that people close to Mr. Iliescu, on the one hand, are disturbed by the development of the situation in the Republic of Moldova and, on the other, they link the future development of this situation to the development of the situation in Ukraine, particularly the future status of Odessa Oblast. In Mr. Iliescu's opinion (as presented by Mr. Kodita), the Republic of Moldova is an artificial state formation. But the unification of Moldova and Romania in the foreseeable future would be extremely undesirable for the Romanian side, mainly because of economic factors. For Romania the best version of a solution to the problem would be the preserve Moldova as an integrated independent state as a part of the CIS. Then Mr. Iliescu would agree that the Dniester region should be granted a special autonomous political and economic status as a part of Moldova along with guarantees that are convincing to the Dniester side that this special status would be preserved in the future. At the same time, Mr. Iliescu and his inner circle are alarmed to see the situation in Ukraine. In their opinion, the version according to which the Ukrainian economy collapses, the central state power in Kiev is degraded and, as a result, there is civil conflict within Ukraine with the prospect of armed intervention from Russia in the next two or three years is extremely likely. As a result of such a development of events, some of the territory of Ukraine, including Odessa Oblast, obviously, in one form or another could end up under Russian control. Consequently, the first territorial link would then be established between the territory under Russian control, on the one hand, and the Dniester region, on the other. In the conditions described, the population and the leaders of the Dniester region obviously would try to finally separate themselves from Moldova and join with Russia in one form or another. This, in turn, would lead to a sharp increase in the friction between Russia and Moldova and, consequently, between Russia and Romania. Moreover, such events would inevitably initiate a fierce political crisis within Romania and strengthen the position of Mr. Iliescu's opponents. In order to avoid such a development of events within Romania and in Russian-Romanian relations in the event that the situation in Ukraine were to develop within the framework of the scenario described, Mr. Iliescu and his inner circle think it would be expedient to reach an agreement with Russia beforehand concerning the possible division of Romania between the two countries. In their opinion, within the framework of such an agreement, the Dniester region should go to Russia while the rest of the Republic of Moldova should go to Romania. In the opinion of the Romanian side, if there were such an agreement between Russia and Romania and also if coordinated pressure were brought to bear on the Moldovan leaders Mr. Lucinschi and Mr. Snegur (whose position today, in Mr. Kodita's estimation, is extremely weak), on the one hand, and on the president of the Dniester region, Comrade Smirnov, on the other, the process of the division of Moldova between Russia and Romania could occur without a scandal (Mr. Kodita's expression) in keeping with the formal requirements of international law. Mr. Kodita announced the need to establish contacts for discussion of problems of the future status of Moldova between representatives of Mr. Iliescu and representatives of Russia (and not representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia but direct representatives of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and other power structures). At the same time, in Mr. Kodita's words, in the first stage such contacts must be informal in nature. Mr. Kodita stated that he has the authority to discuss the question of establishing such contacts. He did not mention the source of his authority, but he said that he had discussed this subject with Mr. Iliescu personally.

Responding to the question of the Romanian view of the situation in Yugoslavia and particularly the prospects for the continuation of the military and civilian transit from Russia to Serbia through the territory of Romania, Mr. Kodita stated that Mr. Iliescu and his inner circle do not support the position of the United States and the NATO countries on the Yugoslav question. But they are forced to officially comply with the declared international sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. At the same time Mr. Kodita thinks that if the Russian side were to make a confidential request to Mr. Iliescu to make it possible to continue military and civilian transit through Romanian territory of cargo for Serbia (after the expiration of the previous Russian-Romanian-Yugoslav informal agreement) and provides guarantees of secrecy of the continuation of such an operation, Mr. Iliescu would not object.

I request your instructions concerning continuation of contacts with Mr. Kodita.

Feliks research group commentary

Expansion of the NATO bloc to the east is inevitable, and it is planned in several stages. In the first stage (in two to three years) NATO will accept Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. In the second stage (roughly by the year 2000) it is planned to accept Romania and Bulgaria into NATO, and also, if possible, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In this same stage it is probable that Finland and Austria will also be included in NATO. Finally, in the third stage (approximately the year 2005) it cannot be ruled out that Ukraine will be accepted into NATO. The main initiator of the expansion of NATO to the east is the FRG (the decision to expand NATO was finally adopted after the completion of the withdrawal of our troops from the former GDR). Actually we are dealing with the restoration of German expansion to the east and southeast, which has been interrupted twice during this century, and this time so far is being realized mainly by political and economic methods under the American "nuclear umbrella." It is interesting that in the West it is precisely German politicians, for example, Volker Ruhe and Klaus Kinkel, who are the most brazen and unrestrained with respect to Russia.

Now many politicians of the West are assuring us that they do not intend to expand NATO to include the Baltics and Ukraine, just as they do not intend to station Western troops and nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe. But we must not believe them. After all, just a couple of months ago we were assured that NATO did not intend to expand at all, even to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. But today, according to our information, NATO is drawing up operational plans for deploying mobile forces in the Baltic region in the event of a conflict with Russia, and the idea of creating a 60,000-strong so-called "Baltic Corps" made up of troops from Poland, Denmark, and the FRG is being discussed.

Along with NATO's expansion there is Turkey's political penetration and the economic and intelligence penetration of the United States, Britain, and the FRG into Azerbaijan. This is the most appropriate base for further Turkish and Western expansion in the direction of Central Asia, the Volga region and the Northern Caucasus, taking advantage of the "Turkish" and "Islamic" factors.

Finally, the comprador model of structuring the economy imposed on Russia by the IMF (orientation toward exporting raw material and importing everything else, encouraging nonpayment by CIS countries of their debts to Russia for oil and gas, as well as encouragement of the flow of capital out of Russia to the West—up to $15-20 billion a year, parallel improvement of national industry, science, and agriculture) threatens to degrade the country's potential and eliminate the unified domestic market, which could become the basis for regional separatism, the falling away from Moscow of raw material and maritime regions, and the shrinking of the country to the borders of the 14th and 15th centuries.

NATO's expansion to the east, the independent activity of Turkey and the oil companies of the West in Baku, and the economic model imposed on Russia by the IMF are links in a single chain, creeping expansion, whose goal is to eliminate Russia as a state and turn its territory into an actual raw material colony of the West and the "world's garbage dump."

The strategy for our survival under these conditions must be as follows:

A change in the economic policy; rejection of cooperation with the IMF; the imposition of elementary order in foreign trade, in the banking system, and in export branches of the economy (oil, gas, aluminum, etc.) even within the bounds of existing legislation, which will make it possible to reduce the outflow of capital abroad and thus increase state investments in conversion of the military-industrial complex and restructuring of industry; higher import tariffs for 15-25 years, that is until national industry and the agricultural complex are able relatively painlessly to withstand competition from imported goods; extraordinary measures in fighting organized crime and expropriation of criminal money and property; and economic integration within the framework of the CIS.

Containment of the "Turkish" factor; refusal to allow a territorial connection between Turkey and the main part of the territory of Azerbaijan; fragmentation of Azerbaijan and purely nominal functions for the government in Baku; refusal to allow the implementation of the "Caspian Oil Contract" in ANY form for at least 15 years, that is, until Russia and the CIS are in a condition to independently, without the West, work the oil resources of the Caspian Sea.

Anticipatory strong resistance to NATO's expansion to the east. True, we are no longer in a position to do anything about Eastern Europe. But we absolutely must return to the Baltics. The pertains mainly to Estonia, Latvia, and the region of Klaipeda. We have the legal and moral grounds for this.

In the first place, illegal regimes exist in Estonia and Latvia, similar to those that existed previously in the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. In these ethnic republics (Latvia and Estonia) one of the ethnic groups has arbitrarily deprived the people of the other nationality of their civil rights and taken all power into their own hands. Under these conditions the part of the population that is discriminated against (so-called "noncitizens") has the right to create its own parallel structures of authority and power structures. In the event that force is used against them, they have the right to appeal to Russia for armed support. As for Lithuania, it does not recognize the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact." Consequently, Russia and Belarus have the right to take back Klaipeda and Vilenskiy Kray.

In the second place the Baltic region is a criminal zone which survives exclusively on contraband and is controlled by the mafia. Taking into account the precedent with the American invasion of Panama and the arrest of General Noriega, Russia also has the right to arrest and submit to a Russian trial such figures as R. Vaitiekunas, P. Gylys, V. Chavers, M. Gaylis, M. Laar

(Lesnik), J. Toomepuu (Yura), A. Einseln (Sasha), and others.

Our return to Estonia and Latvia must be accompanied by the deportation to the West of individuals who have sullied themselves by participating in the discrimination against people of one nationality and who do not wish to live in republics where human rights do not depend on nationality.

As for the reaction from the West, as our probes have shown, if we are resolute, firm, and quick, nobody will fight with us over the Baltics. The economic sanctions will not have the character of a total trade blockade. The FRG, France, Italy, Finland, Greece, and Eastern Europe will continue to buy our raw material resources, which will give us means for converting the military-industrial complex and reindustrializing the country. Finally, we have arguments which are convincing to the West, such as the missile-nuclear potential and the threat of spreading throughout the world weapons of mass destruction which, with skillful tactics, could play the role of a trading card when bargaining with the West.

We will have to solve the problem of Ukraine differently from the way we handle the Baltic region. Analysis shows that the results of Kuchma's "reforms" will be even worse than those of Gaydar's "reforms" in Russia. In the first place, as distinct from Russia, Ukraine has no oil or gas. In the second place, the West cannot support Ukraine in case anything happens. This fundamentally distinguishes the prospects for the development of Ukraine from the development of the Baltic region: The latter, because of the small population, could in an extreme case be subsidized by the West—within the limits of $3-5 billion per year. This is not enough for Ukraine, but it is sufficient for the Baltic region.

On the whole, it should be expected that within three to five years the economy of Ukraine will collapse, the republic will fall apart, and a large part of it, including Kiev, will voluntarily rejoin Russia. Understanding this, the nationalists are hastening to provoke conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The occasion is the Crimea. The goal is to set the two peoples against one another, to sow hatred between them as the Germans managed to do in Yugoslavia with respect to the Serbs and Croats, and thus make any reunification in the future impossible.

The West supports these plans of the nationalists and even encourages them. In general the "cherished dream" of the West is to provoke a sharp deterioration of relations between Russia and such countries as China, Iran, and Ukraine, and also to create strong and constant pressure on the periphery of the post-Soviet space in the Tajik-Afghan and Asia Minor zones. And we, on the one hand, must be resolute in the Baltic and Caspian regions and on the Tajik-Afghan border, but on the other hand, we must be extremely cautious in reacting to provocations from nationalists in Crimea, the more so since the current political elite of Crimea also have a comprador orientation and are totally corrupt.

If we act correctly, it is quite feasible that in five or six years the USSR can be restored, including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, a large part of Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, a large part of Lithuania, the Dniester region, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. And our relations with the Transcaucasus and Central Asia could be arranged according to the model of relations that existed within the framework of the CEMA, and with Moldova, Lithuania, and Western Ukraine—according to the model of Soviet-Finnish relations of the period of 1944-1991.

Finally, the execution of operations in the Baltic region and the associated deterioration of relations with the West would make it possible to significantly simplify the procedures for eliminating the "democratic agitation and propaganda" and remove from power and ownership the "democrats" and the compradors.

Speaking of preparations for the forthcoming military operation in the Baltic region, in this stage we should switch from the initiating activity of certain structures within the army and the former KGB (which have already done all the preparatory work possible in their position) to implementing a goal-directed and coordinated state policy. We must take into account all the positive and negative experience of the Chechen campaign and also the conflicts in the Dniester region, Tajikistan, Abkhazia, Ossetia, Karabakh, and Yugoslavia.

Today it is critically necessary to adopt a principled political decision about conducting a military operation in the Baltic region at the level of the Ministry of Defense and other power structures. This should be followed by concrete measures of a military-intelligence, diplomatic, and propagandistic nature. The beginning of the implementation of the measures in the first stage could be the activity for giving concrete content to the recent statement of P.S. Grachev (during his meeting with W. Perry) to the effect that in response to the expansion of the NATO bloc, Russia as a countermeasure would "create a powerful grouping of troops in the Western area."

Plans for Second Contract With Iran Revealed

LD2205115895 Moscow INTERFAX in English
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[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 22 (Interfax) — The Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov has announced that at the end of this year his ministry plans to sign a new contract with Iran on the construction of a research light water nuclear reactor with a capacity of 40 megawatts.

He told Interfax that Moscow does not intend to curtail its cooperation with Iran in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. On the contrary, it will strictly observe its earlier agreements with Tehran and its international commitments.

The minister said that in the framework of the Iranian scientific program Western countries have built two 10 megawatt reactors in Iran making isotopes. "While the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry is criticized today for wanting to invite 20-40 experts from Iran for training in the sphere of nuclear energy, thousands of Iranians are now studying the field in the USA and Western Europe," Mikhaylov stressed. He added that for the training in Russia Iranian scientists will have to pay according to world prices. The training agreement is not final, though.

Mikhaylov said that the Iranian parliament has earmarked $700 million for the construction of the first power unit in Bushehr built with Russian technical assistance. "I am sure that Iranians will accurately pay for our services because it is a matter of prestige for them," the official remarked.

He stressed that in nuclear cooperation with Iran Russia has not gone beyond the framework of bilateral agreements or international commitments. On Washington's fears about the nuclear deal with Tehran, the Minister said that the technical aspects of the deal will be discussed at the next session of the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission in Moscow in the summer. "Americans might have technical suggestions to make, for instance on strengthening control by Russia as well as the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. We are always ready to accept the suggestions that can strengthen international nuclear security," the minister said.

Mikhaylov announced that Moscow has not decided about delivering to Iran centrifuges for enriching fuel for nuclear power stations, even though Tehran has been raising the question. According to the minister, the centrifuges have nothing to do with nuclear weapons and such countries as Germany and Japan have them.

U.S. Said Employing Double Standard on Iran

MM1905150595 Moscow TRUD in Russian
19 May 95 p 7

["Panorama of the Week" review by Erik Alekseyev: "No Unanimity on Nuclear Problems. Senator Dole Wants To Put Pressure on Russia. More Bombing and Shooting in Bosnia, Croatia Is Not Cleansing Captured 'Demarcation Zones'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] You can agree or disagree that the United States often pursues a policy of "double standards," but here is a specific example. Neither before the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] conference nor at it did Washington at any time give its assessment of Israel's nuclear policy, although it is clearly no accident that the latter flatly refuses to join the NPT and thereby to be subject to IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] control. At the same time the United States has assailed Iran and Russia for their cooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. Iran has confirmed its participation in the NPT and thereby its liability to IAEA control.

This question, as is known, was discussed at the recent meeting between the Russian and U.S. Presidents. This is what Deputy Secretary of State S. Talbott, who accompanied Clinton on his trip to Moscow, had to say on the subject: "We have not yet reached a uniform opinion as to whether the deliveries of Russian reactors will facilitate Iran's implementation of a nuclear weapons program, therefore discussion of this question will be continued."

While Talbott is still talking about a continuation of the discussion, Robert Dole, influential leader of the Republican majority in the Senate, has adopted a very resolute stance. He stated: "It is clear that after the failure of the (Clinton-Yeltsin) summit Congress is reassessing relations with Russia. Our assessment will include consideration of all U.S. aid programs to Russia and options for action to prevent Iran's acquisition of nuclear technology."

Here there is no question of any discussion. These are direct threats, direct pressure.

It should not be thought that Russia is alone in digging its heels in over its position on cooperation with Iran. Even in the United States itself Washington's anti-Iranian position is viewed positively by far from everybody. The WASHINGTON TIMES, for example, calls it a "miscalculation." In its opinion this is because U.S. accusations over Iran's development of atomic weapons are based more on "negative condemnation" regarding its intentions than "hard evidence." That is why Washington has "little chance" of getting its allies to join the "crusade" against Tehran. They are showing a "clear unwillingness" to get involved in the U.S. campaign to put pressure on Russia and China to refuse to export equipment for nuclear electric power stations. The newspaper adds that implementation of the agreements between Russia and Iran could earn Russia $8 billion. [passage omitted]

Paper Decries Yielding to U.S. Pressure on Iran

MK2005124095 Moscow ZAVTRA in Russian No. 20, May 95 (Signed to press 16 May) p 2

[Report by V. Solokhin under "Commentary 1" rubric: "A Narrow Corridor of Opportunities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian-Iranian relations are one of the most serious questions of world politics. Moreover, this matter is long on historical associations. It is enough to recall the Griboyedov case [in which the famous 19th-century diplomat was assassinated]. It is critical to understand that never in the history of Russian-Iranian relations did they turn into a bargaining chip. Russia has never used Iran as a chip in any minor or frivolous scheme. It saved it, as it were, as a last resort. It was its ultimate geopolitical argument. When it was chucked out of Europe for the umpteenth time, Russia, after careful consideration and having weighed up all the losses and acquisitions, would begin cautiously and correctly to pursue its so-called "shift toward Central Asia."

This must be the first time now that we are seeing an attempt to use the Iranian subject in a petty game, first threatening the West with it, and then, using current jargon, "ditching" Iran, stating that there will be no serious relations with it while what has happened is just an accident, a trifle — nothing more. Iran, however, is not a trifle that can forgive such a trick with regard to itself. What will be the price of such a blatant blackmail scheme for Russia? Let us weigh up what is being bet on in the game, with whose help Russia apparently intends to blackmail Bill Clinton a little. At stake are the interests of one of the key sectors of our military industrial complex. This year the defense sectors have not as yet received a single ruble and a number of military industrial complex enterprises have had to send their workers on forced leave. True, some talk about the weakness of Russia which purportedly cannot but yield to U.S. pressure. They must be confusing the country's objective weakness (which is there, to be sure) with the cowardice and meanness of some individuals playing their own petty games. But a coward cannot "play Iran." [allusion to children's song: "Hockey is played by real men. A coward does not play hockey"] This is first. As for weakness, let us recall the Rapallo Accords and the agreements signed in pursuit of them! They enabled a vanquished, weak Germany to preserve its high-tech sectors (and, most important, engineering cadres for them!), by helping to create a military industrial complex for a weak Soviet Russia. Even if assuming that today our country is, economically speaking, in the position of Weimar Germany, even then it must try not to miss a single chance to maintain its high technology. And in effect it is hardly weaker than a country that lost a war; a country whose leadership signed an unconditional capitulation literally in an iron cage. Or are we, too, in an "iron cage"? And are simply not aware of this?

After three years of empty promises from the West it is time to understand that there will be no new "Marshall plan" for Russia. Neither does anybody expect us in NATO, as can be seen from Brussels' reaction to Clinton's proposal about a purely abstract possibility of Russia's joining NATO. A supposition which the U.S. President made in his latter to Yeltsin. It was enough to broach this subject — and all hell broke loose! What an uproar was raised! And a really shattering argument was found! Apparently Europe and its beloved creation — NATO — cannot afford, on account of a certain Russia, to build a common border between NATO and China. How is that! Will this noise not teach anything either? The message, as they say, could not be clearer than this.

But if Russia is being shown the door so obviously, the analogy with the Rapallo Treaty becomes increasingly more relevant. Iran has always been of tremendous importance to Russia, and given that Russia has in effect been driven away from Europe and a Turkic bloc (whose common border with China does not seem to frighten anybody!) is being hastily knocked together, the importance of Iran to Russia grows. Incidentally, the analogy with the Rapallo Accords is far from formal.

Just like Russia in the twenties, Iran is an object of international isolation. Therefore it is a market for our high technology and a job opportunity for our specialists. This is also a common position on the question of using the Caspian shelf from which Russia is consistently being crowded out. To undermine one's credibility with such a partner is not only to "lose face," not only to deprive oneself of far-reaching economic opportunities, but also to worsen Russia's already difficult relations with the Islamic world.

Further on Defense Minister's Visit to ROK

Meets With ROK Counterpart

LD1905195895 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in English 1500 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has suggested that Russia, the United

States, and China join efforts to secure peace on the Korean peninsula. Speaking in Seoul while meeting his South Korean counterpart, Yi Yang-ho, Mr. Grachev said this would help iron out differences over the implementation of a nuclear security agreement between the United States and North Korea. He confirmed Russia's readiness to supply North Korea with light-water reactors that are incapable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. A South Korean military official quoted General Grachev as saying that peace guarantees issued jointly by the above nuclear powers would prompt North Korea to review talks with South Korea.

Signs Military Memorandum

LD1905195095 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A memorandum of mutual understanding between the Defense Ministries of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea on military contacts was signed in Seoul today by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Yi Yang-ho, his South Korean counterpart. The document provides for bilateral exchange of military delegations. The Russian defense minister is in Seoul on a three-day official visit.

Meets ROK President, Foreign Minister

LD2005064695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0633 GMT 20 May 95

[By Nikolay Geronin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SEOUL May 20 (Itar-Tass) — Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, who is staying in Seoul on an official visit, was received by South Korean President Kim Yong-sam today. The sides had a talk on problems connecteeed with the situation in the Korean peninsula and other issues of mutual interest.

Kim Yong-sam highly appraised Russia's efforts aimed at promoting peace and stability in the Korean peninsula. The South Korean leader stressed that Moscow and Seoul must closely cooperate in the interests of lasting peace in the region.

The South Korean president presented the Order for services in national defence to the Russian defence minister.

On the same day Pavel Grachev met South Korean Foreign Minister Kong No-myong.

Talks With Russian Journalists

LD2005141895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1250 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SEOUL, May 20 (Interfax) — Russia stands for developing military-technical cooperation with South Korea, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev told a group of Russian journalists in Seoul on Saturday.

As he said, Moscow stands for cooperating in this area on the basis of supplying Seoul with large consignments of arms and military equipment made by Russian plants.

Russia does not reject South Korea's suggestion that their military-technical ties should be based on licensing Russian military products and building them in South Korea, Grachev said. Nevertheless he noted that so far Moscow and Seoul have not worked out a consensus on this issue.

According to Grachev, the draft agreement on military-technical cooperation he and his South Korean counterpart will initial in Seoul on Sunday will stimulate the development of bilateral ties in the military area. "The document itself will be signed on the highest government level," he explained.

As Grachev said, Moscow has already begun to supply Seoul with arms and military equipment in partial payment of the debt owed by the former USSR. Four military transport helicopters have already been delivered to South Korea. "But this is too little as compared with what we wish to have," he said.

In answer to Interfax's questions Grachev said that the document on military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Seoul is not likely to complicate Russia's relations with North Korea. "We can have equitable relations with any state willing to cooperate with us without detriment to any third country," he noted.

The treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid signed in 1961 between the former USSR and North Korea is "outdated", Grachev said. That is why the coming August (Interfax's note: a year before it expires) Russia will notify the other side of its decision, he said.

Russia's defense minister came to Seoul for an official visit. On Friday and Saturday he conferred with President Kim Yong-sam and with South Korea's foreign and defense ministers. On Sunday he will leave for Moscow.

Stands Opposed to NATO Expansion

LD2005151295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1445 GMT 20 May 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Geronin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Seoul, 20 May — "I will oppose NATO expansion as long as I am defense minister," Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said today in conversation with Russian journalists in Seoul where he is on an official visit. "NATO is a military and political union and relies first on force."

"If Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not included in NATO, some other organization is needed that can consolidate, unite, and direct common efforts aimed at maintaining security," Pavel Grachev said. In his opinion, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is one such body.

Cited on Plans for Treaty With DPRK

LD2005152095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1508 GMT 20 May 95

[By Nikolay Geronin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SEOUL, May 20 (Itar-Tass) — The Russian side will inform North Korea of its decision on the fate of the Moscow-Pyongyang Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in the next two or three months, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev said here today.

The document was signed by the Soviet Union and North Korea in 1961 to include a possibility of military mutual assistance and involvement in combat operations of one of the sides in case of a conflict.

"The current Moscow stand on the issue is the following: we are giving the treaty a comprehensive consideration and analysis. We have repeatedly stated at the government level that some provisions of the treaty have become outdated. Thus, the Russian side will inform its partner in the treaty before August or in August 1995, a year before the treaty expires," Grachev told Itar-Tass.

"All the South Korean leaders I have met in Seoul, from the Defence Minister to the President, started the conversation with the situation on the Korean peninsula, relations between North and South Koreas and the Moscow-Pyongyang Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1961," said Grachev.

The minister is staying in South Korea on an official visit.

Quoted on Regional Security System

LD2005152595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1510 GMT 20 May 95

[By Nikolay Geronin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SEOUL, May 20 (Itar-Tass) — Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, currently here on an official visit, told Russian correspondents today they have raised the question of a regional security system in North-Eastern Asia and, especially, a sub-regional system at the Seoul negotiations.

In the words of the minister, the sub-regional system could involve Russia, China, Japan, North and South Koreas and the United States. At first, the South Korean side took this idea with caution, but then South Korean Defence Minister Yi Yang-ho told Grachev that President Kim Yong-sam instructed him to consider this proposal.

It is not a union which is meant but a consultative group, noted Grachev. This group could elaborate recommendations on solution of problems if any, and decisions would be taken by state heads.

Speaking of the delivery of Russian materiel and equipment to South Korea, the Defence Minister noted the different approaches of the sides to the issue. Seoul would like to base these relations on licensing, supplies of spares and production of Russian-designed materiel at South Korean plants. Moscow does not reject such cooperation forms but stands for larger military-technical relations and the delivery of materiel made in Russia.

Denies Plan To Meet Chechen General

LD2005174595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1645 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SEOUL, May 20 (Interfax) — Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev denied on Saturday he would meet chief of the Chechen general military staff Aslan Maskhadov on May 22.

Maskhadov said earlier this week that such a meeting was possible

But Grachev, talking to Interfax in Seoul, where he is on a visit, did not exclude the possibility of a meeting between him and top Chechen commanders to negotiate peace. But such talks were impossible without Russian President Boris Yeltsin's consent, he stressed.

Another condition for such a meeting was "a complete cease-fire, capitulation and the surrender of arms," which is demanded by the Russian leadership. As a preliminary condition, the rebels must recognize

Chechnya to be part of the Russian Federation, the minister added.

During his visit to Seoul, Grachev signed an agreement in which Russia and South Korea pledge not to pass classified information on their military cooperation to any third country.

The Russian minister also signed a memorandum setting out plans for military contacts between the two nations in 1996-97. Among other things, there are to be exchanges of military delegations and visits by warships to each other's ports.

On Sunday, Grachev and the South Korean defense minister are expected to initial an accord on military technological cooperation.

Initials Military Cooperation Pact

LD2105054595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0500 GMT 21 May 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Geronin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Seoul, 21 May—Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Yi Yang-ho, head of the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Korea, have today initialled an agreement on military-technical cooperation. Also today, the Russian military delegation led by Grachev departed from Seoul upon completion of its three-day official visit.

"Our approach to the problem of security in northeast Asia and the Asian-Pacific region is based on the following fundamental principles: ironing out political disagreements by way of negotiations; maintenance of regular contacts on questions of regional security; and allowing the use of force only for self- defense purposes," Grachev pointed out in an exclusive interview with an ITAR-TASS correspondent.

In our opinion, the first stage in the process of setting up a collective security system in northeast Asia could benefit from trust-building measures in the military sphere, the Russian defense minister noted. At the same time, we can say unequivocally that the priority at present is being given to the development of bilateral relations between the states in this region. We are confident that the future belongs to a collective security system to be set up in northeast Asia and the Asian-Pacific region as a whole.

"I believe that our future relations with the Republic of Korea must cover a wider scope of bilateral cooperation," Grachev continued. "It is necessary in the nearest possible time to discuss on a wider scale not only the issues of military cooperation but cooperation in the defense industry sphere and research and technology as well," Grachev added.

Considering the problem of nuclear nonproliferation in the Korean peninsula, Grachev said: "We want this region to be non-nuclear. We support the firm and coordinated line adopted by the world community aimed at Pyongyang's unconditional observance of the guarantee agreement signed with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]."

The U.S.-Korean framework agreement signed in Geneva on 21 October 1994 that envisages the replacement of graphite nuclear reactors with light water ones is an important step on the way toward turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, the Russian defense minister noted.

"In its turn, Russia is prepared to participate jointly with other countries in the implementation of the project on building light water reactors in the DPRK," Grachev stressed. "At the same time, we believe that Pyongyang has a right to make a final choice of contractors."

To a question on the treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between Moscow and Pyongyang, Grachev replied that, as is known, the current five-year term expires in September 1996. "According to the procedure envisaged in the treaty, i.e. in September 1995, the sides will have to make a decision on the treaty's future and notify each other," the Russian defense minister noted. "I am convinced that the Russian side will act in strict accordance with the said procedure and will notify the DPRK Government on its intentions in August of this year."

Further on Chernomyrdin's Visit to Bulgaria

Meets President Zhelev

LD1905155295 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, 19 May is the final day of Viktor Chernomyrdin's official visit to Bulgaria. RIA Novosti correspondent Yevgeniy Vorobyev reports from Sofia.

[Vorobyev] The second day of Viktor Chernomyrdin's official visit to Bulgaria began with a visit to the Balkancar Association, which is well known in Russia. The premier said that the enterprise was very nice but that, unfortunately, Russian enterprises had practically stopped receiving its products, various models of forklift trucks. In 1994, only 200 forklift trucks were received. Both objective, price related, and subjective reasons are standing in the way.

After that, Chernomyrdin held a conversation with Academician Blagovest Sendov, the chairman of the Bulgarian National Assembly. The special features of the relations between the parliaments and governments of our countries in such difficult times comprised the main topic of the conversation. Today, the Bulgarian press reports on the visit by the high-ranking Russian guest are restrained. It is noted that while at the negotiations both the Russian and Bulgarian sides demonstrated the rapprochement and closeness of their interests while in the corridors it is being said that the agreements are merely outlining the framework for possible cooperation. Issues relating to the delivery of gas and of fresh fuel for the Kozloduy nuclear power station, processing spent nuclear fuel rods, and documentation for Bulgarian goods cannot be solved in the very near future. Experts note as a positive tendency the fact that, in Russian-Bulgarian relations, the time of gifts and concessions in the name of fraternal love has passed. The time for well calculated cooperation has come.

Right now, Chernomyrdin and Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev are holding a meeting at the Boyana government residence. Observers believe that the conversation will touch on Bulgaria's joining NATO, an issue which is painful to Bulgaria, and on Russia's position of discouraging this.

Holds Talks on NATO Ties, Expansion

LD1905173295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1528 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sofia, May 19 (INTERFAX) — Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin confirms Moscow's readiness to develop constructive cooperation with NATO. At the same time, he said he was concerned about plans for expanding NATO to the East. Chernomyrdin informed the Bulgarian leaders on this position at their meeting within the scope of Chernomyrdin's official visit to Bulgaria in Sofia today.

The Russian prime minister's press secretary Viktor Konnov, accompanying Chernomyrdin on his visit, told Interfax that Chernomyrdin had told Chairman of the Bulgarian Parliament Blagovest Sendov in Sofia today that he did not see any reasons for a NATO expansion to the East, towards the Russian borders, which would be comprehensible [as received] for the Russian people. Chernomyrdin said NATO did not have a new concept, while NATO's former strategic concept had a bloc, confrontational character.

Moreover, the re-equipment of Eastern European countries' armed forces, necessary if they are admitted to NATO, would mean colossal expenses for Eastern European countries, Chernomyrdin said.

The Bulgarian parliament's chairman said that Bulgaria considered it necessary to take into consideration the interests of other countries when ensuring its security and not to act in a manner of prejudice against them. He made it clear that he meant the interests of Russia as well.

After the meeting with Bulgarian President Zhelio Zhelev who is, contrary to the heads of the Bulgarian parliament and government, a champion of Bulgaria joining NATO, Chernomyrdin told an Interfax correspondent that everyone had his own vision of the problem on relations with NATO. Chernomyrdin added that both he and the Bulgarian president wanted to agree and "act in one direction."

The Bulgarian president said Sofia was not going to refuse from military-technical cooperation with Russia and has vital interest in continuation of the delivery of spare parts and military equipment. He repeated that the Bulgarian army was practically fully equipped with arms produced by the USSR.

The talks between Viktor Chernomyrdin and Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov were capped by the two countries signing a package of over 10 intergovernment agreements, including a declaration on broadening contacts in concrete spheres: Transport, communication, culture, medicine and the fuel-energy complex.

Russian Nuclear Power Minister Viktor Mikhaylov told Interfax that the agreement on construction in the sphere of nuclear power provided for Russia participating in a project for constructing a nuclear power station in Bulgaria, which had been frozen in 1990. Mikhaylov said this was a framework agreement and Sofia still must set the schedule for starting construction, its scale, the scale of Russia's participation and must work on receiving a credit for launching the construction project.

Bulgarian sources told Interfax that Chernomyrdin had accepted the invitation of Bulgaria to stay in the country for one more day after the official part of the visit expired on May 19. Chernomyrdin is expected to spend this day in a state residency near Varna. He will continue consultations there on economic and political cooperation with Bulgaria as well as have a rest. The Russian prime minister is expected to return to Moscow on Saturday in the afternoon.

Signs Russo-Bulgarian Accords

LD1905170595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1628 GMT 19 May 95

[By Vladimir Abrosimov and Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SOFIA, May 19 (Itar-Tass) — Russo-Bulgarian documents summing up the main results of the talks between Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin who is currently on an official visit to Sofia, and chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria, Zhan Videnov, were signed in the Bulgarian capital on Friday. They signed a Joint Declaration on the development of economic cooperation between the two countries.

This document outlines the main directions of the further interaction between Russia and Bulgaria in various fields proceeding from the Treaty on friendly relations and cooperation between the two states signed by Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Zhelyu Zhelev in Sofia on August 4, 1992.

The joint statement notes, in particular, that positive trends in the state of mutual economic ties have taken shape lately. Both sides by mutual efforts managed to stop the decline in the mutual trade turnover and stabilize trade and economic relations. At the same time their present level and the volume of mutual trade do not correspond to the potential possibilities of the two countries. Both sides believe a considerable expansion of trade and economic cooperation between Russia and Bulgaria would meet their national interests, the statement runs.

Over ten inter-governmental and inter-departmental agreements on the interaction in the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear power, the fuel and power complex, transport ties, science and technology, mutual aid in customs issues, agriculture, public health and other fields, signed by heads of ministries and departments aim at the implementation of this task.

Viktor Chernomyrdin and Zhan Videnov organized a closing news conference for journalists after the signing of the documents.

Chernomyrdin, Videnov News Briefing

LD1905203095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1915 GMT 19 May 95

[By Vladimir Abrosimov, Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SOFIA, May 19 (Itar-Tass) — Russian and Bulgarian premiers Viktor Chernomyrdin and Zhan Videnov stated closeness of their stands on international issues and aspects of bilateral cooperation at a news conference on results of the Bulgarian visit of Chernomyrdin here today. This is also said in a joint statement supplemented by 15 intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements.

"There was no major discussion on NATO-Bulgarian relations. Each side outlined its stand on the issue," said Chernomyrdin in response to an Itar-Tass question. "Our stand is well-known. We stand for a wise approach to a decision on NATO expansion, an approach without any haste."

Speaking of the Bulgarian stand, Premier Videnov noted that Bulgaria proceeds from national interests in seeking contacts with European structures and cooperates within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program in order to help the creation of European security system. In his opinion, the Russian leaders are acting in the same way.

When in Bulgaria — a Balkan state — the Russian premier voiced his stand on the on-going crisis in former Yugoslavia. In his opinion, settlement of the crisis can be achieved with weakening of sanctions against Belgrade. He thinks that the parties to the conflict should have a chance to settle the problems by themselves.

Leaves Sofia for Moscow

LD2005222795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1714 GMT 20 May 95

[By Vladimir Abrosimov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SOFIA, May 20 (Itar-Tass) — Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin left for Moscow today after spending the last day of his official Bulgarian visit in Varna. He was seeing off by Bulgarian Prime Minister Jean Videnov, Russian ambassador to Bulgaria Aleksandr Avdeyev and other officials.

The local press has positively estimated the results of the visit that lasted from May 18 through 19 and noted the efficiency of negotiations proved by the signing of 16 intergovernmental and interdepartmental documents on key areas of bilateral cooperation.

Joint Russian, Chinese Team Inspects Border Area

LD1905205295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1229 GMT 19 May 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Grigoriy Arslanov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Beijing, 19 May — For the first time in the history of Russo-Chinese relations a joint expedition of representatives of the Foreign Ministries of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China has inspected the two countries' border areas. The parties said that the historically unprecedented expansion of Russo-Chinese border links was the result of the development of normal interstate relations.

The parties were unanimous on the need to take joint measures to tackle the problems that hinder bilateral exchanges and the development of border links more quickly.

The ITAR-TASS correspondent was told by diplomatic sources that the joint Russo-Chinese expedition visited the Chinese towns of Manchuria, Harbin, Heihe, and Suifenhe; and Zabaykalsk, Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and Grodekovo in Russia. During their trip the two countries' Foreign Ministry representatives met local leaders, which enabled them to locate specific existing problems and agree upon how to solve them.

Further on Moscow Mayor's Visit to Beijing

Claims 'Russia Lacks Stability'

LD1905203495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1446 GMT 19 May 95

[By Grigoriy Arslanov and Aleksandr Romanov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW [as received] May 19 (Itar-Tass) — "Russia lacks stability. We rush from one extremity to another", said Moscow's mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, now on a visit here at the invitation of Beijing major Li Qiyan. Luzhkov spoke in the Russian embassy in China at a meeting with diplomats, employees of Russian institutions and journalists.

"Stability is essential to normal development of society, particularly to economic development. We have just emerged from the chaos resulting from the transformation of the existing system", Luzhkov said. Therefore the Moscow government will support the election bloc "Our Home is Russia" which declares for stability, he said.

Commenting on press reports about alleged differences between the mayor of Moscow and the Russian President, Luzhkov said: "Some want us to have complications in our relations. This is nothing of the kind. We began the work together. Yeltsin invited me in 1986. I am always firm in my attitudes. I never vacillate and I do not betray friends", Luzhkov said.

Luzhkov noted the importance of dedication to the cause and to those with whom many complex and dangerous situations were navigated. Nevertheless the mayor said he has "problems" in relations with the President's associates.

The mayor said he regards himself as an economic manager and intends to steer clear of politics where "there is too much hypocrisy and too much emphasis on circumstantial considerations". "I would never be a politician," Luzhkov said. He mentioned the example of Yegor Ligachev, who, being an effective party and government official, imagined himself a politician and immediately suffered a fiasco.

"I am used to dealing with construction cites, vegetable storages, sewerage structures, reconstruction", Luzhkov said. He said that his concentration on these matters wins him attention and respect of people. "There is no need to tell fables from a rostrum to win a high rating. People respect those who are engaged in something constructive", he said.

Luzhkov expressed a positive attitude to such structures as "Our Home is Russia" bloc. The state lacks stability. Any movements, organisations and parties that aim at stability and are not going to bring the country into a revolutionary or reactionary state deserve to be supported. "We now begin to see what is resulting from the chaotic development and chaotic transformations", Luzhkov said.

The mayor also expressed adherence to Rybkin's left-wing supporters and to Yavlinskiy. He said that everything that is in the middle of the road should be supported while extremists should not be backed in any case. They may plunge of the country into a horrible state, he said.

Events During Visit Summed Up

LD2005101895 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0503 GMT 20 May 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Romanov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Beijing, 20 May — "The main task at the present stage of cooperation between the capitals of Russia and China is the creation of favorable conditions for business activity that assist the implementation of all plans for the development of bilateral constructive partnership," Yuriy Luzhkov told the ITAR-TASS correspondent.

During his stay in Beijing, Moscow's mayor signed an agreement on the establishment of twinned relations between the two capitals. Until now such relations existed only between Shanghai and St. Petersburg.

In Beijing Yuriy met and had a friendly conversation with State Council Vice Premier Li Lanping, became the first foreign guest officially received by Wei Jianxing, the new first secretary of the Beijing city committee of the Chinese Communist Party, who was appointed to this post at the end of April after the major scandal in connection with corruption among the city's previous leaders.

Moscow's mayor held talks with Beijing's Mayor Li Qiang, during which an agreement in principle was reached on the construction in Moscow of the House of Beijing and of the House of Moscow in Beijing. The Moscow government will finance the construction of "its" house in Beijing and the Beijing government will pay for a similar facility in Moscow. Questions of the creation in Moscow of a large Chinese commercial center and of Chinese medicine center were also discussed. Yuriy Luzhkov visited the plant of the "Panasonic" firm, the "Yansha" commercial center, the city water supply plant, and the economic development zone in a nearby Beijing suburb.

This is the Moscow mayor's second visit to Beijing after December 1992. Having completed his five-day visit, Moscow's Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov left today on a scheduled Aeroflot flight.

Cuban Foreign Minister Robaina on Visit

Military Cooperation Ruled Out

LD1905183695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1654 GMT 19 May 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: reports by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Interfax) — Resuming military cooperation will be out of the question during the future official visit of Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina to Moscow, a high-ranking Russian diplomat told Interfax Friday.

According to the source, "military cooperation between Moscow and Havana was curbed by both sides within reformation of bilateral relations." "Neither us, nor the Cuban are going to resume it as we believe that the present status quo in the military field meets the interests of both sides," he added.

The diplomat said Robaina was coming on the invitation by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. "The Cuban guest will stay in Moscow until May 24 to pass a day or a day and a half in St. Petersburg then," he added.

According to the source, for Moscow "it makes sense to reanimate the Russian-Cuban economic cooperation." "The talks will discuss Cuba's debt to Russia, a legacy of the former Soviet Union. Its size has not yet been specified by either side, because the debt was accounted in transferable rubles," he added.

The diplomat said a joint working commission had been created in Havana in the near future to discuss the problem.

He said the Moscow talks would focus on the "rather worrying" situation around Cuba.

"Moscow believes that the unstable situation around Cuba comes as a result of the ideological and military confrontation during the existence of the two blocs. Russia has eliminated the "cold-war" factors provoking tension. However, there are still such remains of the bloc confrontation as the U.S. embargo on Cuba," the diplomat said.

He said the embargo contradicted the new relationship between countries which was now being established.

The diplomat said Moscow believed that the key to the solution to the problem was in the hands of Washington and Havana which "must seek the ways to make the situation healthy together."

Robaina Thanks Duma for Appeal

LD2205111195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1003 GMT 22 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, May 22 (Interfax) — The common desire to expand cooperation between Russia and Cuba was expressed at a meeting in Moscow on Monday between Chairman of the Russian State Duma Ivan Rybkin and Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina.

"Russia adheres to the principle: to gain new friends and never to lose old ones," said Rybkin. He said that Cuba has been and remains among Russia's priority partners.

Robaina expressed gratitude to the State Duma for its statement which included an appeal to the U.S. authorities to refrain from expanding the economic embargo against Cuba.

The Cuban foreign minister said that his country "sooner or later will reach accord with the United States, including in the sphere of emigration, but only on condition that the United States does not swallow up Cuba." Robaina assured Rybkin that "his country is ready to find a common language with the whole world, which has changed over the past years."

Rybkin informed the guest of the internal political situation in Russia. He expressed hope that the three-four leading parties represented in the future parliament will express the whole range of sentiments found among the Russian people.

Federation Council Official on Mideast Visit

LD2105205695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2047 GMT 21 May 95

[By Georgiy Shelenkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CAIRO, May 22 (Itar-Tass) — "During our Middle East tour, statesmen and ordinary people asked us more often than before to restore Russia's historic role in the region," deputy chairman of the Federation Council Ramazan Abdulatipov said.

Speaking at a news conference on Sunday, Abdulatipov who led a parliamentary delegation on the visits to Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, said that one of the reasons for the dangerous aggravation of the situation in the region was the disintegration of the Soviet Union and a series of crises in Russia that upset the balance of forces in the area.

However, lately, especially after Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's recent visit to the region, Russia has boosted its activities in the Middle East, which will help ease tension in the region, Abdulatipov said. Russia is sincerely interested in this, he added.

At the same time, he said Russia lost 30 billion U.S. dollars as a result of excessive orientation to the West several years ago and has not been able to remedy the situation completely yet.

Speaking about Israel's seizure of land in Eastern Jerusalem and the U.S. veto on the U.N. Security Council draft resolution condemning this move, Abdulatipov said it has complicated the Arab-Israeli talks.

"If we are truly interested in achieving Middle East settlement, we must avoid new moments leading to confrontation and ease tension," he said.

Asked about Chechnya, Abdulatipov said it was necessary to take measures to restore law and order in Chechnya, but "we do not approve of the use of force there."

He stressed that the "parliament cannot do anything except adopt political statements." The war in Chechnya is the "Russian tragedy affecting all peoples of the Federation, especially Russian," he added.

Speaking about the situation in Russia in general, Abdulatipov said the country begins to realise the need to resolve the existing problems on its own. "We do not need Western help any more. We need that they open their markets to us... Russia is not a poor and sick person, but a rich and healthy one who, however, cannot use his potential in full yet," he said.

'Lightweight' Kozyrev Criticized for Defeats

MM1805123595 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 May 95 pp 1, 2

[Article by Nina Petrova under the "Administration" rubric: "Russia's Foreign Policy Must Become Presidential. The Reasons for and Consequences of Defeats for Andrey Kozyrev's Diplomacy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In times that have been most difficult for Russia, when the country has been weakened by wars, revolutions, or internal internecine strife, it has as a rule had a strong foreign policy. This not only served as a cover, a kind of "compensator" for the state's internal political weakness, but also ensured external conditions for Russia to obtain the historical breathing space necessary for gathering strength and getting back the position of a great and influential power in the international arena. At these critical times brilliant, outstanding individuals would appear in the post of foreign minister, who not only led the country out of international isolation but significantly multiplied the foreign policy capital accumulated by their predecessors.

Our times are the exception to the rule. For virtually the first time in Russia's history, its foreign policy is not only failing to compensate for internal weakness but is even exacerbating it. The most depressing thing is that no sign can be seen of an improvement in the country's foreign policy situation. Not only that. It is very likely that a further deterioration will follow. It would scarcely be right to attribute this purely to internal economic problems.

The reasons for the prevailing situation are many-sided. There is the lack of a clear, long-term foreign policy strategy, an extreme lack of professionalism in implementing foreign policy, with numerous tactical blunders and failures linked to this, and finally there is the lack of a unified federal coordination mechanism for the elaboration, adoption, and implementation of foreign economic decisions. Subjective reasons also include the degradation and breakdown of the Russian Foreign Ministry, as well as the very lightweight figure of the foreign minister, who not only lacks prestige in any of the strata of Russian political circles but evenhas none in his own department.

A False Platform

The new Russia's foreign policy was formed first and foremost as a "platform of negation" in respect of the former Soviet Union's international activity. That is why back in 1991 its entirely comprehensible anticommunist enthusiasm was not balanced by active and creative principles. It was characteristic of it to aim to dissociate itself from virtually all elements of Soviet foreign policy "by definition," regardless of the cost and even if, on closer inspection, they turned out to be entirely reasonable and dictated by the country's age-old interests; to reject virtually all allies of the former USSR and "fall into the embrace" of its foes; and to depart from almost all of the country's traditional spheres and regions of influence without, however, having consolidated a position in new ones.

Meanwhile it was clear by 1992 that the subjects of Russia's new foreign policy entourage were guided in their policy by their own national interests and were often — thanks in many respects to the early (August-September 1991) aggressive and irresponsible statements by the young Russian democrats — in an anti-Russia and even anti-Russian mood. In this connection, the natural question arose about who are Russia's geopolitical allies and potential rivals. However, this attitude seemed "cynical" at that time, and the Foreign Ministry declared that Russia had no enemies at all. Hence the shifts in the foreign policy line, and essentially the lack of one in the post-Soviet geopolitical sphere and the inability to establish the spheres of Russia's vitally important interests in the near abroad: It was declared that all the near abroad without any exclusions or preferences was thus categorized.

Real geopolitical interests in foreign policy were essentially undermined by ideological slogans, aimed at "dissolving" Russia in the Euroatlantic civilization. It was using this particular thesis that Andrey Kozyrev created an image for himself abroad and at first strengthened Yegor Gaydar's position in the Russian government.

There was a grain of reason in this concept. Its creators were reasoning approximately as follows: The countries of the West have formed a single world economic system on the basis of the mutual permeation of national economies and the creation of a single world market. They have inculcated universal norms and principles of democracy, humanity, and social progress in civilization. Russia should become part of this community — and the sooner the better. That is why following in the path of the West's policy is not capitulation but Russia's main national interest. Russia is part of the West, and all of its strange "non-Western" history was an annoying deviation. Europe embodies a close and comprehensible ideal of democracy and economic prosperity. Russia essentially always was and is a European power and therefore should be geared primarily to partnership with Europe and the United States, particularly since the United States is the transatlantic extension of European democracy.

Such an attitude to foreign policy inevitably led not only to a complete refusal to accept geopolitics, but also to the loss of a clear conception of today's Russia as a subject of international relations. It is clear, however, that the abstract "Russian democracy" could not replace the national "self" for long. A complete renunciation of nationalism could only be welcomed if we were dealing with a mature Russia in mature surroundings. But today absolutely all of the former Soviet republics are basing their foreign policy on nationalism, while the romantic, "moralizing" Russia is pretending that it has "grown out of it." As far as "democracy" is concerned, that can only be played as a trump card in a mature democracy, and the most important precondition for the formation of a mature democracy is actually the formation of a nation and a new national "self."

Historical practice has shown that if, in their relations with the external world, states give priority to moral categories to the detriment of taking geopolitical national interests into account, then sooner or later they will suffer a defeat and will become dependent on stronger powers. It is naive to believe that in the world of strong-arm politics good relations between states are formed thanks to "friendly" feelings between their leaders or peoples. In the rapture of power it is of course possible to bypass geopolitical realities, but those realities will not bypass politics. Furthermore, they will get their irreversible revenge on figures who either through ignorance or deliberately wave them aside.

It appears that Kozyrev's foreign policy platform was the result of mixing completely different concepts: politics-of-values indicators and national interests. The indicators have overshadowed the interests here, becoming an end in themselves, while a reasonable balance should have been sought between liberal-democratic ideas and the unchanging, geopolitically dictated interests of the country, which embody the conditions for its survival and stability as a nation-state.

This basic reason has also dictated other characteristic features of the new foreign policy philosophy, notably respecting "values common to all mankind" more than your own sovereignty, and someone else's sovereignty more than your own. But the desire for "conflict-free" relations with Western capitals in fact turned into a situation whereby existing differences were driven inward, and the Western partners became tempted to speak to Moscow in tough language.

This latter factor, it appears, was also connected with unjustified calculations as regards the reduction in the role of military strength following the end of the Cold War in the regional and local dimension. But in actual fact a sharp growth was already being observed at the beginning of the 1990's in the provincial conflicts and nationalism which had in the past been restrained by tough military-strong-arm confrontation between the two superpowers. It becomes clear that the post-confrontation world needs strong management to an equal, if not greater extent than during the era of USSR-U.S global confrontation, and that a "multipolar" world is replacing the "bipolar" one by no means automatically or overnight. The instruments created to manage the Cold War processes — NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and others — have turned out to be completely ineffectual in solving the new tasks.

The "internationalism of Russian foreign policy and the refusal to present what is "national" in a logical way has led to another acute problem — carelessness in respect of "Russia outside its borders," and a refusal to protect the rights of Russian people in the near abroad. This most important nationwide question was completely ignored by the Foreign Ministry for a long time, and a natural trump card was thus handed to the national extremists. Even now Kozyrev's statements about Russia's readiness to protect the Russian-speaking population have more of a demagogic and even provocative, rather than constructive nature. In practice, the Foreign Ministry is continuing to do next to nothing in this respect.

And here we approach the main point. No doubt you could turn a blind eye to certain obvious shortcomings in the foreign policy platform and even the obvious failures in our foreign policy, proceeding on the premise that they are the result of "democratic romanticism" of the first years of life of the new Russia (like the "market romanticism" in the economy) and that they will be overcome as it becomes more established, if it were not for one extremely important circumstance: Essentially, this platform, which is very vulnerable to criticism from the right, is clearing the road for radical nationalism. It is already obvious now that the people and the majority of the intelligentsia, seeing the Foreign Ministry's inability to implement a foreign policy line based on humanistic values, is gradually becoming imbued with a "hankering after a strong state" (the parliamentary elections back in 1993 were an indicator of this process). However, given the lack of a clear and balanced program, formulated at the top, and a consistent policy for implementing it, their hopes will inevitably be exploited and channeled by the nationalist camp in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. Then, in the face of the entirely likely paralysis of the democrats, the people and the intelligentsia may give their support to the extremists before realizing what a terrible price they will have to pay for the new foreign policy line being offered to them by the "patriots."

A Clumsy Policy

Regrettable though it is to realize this, the fact remains that the diplomacy which aimed to secure Russia's speediest involvement in the Western community has suffered a defeat. We cannot get away from the fact that the West, despite Clinton's recent declarations in Moscow, is in actual fact currently not letting Russia into its key organizations — the European Union, the Council of Europe, NATO, and so forth. The invitation to Russia to "sit in the dressing room for a while" at the upcoming Halifax meeting of the seven major countries in the world in the economic sense can scarcely be considered a major diplomatic breakthrough. Of course the renaming of the "economic seven" into the "political eight" does not change things either: It would be naive to assume that henceforth all the most important decisions on the world economy will be made with Russia's participation.

Moscow has not been able to join the integration processes in the Asia-Pacific Region either. Confrontation between Russia and the Islamic world has begun to show. At the same time, no serious breakthroughs have been observed in relations with the new independent states and the development of the CIS as a whole.

The reason for these failures is not only the continuing crisis in the Russian economy, but also the very gross mistakes made by the Foreign Ministry leaders, connected primarily with their counting on the "charity" of the West and their heightened expectations of Russia's rapid integration in the system of international economic relations in the postcommunist world.

The removal of the ideological-political contradictions that were the prime cause of confrontation turned out to be a necessary but far from sufficient condition for the rapid integration of the post-Soviet and postsocialist states in the world economic space. What was needed for that was substantial capital investments, which the West turned out not to be prepared to make. The motivation for adopting decisions on such investments has historically been mainly political. For example, the "Marshall Plan" presupposed large-scale U.S. economic aid to West Europe with the aim of strengthening and stabilizing the alliance of Western states in the face of its confrontation with the USSR. Furthermore, the factor of "free" resources, which is now practically absent, always had great significance here. As the experience of German unification has shown, expenditure on economic integration by even the most developed postsocialist country (GDR) is so great that in all probability transferring the entire former Eastern bloc to a Western economic model would take rather longer than one or two decades.

All the indications are that in the near future it will be very hard for Russia either to obtain real economic aid from the West or even to overcome its unequal position in international markets. Despite the fact that COCOM finally formally stopped existing last year, discriminatory mechanisms remain at national levels.

In this respect Russian diplomats are simply being led up the garden path. After Russia had met a whole set of conditions connected with the harmonization of its national export control system with international standards, and the old COCOM had been abolished, the members of that organization gathered at a special meeting where it was announced that a special "post-COCOM" mechanism would be created. Russia was not even invited.

It is not a participant with equal rights in consultations on establishing a new organization even now. Furthermore, new preliminary conditions for Russia to participate are being put forward, notably giving up cooperating with countries (Iran, for example) which are "inconvenient" to the West, and above all to the United States. By and large, Russia has been deceived so many times on this issue that the latest confirmation by Clinton at the latest summit of the U.S. commitment to support its participation in talks on a new international export control regime engender little optimism.

However, the political and military-political results of Russia's international activity are even more depressing. It has now become definitively clear that, after a certain period of waiting, the countries of the West have started regrouping forces in the Europe-Atlantic region with the aim of sealing the geopolitical changes which are favorable to them. Unfortunately it is on this level — in many respects thanks to the passive, inconsistent, and contradictory policy of the Foreign Ministry — that the NATO "Partnership for Peace" program, which initially had a big stock of constructive cooperation with Russia, is being transformed. The Clinton administration's decision to transfer the preparations for expanding NATO to a practical plane with the "non-resistant" neutrality of a number of West European countries and the active support of East European ones means a most serious defeat for Russian policy not only in the European sphere but also in the American sphere, which had hitherto been a priority. Obviously our link with the "Partnership...", which is of a purely verbal nature in respect of Russia and now pursues the aim of "conciliating" it in the light of this very decision, does not change the essence of the matter.

With the transfer of control of U.S. Congress into the hands of the Republicans, who were ostentatiously ignored by the Foreign Ministry until then, U.S. policy in respect of Russia has become even tougher. And the extensively publicized "mature strategic partnership" between Russia and the United States has turned out to be an empty declaration, not backed up by any concrete actions. And what about in practice? A line toward the maximum weakening of the country's military-technical — and in Russia's case this means economic — potential can be increasingly observed on the part of the United States. The zone of American and Western responsibility is in fact being expanded not only to Central and Eastern Europe, but also to practically all the European republics of the former USSR, particularly Ukraine, and recently partially the Transcaucasus and Kazakhstan. And correspondingly the "gentle" but single-minded squeezing out of Russia from this zone, despite Kozyrev's statements about the presence of our "vitally important interests" there. It is clear to any objective observer that Clinton's visit to Moscow was by no means something to the credit of Russian diplomacy, but a pragmatic calculation by the U.S. Administration. In actual fact, Washington has already written Russia off as a key geopolitical partner. The responsibility for this lies to a significant degree with a Foreign Ministry leadership which has proved incapable of proposing a mutually acceptable and realistic program for the development of bilateral relations. In the end, as was to be expected, factors which put our countries into conflict with each other have moved into the foreground.

Admittedly, during the recent meeting, thanks to the personal efforts of the president, it did nevertheless prove possible to remove the most acute contradictions, at least temporarily, and bilateral relations have apparently now come out of the deadlock into which Kozyrev and his team had brought them. But there is no firm certainty that this trend will become established long-term. If the president's apparatus proves incapable of organizing effective, constant monitoring here of Foreign Ministry implementation of the agreements reached, then after a while, when the euphoria from the summit dies away, its achievements will be wasted and we will find ourselves back at square one once again — as has happened on many occasions.

Foreign policy in respect of West Europe is not marked by any notable successes either. In this region, which is so important to Russia, the Foreign Ministry has neither a long-term policy nor an effective mechanism for political collaboration. There is practically no policy in respect of Central and East Europe. The preconditions have emerged for a gradual departure from the traditional neutrality of some countries like Sweden and

Finland, in many respects thanks to the passiveness of Russian diplomacy. In general our diplomats are more often than not losing out in Europe to countries with a far smaller diplomatic and intellectual potential.

The Asian sphere is noticeably "sagging." The Foreign Ministry has not been able to overcome the tradition of viewing it as a kind of third-rate derivative of the "Western vector." It is as though we cannot see that the center of the entire world economy is moving inevitably to the Asia-Pacific region, although this fact alone is a most important precondition for leading our own Far East territories out of their depressive state. We still do not have a Pacific strategy that corresponds fully to today's realities. Individual, sometimes poorly interconnected actions on the part of Russian diplomats testify that they have not become aware of Russia's new role in the Pacific orchestra. Attempts to liven up certain parts of Asian policy have not been systematic, however, and are mainly adjusted to events which are developing more and more often without Russia's participation.

As for the logic of the development of bilateral relations with key Asian countries, this provides grounds for talking of Russia's virtual departure from the Asia-Pacific region. Really. Relations between Moscow and Tokyo are practically frozen, although it must be admitted that this is not just our fault. A large element of unpredictability persists in relations with China. A poorly thought out and clumsy rapprochement with South Korea has deprived us of the remains of any influence in the DPRK and has essentially undermined Russia's role on the Korean peninsula. We have not avoided difficulties in our relations with India. Russia's influence in Central Asia has fallen significantly, never mind in the Near and Middle East. As was to be expected, this development of events has encouraged large-scale expansion by the United States, China, and Japan, first in the "vacuum zones" which have formed in the Asia-Pacific region, and then in the Russian Far East region, which has in turn started stirring up separatist attitudes there.

Things in the CIS seem to have moved faster recently. This is not to Russian diplomacy's credit, however, but is the consequence of the natural process of economic reintegration. And Russia continues to have no clear strategy in respect of the former USSR republics. We do not even have a concept for the development of the Commonwealth, which Russia specifically, as the natural center of geopolitical gravity for the new independent states, should have ormulated. A mechanism for cooperation in the military and political spheres has still not been created. The Collective Security Council exists on paper only. Meanwhile it is utterly clear that prospects for Russia's economic rebirth and the restoration of its status as an influential great power on the world arena are connected specifically with the reestablishment of the artificially broken economic and military-political ties within the Commonwealth framework.

The passiveness of Russian diplomacy is dooming the CIS to degradation and is depriving it of a serious role not only in the post-Soviet area but also in relations with the wider world. The Foreign Ministry is doing practically no work on this issue with Western countries, particularly the United States, however. Meanwhile, both the United States and its partners increasingly believe that they have the right to ignore Russia as an integrating factor in the area of the former USSR. Doubt is being cast on Russia's peacekeeping operations on CIS territory. And its timid efforts to strengthen this organization are interpreted as relapses into "imperial" policy. The actions of the United States, Germany, and other Western countries are aimed at intensifying the irreversibility of the disintegration of the post-Soviet area and encouraging an unfriendly policy toward Russia on the part of the new independent states on its border perimeter. Certain forces are already designing the separation of certain areas of Russia (the Far East, the North Caucasus, the Kuril islands, Yakutia, Sakhalin, and Karelia) and the creation of a cordon sanitaire around it, which would remove it further from the most developed and economically promising partners in Asia — Japan, South Korea, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and, in Europe, Finland.

A most serious challenge is connected with the further economic disintegration of the territory of the former USSR, which is being encouraged by the West. Of course, the majority of the former Soviet republics will ultimately suffer from this more than Russia. But there is something else you cannot ignore: If they reorient themselves on the wider world, then Russia will not only be cut off from its traditional partners but will also be isolated to a great extent from the wider world. Impetuosity in the regionalization of Russia itself is ultimately leading to a situation whereby foreign business will be given a chance to exploit the Russian market in an uncontrolled way and monopolize individual spheres of it. It would be naive to count on the idea that foreign businessmen will proceed on the basis of something other than the desire to take advantage of internal chaos and get the better of a weak partner.

Russian diplomacy's inability to provide a foreign policy cover for the events in Chechnya is another matter again. After all, the country has essentially found itself on the brink of having sanctions applied against it. This means that in its relations with democratic countries the Foreign Ministry has not managed to create a "reserve of resilience." Although they do not tire of stating that the Chechnya crisis is Russia's internal affair, it is perfectly clear that it is being used to exert strong pressure on our country. This pressure was tangible during the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. On 10 May in Moscow Helmut Kohl stated bluntly that henceforth questions of economic cooperation between Russia and the Council of Europe would be linked to the situation in Chechnya. The events in Chechnya are being exploited very skillfully by the supporters of the speediest implementation of plans to expand NATO.

Events in Chechnya have dealt a serious blow to relations with the Asian CIS countries. Despite the Foreign Ministry's official statements, many of them view the Chechnya crisis in the light of Islamic-Orthodox confrontation. Demands for a trade boycott against Russia are being made in many Muslim countries around the world at official and semiofficial levels, and fundamentalist parties and extremist organizations are making appeals for support, and are giving support, to the Chechen armed formations. You get the impression that our diplomats have not even noticed that certain forces in the West, exploiting the situation that has formed in Chechnya, have recently been making increasingly active attempts to turn the vector of Islamic aggressiveness in Russia's direction.

It follows from all the aforesaid that, in many respects because of the shortcomings and failures of the Foreign Ministry, this year of 1995, the year of preparation for the elections on which so many hopes are pinned as regards the strengthening of Russia's international prestige, is passing under the banner of a sharp weakening of its foreign policy stances and the strengthening of a real threat of international isolation. The consequences of the damage done have yet to be assessed.

Case Argued for Kozyrev's Ouster

MM1905103595 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 May 95 p 2

[Second part of article by Nina Petrova under the "Non-Administration" rubric: "Russia's Foreign Policy Must Become Presidential. The Reasons for, and Consequences of, Defeats in Andrey Kozyrev's Diplomacy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Unsuitable Instruments**

One of the subjective reasons for the failures in our diplomacy is connected with the lack of a unified federation-wide mechanism for the elaboration, adoption, and implementation of foreign policy decisions. You can disagree with communist ideology, but you cannot deny that a well-oiled system for adopting such decisions existed in the former USSR. Since the destruction of the old mechanism, we have not managed to create a new one. The lack of such a system, as the experience of recent years testifies (suffice it to recall our waverings on the issues of the Kurils, the expansion of NATO, Bosnia, the CIS, a Near East settlement), inevitably leads to impulsive, disconnected, and frequently mutually contradictory actions, and this discredits the presidential foreign policy and is increasingly being viewed worldwide as a frightening symptom of Russia's "post-communist" unpredictability.

Attempts made to create this kind of mechanism — whether it be within the framework of the Security Council or outside it — have been blocked by those who would like to "grab a bigger slice" and keep a free hand in this sphere. (One of these people is the foreign minister who, on the pretext of fighting against "incompetence, multiplied by ambition," as he himself admits in his brand-new "memoirs," (not "camp memoirs") "...has constantly and persistently opposed the accumulation of all kinds of coordination mechanisms in foreign policy, such as, for instance, the Security Council, or earlier, the State Council"). But the interdepartmental commissions on various problems of foreign policy have not solved problems of coordination: They have only led to a further dissipation of efforts in this sphere, duplication of work, and ultimately, a growth in irresponsibility and a reduction in the efficiency of foreign policy. It has proved to be beyond capability of the Security Council interdepartmental foreign policy commission, which by its status is supposed to be involved in coordinating positions on international questions of a conceptual and strategic nature, to take upon itself the process of coordinating the activity of ministries and departments in this sphere. And indeed in practical terms it is not functioning. As a result, a situation has formed whereby no one is involved in this type of coordination at state level.

In November 1992 the president signed a directive which gave the Foreign Ministry the role of the leading coordinating department on questions of foreign policy. It would seem that everything was clear. However, the Foreign Ministry was not coping with the functions of coordinator, which the president, as we have found out, spoke about bluntly at the March collegium of the foreign policy department. By confirming the Foreign Ministry's powers as coordinator on current questions of foreign policy, the president was giving it another chance. However, it is already clear that the Foreign Ministry is not capable of taking advantage of this chance — at least under its present leadership.

This state of affairs is leading to a situation whereby we have virtually no presidential foreign policy (as it should be under the Constitution). Although the foreign minister is constantly saying that he is conducting just such a policy, the president is more often than not being faced with faits accomplis. You get the impression, for example, that first Kozyrev coordinates with the Americans on Bosnia, and then he brings a position which has been agreed with them to be "pushed through" in Moscow.

The Russian foreign policy concept elaborated with great difficulty and adopted in 1993, which at least formulated its priorities fairly clearly, is essentially not being implemented by the Foreign Ministry: In 1993-1995 it has still been the American sphere, rather than the near abroad, which has remained our priority. As a result, foreign policy is called "presidential," but the president has no possibility of either directing it, or supervising it, or indeed adjusting it. One example: In Budapest in December 1994 the president announced the impermissibility of the expansion of NATO, but in January-February of this year, Kozyrev and his deputy, Mamedov, who started an unauthorized discussion with the Americans on "compensation," (that is, Russia's terms or conditions), are virtually giving the West grounds for saying that Moscow is agreeing to the expansion of the alliance by extending it to its former Warsaw Pact allies, which is generating surprise not only in Russian political circles, but also in Western ones.

While being involved only in operational activity and working as a "fire brigade," the Foreign Ministry is in fact trying to get total control of the country's foreign policy (although it does not have either the strength or the resources needed), while presenting it as a presidential foreign policy. It must be said that this position is very convenient for the foreign minister: After all, in the event of failure, you can always hide behind the broad back of the president (which he is doing at the moment), and duck any responsibility.

Ultimately, it has been the irresponsibility, that is, the situation in which there is no one who can be held answerable for the failures in foreign policy, that has led to the aforementioned disastrous results. The lack of a unified state line, a serious negotiating process taking into account the interests of various federal organs of power, and also a democratic procedure for coordinating their positions, and, as a result, the lack of any real results, cannot be compensated by extemely extravagant "airport diplomacy."

A particular, very acute, problem is the disintegration of the Foreign Ministry itself. Every year, it is losing dozens of the best people. There is no longer anyone to cover many key areas. The Moscow State Institute of International Relations has stopped being the "forge of cadres" for the ministry — young people do not want to go there. The country is losing its diplomats — a strategic resource which cannot be restored in the foreseeable future. People are leaving not so much because of material difficulties as because of the ministry leadership's couldn't-care-less attitude toward cadre diplomats and their experience and skills.

Decisions are made in secret, without having been thoroughly studied, and are often made by an individual single-handedly. As a result, it is not just that their quality suffers, but the morale of the diplomatic corps is undermined. Many talented people do not want to sit about pointlessly in the building on Smolenskaya Square when they are not being given any opportunity to influence either the formation or implementation of foreign policy, and the country's prestige is falling lower and lower: It is difficult to avoid the fact that less and less notice is being taken of Russia both in bilateral relations and in international organizations. The ministry's central apparatus is in the process of constant reorganization, during which the minister is settling his own personal scores with "objectionables." Functional departments — for assessments and planning, for disarmament, and others, are first closed down, and then revived again, this time in a weakened form in terms of organization and cadres. The human rights, economic cooperation, and CIS departments look very enfeebled. But on the other hand, the department specially created and nurtured for advancing Kozyrev's constituency business in Murmansk is doing "sterling work" under the minister's beady eye. All this is inevitably leading to the ministry being squeezed out of the process of elaborating and adopting decisions on the most important foreign policy issues — no matter how many times its functions as coordinator are confirmed.

Time To Make Adjustments

The continuation of our previous foreign policy line, which, as has now become obvious, has turned out to be erroneous, is liable to result in a further loss in Russia's standing in the international arena, and the cooling down of its relations both with the West and the East, and also the United States. Under certain circumstances the scenario of a new split in Europe and the revival of military-political confrontation on the continent cannot be ruled out. For the first time in its history, Russia is threatened with international isolation both in Asia and in Europe, accompanied by very cool relations with members of the CIS.

Such a development of events could undoubtedly have disastrous consequences for the internal political situation in the country too.

The future not just of economic reforms, but of democracy itself has been jeopardized, particularly in the light of the prospect of the parliamentary and presidential elections. Only the opponents of the democratic transformations would gain something from such a dramatic turn of events in Russia's internal policy and in international relations as a whole.

This circumstance makes the task of forming a democratic and at the same time genuinely national foreign policy platform, in line with both the modern realities of world policy, and the role of the Russian Federation in it,an urgent one. Without this — if the earlier course is maintained, in which the foreign policy reference points remain eroded, and the specific national features are made subordinate to the abstract task of the international solidarity of democratic states — a serious discussion cannot fail to begin with our potential partners or a considered line conducted in respect of possible rivals [as published — sense appears to demand the deletion of "fail to" and the replacement of "or" with "nor"]. In other words, it is vital to primarily formulate a conceptual base for the foreign policy line in the form of a national security doctrine. The vagueness of the fundamental priorities at this phase have turned into a brake on the further development of Russia's relations with the outside world, including its partners who are going no further than adopting political declarations on partnership.

The phase of "bashful silence" about these priorities and Russia's national security interests, as well as the slavish following of the West, has become protracted and started to worry the West itself. That is no doubt the basic reason for the prevailing, at first sight paradoxical, situation; we are insistently appealing for partnership with the industrially developed, or so-called "civilized" countries, but we have no clear ideas either of the aims or the optimum forms of cooperation. But the interest of the developed part of the international community toward the Russian Federation is mainly painted in negative hues; everyone more or less knows what the new Russia should not be like, but they have no constructive idea or grasp of what it could and should be like, once it has found its own national identity.

However, the West should scarcely be reproached for this. After all of course no one from outside can explain to us our role in world politics. Obviously Russia should set forth its views of its own place in international relations in the new historical phase and clearly mark the contours of its interests by itself. It is only on this basis that a legally formulated and viable system of partnership ties, materialized into fruitful cooperation based on equal rights on a wide range of fundamental problems of international policy, can emerge, and not on the wittingly dubious premise about the full coincidence of Russia's foreign policy tasks and priorities with those of the advanced section of the world community.

It is finally time to bring some basic order into the preparation and adoption of decisions on the range of foreign policy and national security issues which are under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry and the Russian "power" structures. Someone should make sure that all — even the most authoritative — state organs have pursued a line in international affairs that is in strict accordance with the one the president is maintaining. Independent action and improvisation in foreign policy questions are impermissible. Russia's work on the international arena should be firm and consistent. We must finally put into operation a presidential mechanism for the coordination of foreign policy, and, with this aim in mind, create a authoritative organ specifically under the president's control, which he spoke about in his annual message to the Federal Assembly.

Finally, the need to replace the foreign minister is growing fast. He has turned into one of the greatest liabilities of the president and the government within the country, and one of the main obstacles in the consolidation of political forces around foreign policy. Having fully demonstrated his bureaucratic inability not only to conduct a presidential foreign policy (the latest example is his behavior in Copenhagen), but even to lead the foreign policy department, Kozyrev has also lost — because of his amazing somersaults and dizzying about-turns — his ability to serve as a cover in the West both for the president and for the country as a whole, which has recently been confirmed by the outspoken (both anti-Yeltsin and anti-Russian) utterances of top officials in the United States, the FRG, Great Britain, France, and other countries. There is no point in talking about the extremely low personal reputation abroad of the "deputy from Murmansk."

It appears that there is still a possibility of alleviating the unfavorable trends in foreign policy itself. This will require serious adjustments in all basic spheres of our international activity. At the same time, it is extremely undesirable for any abrupt moves to be made during these amendments — such as Kozyrev's statement on the protection of Russians abroad with the help of military force. They are received extremely negatively by our Western partners, former East European allies, and also the new independent states, and only provoke the expansion of NATO and the line of the further international isolation of Russia. Conversely, without lapsing into a panic-stricken stampede, Russia should calmly and at the same time firmly state its intention to implement its own foreign policy line in European and world affairs consistently. Obviously, Russia's new foreign policy line will scarcely be received seriously by anyone at all in Europe or Asia if the same people who bear personal responsibility for the bankruptcy of the 1991-1995 policy are instructed to conduct it.

Russia's foreign policy must become truly presidential.

Political Issues

Yeltsin Signs One, Rejects Two Federal Laws

LD1905134395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1241 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Interfax) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Friday the federal law on commemorating the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, which was passed by the State Duma in April.

The Russian president turned down the law adopted by the Duma on April 12 on temporary measures for the political settlement of the crisis in the Chechen Republic. In a message to the Duma chairman Ivan Rybkin, Yeltsin said that instead of reaching a political settlement in Chechnya, the law may have the opposite effect and become an additional destabilizing factor. "Besides, some provisions of the above law contradict the Russian Constitution and its international commitments," says the report of the Russian president's press service.

Yeltsin also turned down the law on trade unions, their rights and guarantees for their activities, which was passed by the Duma on April 14. The president believes this law contains some provisions which do not correspond to the Russian Constitution and the system of the Russian legislation.

Yeltsin Signs Law on Public Associations, Edict on Veterans

LD1905210695 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1414 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 May — President Boris Yeltsin signed a federal law "On Public Associations" today, which the State Duma of the Russian Federation passed on 14 April 1995. He also signed an edict "On the Procedure and Conditions for Conferring the Title 'Military Service Veteran.'"

This informaton was given by the press service of the president of the Russian Federation.

Filatov: Yeltsin Opposes Portions of Duma Election Law

LD2005143195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1424 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW May 20 (Itar-Tass) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin opposes three clauses of the law on "Election to the State Duma" which was sent by the Duma for his signature, Itar-Tass was told today by Sergey Filatov, presidential administration chief.

Firstly, Yeltsin finds unoptimal the provision which would give half of parliament seats to runners on party tickets.

Secondly, Yeltsin insists that turnout be made 50 percent to make the election valid. The State Duma-passed law sets required turnout at 50 percent for the presidential election and at 25 percent for the election of itself.

Thirdly, Yeltsin thinks the law indents the right of the population to participate in the election campaign, Filatov said.

He explained that the law actually bars public servants from the State Duma election by requiring them to suspend their professional activities for the period of the campaign.

"However, this would damage performance of many bodies of the state," Filatov said.

Yeltsin might appeal to the Constitutional Court for rulings on the three controversial clauses.

However, Filatov said, Yeltsin is going to sign the law and immediately send to the State Duma a motion to introduce his additions to the law.

The State Duma election law is currently under scrutiny of the presidential law department.

Under the Constitution, the law must be signed or turned down by the president within two weeks of receiving it for signature. The scrutiny period expires next week.

Yeltsin Discusses Reform With Young Economists

LD1905191495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1709 GMT 19 May 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: No. 93 (837), compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin feels that "this year may close the first stage of the economic reform and be followed by a period of economic and financial stabilization."

At an hour-long meeting with young economists Yeltsin said Friday in the Moscow Kremlin that "this is just the beginning and the reform is to continue." "Yet unknown postgraduates and junior experts may come to add new dimensions to the strategy for the Russian economic reform," he said.

According to Yeltsin, the government plan for economic development in 1995 through 1997 "was largely drawn up with help from the Academy of Sciences." Yeltsin was sorry that "the chance to hear advice from the young economists was lost."

Yeltsin's press service says that Yeltsin covered prospects for economic development, economic studies, regional policies and the training of experts.

He instructed the federal government and his aides to prepare a package of executive orders on the basis of what the young experts said. He suggested that young experts play a bigger role in economic decisionmaking and the realization of their own projects.

Yeltsin's economic aide Aleksandr Livshits told journalists after the meeting that "Yeltsin came out with ideas that even the government had not yet heard."

"If the discussion had been more in-depth and if the President had broached the problems of the securities market and banking system, even more rewarding ideas could have been born." After the meeting Yeltsin instructed Deputy Prime-Minister Yuriy Yarov and Livshits to prepare draft decisions on the most interesting and rewarding suggestions.

In response to a question from Interfax, Livshits cited the problem of relations between big shareholders and business executives. A solution to that problem was offered by one of the seven young participants in the meeting. Presidential decisions are to be prepared on that and a number of other problems, Livshits said.

Commenting on the future "G7+Russia" summit in Halifax, Livshits said Russia was preparing to put into practice the economic part of the meeting into a "7 and a half" formula, because the political part is already G8. According to Livshits, "Moscow is developing serious steps for this," though he declined to provide more details.

Yeltsin, Family To Leave on Two-Day River Cruise

LD1905185195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1826 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Interfax) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin has decided to spend this weekend with his family on a two-day river cruise, well-informed sources told Interfax in Moscow Friday.

According to unofficial information, Yeltsin will cruise down the Moscow-Volga canal on the Rossiya boat.

Yeltsin is not expected to hold any long meetings during his journey.

Yeltsin Staff To Get Revived 'International Department'

MK1905112095 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 19 May 95 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "Hold the Front Page!" rubric: "They Will Once Again Appoint Our Intelligence Service Chiefs of Station on Staraya Ploshchad"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Step by step, the reorganization of the president's staff structure makes it increasingly resemble the CPSU Central Committee apparatus. According to information from sources close to those around Yeltsin, immediate plans also call for the creation of the staff's international department.

This department will supposedly perform the same functions as the international department of the Central Committee. That is to say, first and foremost, "diplomats" from the president's staff, housed on the very same Staraya Ploshchad, will take charge of communicating Yeltsin's foreign policy and foreign trade directives to chiefs of the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. Also, bureaucrats of this department will consider, in special commissions, candidates for the position of ambassadors and even heads of legal stations of the Russian intelligence service.

It is yet unclear, however, which current structural subdivision of Yeltsin's staff is to be made into the international department. There are two main candidates — the Commission on Citizenship Questions under the president, or the Russian Federation Government Commission on Relations With Expatriates.

Chernomyrdin Interviewed on Political Ambitions

LD2105202795

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow NTV in Russian at 1700 GMT on 21 May carries the weekly "Itogi" program. The program includes a 15-minute "exclusive" interview with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin by Yevgeniy Kiselev recorded "earlier this week." The place of the interview is not given.

Kiselev begins by asking Chernomyrdin why he decided to lead an electoral bloc, Our Home Is Russia, after claiming to be apolitical for a long time. Chernomyrdin replies that he avoided politics in the past, concentrating on his work in the government instead. Chernomyrdin says: "However, it is now 1995. We have entered an electoral year. The situation in the country is slightly different, and I believe it is no longer possible to avoid political affairs because results have never been achieved by dealing with the economy to the exclusion of politics. How much time has been wasted over political feuding? When you have to worry about following this or that political line, it is practically impossible to get your work done properly. I believe that period is behind us now."

Asked about relations between the government and the State Duma, Chernomyrdin says: "I am quite pleased with the way relations are developing. A colossal amount of time has been spent putting across our policies in the past. Lately we have been meeting with support in the State Duma whenever we try to get big items through, and I believe that the government's position will become stronger still when it has a powerful bloc in parliament to lean upon."

Kiselev notes that the creation of his electoral bloc might leave the government hostage to politics during the electoral campaign. Chernomyrdin replies: "But that is how it is today. The government and the chairman of the government in particular are a good target for everyone. Yes, the risk does exist to some extent, but what of it?"

Asked how he might react to failure at the elections, Chernomyrdin replies: "The thought of failure hardly crosses my mind. It should not be the case. I am confident that we will do well. Otherwise I would not have got involved. I should stress that we are not just talking about Chernomyrdin here. A lot of work was put into this. Everything was well planned."

Asked what would be the dominant factor at the elections, Chernomyrdin says: "The main issue at the elections in 1995 will be the economy." He also notes: "That is the main thing and we are not the only ones to say that: Every party, movement, and bloc is going to be outlining its program. It is inevitable. That is what they will judge us by."

Kiselev then asks: "What is the result that you are counting on from your supporters at the elections? How many seats would you like to obtain in the Duma?" Chernomyrdin replies: "A lot. A majority. I cannot tell you exactly."

Kiselev asks: "An absolute or a relative majority?" Chernomyrdin replies: "We believe that we should get a good result, and we believe that the people will understand who's who, for whom they should vote, and what needs to be done."

Kiselev points out that a law passed by the State Duma made it illegal to combine a parliamentary seat with a ministerial post. He asks: "Will the present members of the government enter the electoral lists? After all, it would mean resigning."

Chernomyrdin replies: "First, that still has to be clarified. Article 44 has to be interpreted. So I think that the State Duma will sort this out. Let us see how it goes. We have only begun this work."

Kiselev reminds Chernomyrdin that he recently said that President Yeltsin might not sign the law on electing deputies to the State Duma in the form in which it was passed by the Duma. Kiselev asks what reservations the president might have about the law. Chernomyrdin says he met the president and gave him his opinion: "The majority of the deputies should be elected through direct ballot. That would reflect the people better."

Kiselev then asks why Ministers Andrey Kozyrev and Anatoliy Chubays do not figure among the leaders of Chernomyrdin's new bloc. He suggests that this might mean they are out of favor. Without referring to Kozyrev, Chernomyrdin replies that this was not the case and points out that Chubays contributed greatly to the creation of the bloc. He concludes: "This is nothing for anyone to worry about. There is nothing sinister about this, and no one is being discriminated against."

Kiselev then asks: "Let us assume that your bloc is successful at the parliamentary elections and then the presidential election arrives. Under what conditions would you run in the presidential election?" Chernomyrdin replies: "Under what conditions would I take part in it? As a voter." Kiselev then asks: "So you do not see any possibility of putting yourself forward as a candidate for president?" Chernomyrdin replies: "No. I do not think that is the main issue today. The main thing today is the elections to the State Duma. I believe that is what we should be concentrating upon."

Finally, Kiselev asked whom Chernomyrdin views as his main political opponent at the December elections. He replies: "In actual fact, I do not see anyone in particular as an opponent. For the time being, anyway. The manifestoes are not out. There is nothing to be afraid of right now, nor do I see any reason for fear. I just do not see any."

Chernomyrdin Letter to Rybkin on Agriculture

LD1905171695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1619 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Interfax) — The Russian government "is taking all possible measures to stabilize the situation in the agroindustrial complex," Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said in his letter to State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin. The letter followed a government meeting on the demands for state support of agriculture put forward by the parliamentary faction of the Agrarian Party and the April-5 nationwide peasants' assembly.

Chernomyrdin remarked that "despite the difficult financial and economic situation in the country" the government supported the Agrarians' proposals and set aside 13.3 trillion rubles for agriculture in the 1995 federal budget, equal to the last year's level.

Chernomyrdin also emphasized that this year "the main forms of state support to the agroindustrial complex are planned to be preserved," including subsidies and compensations on meat products, cattle, seeds, flax, wool, mineral fertilizers, pesticides, electricity, heat, gas and other kinds of fuel. Fuel and lubricants will be sold to farms on credit provided they will be repaid by the end of the harvest, December 1, 1995.

In accordance with the schedule, agriculture has received 2.19 trillion rubles from the federal budget in the first quarter of 1995. In addition, another 177 billion rubles were leased to accomplish unfinished construction projects and purchase equipment.

The government also decided to convert the agroindustrial complex's overdue credits and interest, totalling 18 trillion rubles, into internal debt with repayment over 10 years in equal installments starting from 1998, at 10% a year.

In his letter, Chernomyrdin said the government had made a special resolution to enable agricultural producers to participate in the process of turning adjunct enterprises into joint-stock companies.

Chernomyrdin Bloc Seen as Way To Keep Regions in Line

MM1905131795 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 May 95 p 2

[Article by Observer Valentin Karkavtsev under the "Elections-96" rubric: "'Our Home' from the Kremlin Entrance"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The new ["Russia Is Our Home"] bloc is ready to take power without relinquishing its hold on the helm. [passage omitted]

What started this all off?

At first glance, the answer seems obvious: The "party of government," organized by the elite, is needed to keep power in the hands of those who have it today. But everything is much more complex.

First, the Kremlin intends to cure a headache it has long suffered from, namely the conflict between the center and the regions. In recent months a new trend has emerged here — governors who have built up a local power base have been gearing themselves up for elections. Let us recall that last fall Yeltsin issued an edict banning the election of governors for the time being. But the pressure from the oblasts has been getting stronger and stronger; and now, by way of an exception, Eduard Rossel, confident of success, is pushing through the election of the head of Sverdlovsk Oblast Administration. Nizhniy Novgorod, where Boris Nemtsov is also bound to win, is next in line. And thereafter, well, things have now been set in motion....

Why is the local elite in such a hurry to hold these elections? Today the governors, who are appointed by the president, share responsibility for the mistakes and failings in the economy and politics because they are linked in one way or another with federal executive power. By undergoing election they relieve themselves, as it were, of this responsibility and — most importantly — secure their independence from any change of power in Moscow.

Chernomyrdin's "Home" (46 governors have joined its council alone) is a marvelous mechanism for influencing regional recalcitrants. First, it acts as a form of party discipline, which for people who have not yet forgotten the regulations in the CPSU does mean something. Second, it provides real levers: finance, material resources, quotas, tax reductions, and other goodies.

Another consideration here is the real opportunity to get rid of cabinet mavericks. If Viktor Chernomyrdin's "Home" wins the election he won't have to award ministerial portfolios to opponents for no good reason.

And there is yet another major task which the government party has to solve, and that is strengthening the "Union of Sword and Plow." Corruption and the fusion of the bureaucracy and capital here take on seemingly noble party goals proclaimed for the good of the people. It is small wonder that the congress held at the All- Russia Movie Center saw so many flashily dressed people ["malinovyye pidzhaki"] in attendance — people who have made a financial killing under this government and who are ready therefore to support it. In return, the government gains the opportunity as a "party" to exercise control, albeit only partially, over banking and industrial capital, thereby taking out insurance against further "Black Tuesdays" and other unpleasant surprises [passage omitted]

Chernomyrdin, Yeltsin, Luzhkov Top Polls

LD1905135895 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in English 1110 GMT 19 May 95

[Commentary by Vitaliy Gurov; from the "News and Views" program]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] According to the Russian Center for Strategic Analysis and the "Vox Populi" Service for Public Opinion Research, the most authoritative [as heard] politicians in Russia are Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, President Boris Yeltsin, and the mayor of Moscow, Yuriy Luzhkov. More on this from Vitaliy Gurov.

The forecasts from these two centers have proved to be very reliable. Their forecast made in March and April about the economic and political situation proved to be 85 percent correct. Much attention in Russia is paid to conclusions made by these two centers.

In May, Mr. Chernomyrdin was the first on the list of the most authoritative Russian politicians and he is likely to retain this position up to December when parliamentary elections are to take place in Russia. Experts came to these conclusions after a number of public opinion polls had been conducted. The Russian public wants no upheavals, neither economic nor political ones. The prime minister is considered to be an advocate of stability. Hasty decisions are uncharacteristic of him. President Yeltsin's high rating can be attributed to the same motives. The popularity of the Moscow mayor, Yuriy Luzhkov, is explained by his dynamic work and desire to take into consideration social factors.

Specialists who conducted the poll say the rating of Grigoriy Yavlinskiy could rise by the end of the year, in time for the parliamentary elections. Mr. Yavlinskiy is the leader of the YaBLoko bloc and an advocate of democratic reform.

According to the poll, the ratings of the communist leader, Gennadiy Zyuganov, and the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, could also rise. Criticism of the government and the president from different positions will probably add to their popularity.

According to the poll, a number of politicians will occupy lower places in the listing, among them the former Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, the well-known politician Aleksandr Yakovlev, and the economist Gavriil Popov.

The head of the Center for Strategic Analysis, Dmitriy Olshanskiy, believes that up to 70 percent of the eligible voters will take part in the parliamentary elections in December. Most people intend to vote against all candidates. However, the situation in Russia is volatile and it is hard to predict what may happen in six months' time.

Rybkin on Need for Commonsense Politics

LD1905164195

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1510 GMT on 18 May broadcasts a 60-minute program entitled "On the Political Olympus" by Bella Kurkova on the political situation in Russia in the run-up to the parliamentary elections, coming up in less than six months. The program mainly features Russian Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin who speaks about ideology, patriotism, describes his bloc, identifies possible target groups whose votes his bloc would like to have, criticizes the government, and speaks about democracy and the levers of power the State Duma can use. He also discusses the necessity of having a parliament and government of commonsense, of reforming the judicial system, and he tells the correspondent about himself as a person. The program recalls Gorbachev's era, showing him as a man of the past whose time has gone, and carries footage of the founding congress of the Our Home is Russia movement, with Sobchak, Abdulatipov, and other MPs, describing their vision of the arising movement and speaking about their aspirations.

At the beginning the program shows two Russian MPs, captioned as N.N. Vorontsov (the Democratic Russia movement) and M.M. Molostvov (the Russia's Choice party) saying that people should be more active during the elections because their passivity can give rise to undesirable trends in society, for instance, the fascists coming to power.

This is followed by footage of Rybkin interviewed by Bella Kurkova. Asked about a force capable of uniting the Russian society, Rybkin says: "I am sometimes told that there is no ideology that can unite people. I say this is a wrong statement. There is love for the motherland, we call it patriotism. The word "patriotism" ... patriotism in Russia is multinational, there cannot be Russian patriotism, or Tatar or Yakutian patriotism, though it can be both this and that and another — dozens of varieties, but it must be a nation's patriotism. This is a must. Russia used to grow strong on it, and Russia ranked as a great power, gained its greatness, glory and significance."

Then over a video of a meeting in progress, showing Chernomyrdin taking his seat in the presidium of the meeting and a close-up of Rybkin, the correspondent says that the setting up of two powerful pre-election blocs — those of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Speaker Rybkin — has enlivened the soporific political environment in Russia.

When asked what motivated him to set up his bloc and what powers are backing him, Rybkin says: "As far as the left-centrist bloc is concerned, I would like to say that its fragments do practically exist. In fact, if we use the language of mathematics, it is present as an implicit function...People are not satisfied with the progress of reforms, their pace, that high price they are paying for these reforms. They want to see their own association, and they insist on it...It does not matter who will be the leader, it matters to have a political movement which will express people's attitude so that people would follow it."

Identifying his possible voters' groups, Rybkin dwells on the problems of the older generation saying that the Russians have always had very strong spiritual beliefs, that the older generations are self-sacrificing and they should be socially protected by the authorities. He criticizes the government for its financial reform when the elderly lost all their life-long savings: "I am not a proponent of catastrophism. On 1 January 1992 the older generations lost all their savings overnight and, of course, this is inadmissible."

Among his target groups he lists the young people, students in particular: "This young and strong generation has lots of strength and health but does not have employment. This is absolutely unfair. One is at the beginning of one's life and encounters this indifference...We must give them jobs. We do not want to turn Russia into one big charity home when everyone gets an equal share of everything and can sit back doing nothing." He goes on to speak about Russians emigrants who live in the West and are waiting for stability and accord in Russia: "These people are terribly homesick, they long for Russia. But they want Russia to have stability, accord and peace. Today 40 percent of our economy is a shadow economy. It means that the one who works in the government lacks skills, and the one who adopts laws is not very skillful either. Forty four percent of people's income is not taxed. People evade taxes, go into the shadow economy. It means that the taxes should be realistic so that people could become law-abiding and feel that way, and can pay taxes. For those who cannot pay, one can give tax holidays. All this is real, and is used in other countries."

Speaking about the Duma's levers of power, Rybkin says: "The Duma as a representative and law-making body does not have many controlling levers, but it does have some. The two very powerful levers, in my opinion, are — first of all the auditing chamber. The auditing chamber is a new institution of statehood and has been set up for an omnipresent, I would say, total comprehensive control over the funding and the budget, for their appropriate use and so on. Other countries owe Russia a lot of money. We must, regardless of any political preferences, empathy or antipathy, recover this debt from all countries without exception. There are other levers as well, other approaches."

Asked whether he would oppose Chernomyrdin or support him, Rybkin says: "I think the attempt which is being made today, at least by the left-centrists, it is an attempt to grow muscles of the Russian centrism. Commonsense prevails in people's life but it does not receive a proper and sufficient setting either in parliament or the government or the presidential structures." Rybkin says about the judicial power that "the judicial system should be drastically reformed."

The program then shows footage of the inaugural congress of the Our Home is Russia movement. It shows St. Peterburg's Mayor Sobchak standing outside the conference hall and speaking to Bella Kurkova. Sobchak describes his vision of the new bloc: "I do not think it is an order-tailored party just because heads of regional authorities and ministers are present here. I do not think it is an order-tailored party because such a party will not survive, it will not prove successful. It can be set up but it will peacefully die a moment later. Politics is a serious and sophisticated thing and one cannot work as has been ordered from above here. We need to remove absurdity from our life — political and economic absurdity. When we see our Duma with a lot of dilettantes, people who are not ready for making laws, we are not surprised that the Duma cannot pass even one normal law. We ask ourselves, why these people should be there and not professionals who have experience and knowledge."

The program then shows Irina Khakamada, a young female MP, who says she is a new wave politician orientated toward the 75 percent of the electorate who tend to dodge the elections rather than toward the 25 percent who vote in them. She also says it is easier to be in opposition to the ruling party in Russia because the Russians would rather vote for the opposition.

The program then shows Ramazan Abdulatipov, deputy speaker of the Federation Council, speaking in the congress lobby, who says: "There are many good people in the government. People who are really capable of doing real work. I have just told them. Look how many good-looking ministers you have got. Each of them is unique, talented, worthy of respect and able. But taken together as a whole they are not coping somehow." Speaking about centrism in Russia, Abdulatipov also says: "I am always very pessimistic about those blocs that declare themselves centrists and immediately feel the urge to overthrow somebody. Unfortunately, the center in Russia is empty. Centrism, no matter how I dearly love it, does not have any future in Russia. As Berdyaev (Russian philosopher) said, Russia is a polarized country, with a polarized mentality. Under the current complicated situation, Russia seems to be even more polarized than ever before."

The program then shows footage of Mikhail Gorbachev and the correspondent says that Gorbachev is no longer popular and should not appear on the scene again because people no longer trust him.

At the end of the program Rybkin speaks about his past, his family, educational background, hobbies, favorite poets, and interpersonal skills at work.

Rybkin Discusses Election Bloc With Shcherbakov, Volskiy

LD1905185295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1625 GMT 19 May

[By Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Itar-Tass) — A meeting of Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin and heads of the Russian United Industrial Party Vladimir Scherbakov and Arkadiy Volskiy was held here today to discuss the creation of a new election bloc.

The speaker told correspondents that the new bloc will be in between the Our Home-Russia movement and the Agrarian Party of Russia election association. He stressed that the Agrarians are welcome to join the bloc but they intend to participate in the elections on their own.

The economic structure of the new bloc is being elaborated with the help of head of the Reforma Fund Stanislav Shatalin. The bloc may be joined by the Soglasie (Accord) public-political movement whose registration documents have been submitted to the Justice Ministry and whose leadership is offered to Rybkin.

Rybkin's Bloc Facing Challenges, Opportunities

MK2005101095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 20 May 95 p 5

[Report by Natalya Arkhangelskaya: "Party Life in Russia. Organizational Party Development Is Reminiscent of a House-Building Combine"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] While construction of Chernomyrdin's "Our Home" is proceeding apace, not even ground breaking has yet been done on the construction site reserved for Rybkin's bloc. The designers seem not to have agreed on what sort of material is to be used to build their "home." Although there are several possible options emerging already.

In accordance with the first most probable scenario, the bloc's foundation is to be finally formed by the Agrarian Party [APR], from whose depths Ivan Rybkin emerged — or more precisely, the party's more pragmatic part led by Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha and Agriculture Minister Aleksandr Nazarchuk who are, naturally, oriented toward the government. The APR will not be allowed to throw its entire support behind Rybkin by its ideology-permeated left wing controlled by Vasiliy Starodubtsev, former State Committee for the State of Emergency man and nomenklatura land-tiller. The first rumors of a possible split among the Agrarians emerged as early as last August when Zaveryukha openly announced his intention to form an alternative party for peasants. At that time, the splitter received a deserved rebuff but, people in the know insist, he has not given up his intrigues. The election campaign may act as a catalyst in the process which seems to have already started. This is indirectly indicated by unmotivated frequent and emotional outbursts by APR leader Mikhail Lapshin in which he pledges that things in the party have never been better and that Ivan Rybkin remains a member of its leadership. In a 17 May press conference in the Duma, he even ventured a revealing statement to the effect that "peasants will never be servants in 'Our Home.'" It is not ruled out that we are witnessing a desperate haggling between the Agrarians and the government, to which they want to sell themselves for higher bids. Notably, not only the executive branch is interested in a split of the APR — the Communists, too, may profit from it in some way. There has long been a tug-of-war between the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] and the APR: the Communists are urging the inclusion in the APR rules a point permitting dual membership — whereas the APR leadership, who still think of themselves as the CPSU's "agriculture department," are offering desperate resistance. Why Lapshin is the busiest man of them all today is also clear: should there be a split, the right- side fragment complete with Zaveryukha and Nazarchuk would end up under Rybkin, the left-side one with Starodubtsev — but under the CPRF, the present leader of the party may end up sitting between two stools. Which is an awkward position. [passage omitted]

KOMMERSANT-DAILY has already written that far from everybody joining Chernomyrdin's bloc likes its creators' frankly nomenklatura preferences and manners. According to confidential information, members of the cabinet were gently recommended not to be too slow in considering requests from deputies who are members of the movement, while the heads of administrations have been asked to facilitate reelection of these deputies for a second term — and if that fails, to fix them up with dignified jobs. The heads of regional administrations, for their part, have begun to urge their deputies to immediately cross over into the Duma "Stability" group, which, as a whole, is known to be entering "Home." Named among those so "affected" are deputies Valeriy Podmasko (Khabarovsk Kray) and Viktor Lotkov (Omsk Oblast.) Such undisguised pressure can provoke (and is now provoking) a contrary reaction — a rather heavy flow of Home into Rybkin's future bloc is possible. The biggest "brick" that is about to fall off the "Our Home" foundation is the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, all of which (minus their leader) are packing their bags for an exit.

Also conspicuous is a stream of newly registered but enigmatic — to many people — parties and movements that has become especially strong over the recent week. Most of them are "dummies" registered by the Justice Ministry which, a month or so ago, opened wide the gates to all comers, most of whom will never find any application. But this number of phantom parties provides wide scope for imagination in thinking up the most canny and surprising moves, which interested observers will be seeing in profusion between now and mid-August, when the time comes for everyone to register.

Gaydar Scolds Yavlinskiy's Decision To Spurn Alliance

LD2005102795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1017 GMT 20 May 95

[By Tamara Ivanova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW May 20 (Itar-Tass) — Yegor Gaydar, the leader of the Russia's Democratic Choice party, described as "betrayal and a stab in the back" refusal of Grigoriy Yavlinskiy to ally his Yabloko movement with Gaydar's.

Gaydar explained in his today's speech to a conference of the Moscow branch of Russia's Democratic Choice (RDC) that the RDC was ready to nominate Yavlinskiy for the forthcoming elections as a candidate of the two pro-democracy blocs. This would consolidate democratic forces in Russia, Gaydar said.

However, Yavlinskiy "backtracked on his proposal of cooperation" in the elections by verbose explanations of why the alliance of Yabloko and RDC was impossible, Gaydar said, adding that the destructive stance of Yabloko will get remuneration it deserved from electorates.

If this alliance is impossible, a new electoral bloc of existing democracy movements need be announced, the RDC's leader said. He said the RDC would soon start negotiations with movements having extensive regional nets of branches.

As for the presidential election ahead in June 1996, Gaydar said only communists, agrarians and the party of power can collect one million electors' signatures to nominate their candidates for presidency. Of democracy movements, only the RDC is able of it, Gaydar said. The party's congress in June is to advance its candidate.

Gaydar stressed that the task was of crucial importance and required the party's consultations with other democratic forces and the Russian society.

"If the democrats manage not to give away power to irresponsible adventure-seekers, there is hope that we will obstruct the path of those forces to power for good," Gaydar said, adding that the present economic pickup gives grounds for voicing such a hope.

Yavlinskiy Denies Charge of 'Betraying Democracy'

LD2205093795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0908 GMT 22 May 95

[By Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 22 (Itar-Tass) — "It is impossible to betray somebody whom I promised nothing", in brief reacted Grigoriy Yavlinskiy to reproaches of betraying democracy against him by Yegor Gaydar.

Last Saturday leader of the party "Democratic choice of Russia" had publicly accused leader of the political bloc "Yabloko" of betraying common interests of the democratic movement, calling the refusal to form a pre-election alliance between the "Choice" and the "Yabloko" as stabbing democracy in the back.

"I do not take part in such scandals", Grigoriy Yavlinskiy told Itar-Tass, hinting, that Yegor Gaydar's charges made against him are not even a topic worth commenting upon. "What Yegor Gaydar said is a fact of his biography, it does not have anything to do with me", Grigoriy Yavlinski said.

Gaydar Outlines Party's 'Minimum' Goals

LD2005171395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1645 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 20 (Interfax) — The program-minimum of the Russia's Democratic Choice party is to "prevent a new revolution and war in Russia," the party's Chairman Yegor Gaydar told a conference of the Russia's Democratic Choice Moscow City Organization in Moscow today.

He said that to fulfill the program-minimum his party had to cooperate with the "party of power." Gaydar said that, nevertheless, "our fraternizing with the party of power defending the interests of Russian officials and a refusal of our principal strategic positions and discord with it would be a fatal mistake for democratic movement."

Gaydar named among such discord the Chechen tragedy. He said Russia had already lost "tens thousands of lives" in Chechnya.

Gaydar said that signs of economic stabilization were now appearing. He said he believed that "the capitalist revolution" which had begun in Russia in 1991 "finally turns out to be success."

He said the capitalist economy had been formed in Russia. Gaydar said he was proud that he had taken some part in the struggle for the victory of the capitalist revolution.

Gaydar admitted that this revolution was "a disastrous tragedy of Russia." However he said the revolution was "a payment for the incapacity of the Communist elite and the Communist regime of ensuring a consistent way out of Socialism."

Gaydar said he believed that the government's present economic program had serious chances for success. He said the success was an important precondition for stopping the extremists on their way to power at the next parliamentary and presidential elections.

Gaydar told his party's members that "nobody is interested in the success of this policy more than we."

Gaydar said that Democrats, including the Russia's Democratic Choice, were seeking to contribute to the consistent process of the adaptation of Capitalism to the needs of the Russian people.

Democrats Seen Searching for Electoral Base

MK1905123095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 19 May 95 p 3

[Report by Sergey Markov, political scientist, under the "Electorate" rubric: "'Democratic Choice of Russia' Sympathizers Have Become Younger and Richer. Those Who Are More Moderate Drift Toward 'Yabloko'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A "roundtable" on the subject "The Electorate of Democratic Parties," attended by key sociologists, political scientists, and also leaders of electoral staffs of democratically oriented parties and movements, has been held at the Carnegie Center in Moscow as part of a series of seminars devoted to the upcoming parliamentary elections. The keynote speech was delivered by Igor Klyamkin, director of the "Public Opinion" fund's analytical center; a commentary to it was delivered by Leonid Sedov, expert of the All-Russian Public Opinion Studies Center.

The key question of the discussion was how to determine the best possible strategy for forming blocs out of democratically minded parties and movements (in the Russian sense of this term). Two options were proposed. Igor Klyamkin cited data according to which the electorate of the Democratic Choice of Russia [DCR] has recently become even more radical; in particular, it has become younger; the share of students in it has gone up at the expense of working persons who have declined in percentage terms; its average income has increased (owing to the dropout of voters with medium and low incomes); the share of workers and employees fell, but that of people employed in the private sector has gone up.

At the same time, changes that have occurred in the "Yabloko" electorate are directly opposed in nature. Given that, it is not by chance that the political views of "Yabloko" leaders are becoming increasingly moderate (centrist or left-of-center), while those of the DCR leaders are, on the contrary, becoming more radical. Proceeding from these data, the speaker concluded that a merger of the DCR and "Yabloko" into one bloc is becoming not only increasingly unfeasible owing to their differing political stances, but also unproductive from the pragmatic point of view: Should they join forces, the most moderate part of the "Yabloko" electorate and the most radical part of the DCR electorate will be disoriented and will simply not turn out for the vote. Thus the overall number of votes that could be won by Russian democrats would decline.

At the same time, poll data show that the other democratic leaders, among whom Svyatoslav Fedorov and Boris Fedorov are the most successful ones, and the blocs they head have very slim chances of clearing the 5-percent hurdle, for which reason their candidates, if nominated, will simply siphon off votes from the front-runner blocs.

The reason is that the overall democratic electorate has remained surprisingly stable — 21 percent — for a long time (notably, 21 percent of the total number of voters, not of those who may turn out for election. Prodding their potential voters to come to the ballot boxes will be a separate problem for all blocs, and the election results will largely depend on how it will be resolved). Therefore, as figures show, claims by the new democratic leaders that they can snatch votes away from the opposition forces turn out to be groundless. Igor Klyamkin draws the following conclusion: The democrats should rally around two poles. One under the banner of radical reform and the other as a democratic opposition to this reform.

The new blocs of Chernomyrdin and Rybkin may affect the definitive balance of votes, because they could garner 10 percent and 9 percent in the parliamentary elections respectively, even if only 2 percent and 3 percent in the presidential election. But this will not be crucially important for the democrats since the new blocs' electorate is uncertain and only 35 percent of Chernomyrdin's potential supporters and 19 percent of Rybkin's lean toward the democrats, that is, can take votes away from them. To all appearances, however, these new blocs will target the votes of the so-called "swamp," which is fairly vast and comprises about 45 percent of the electorate. The democrats, for their part, need to straighten out problems regarding their firm supporters and to see to it that they will turn out for the elections.

In Leonid Sedov's view, on the contrary, the percentage of voters ready to vote democratic has dropped very significantly, particularly after the creation of the new blocs of Chernomyrdin and Rybkin, for which reason it is essential for the democrats to join forces. This unification can be facilitated by the emergence of a common enemy which can be furnished by the fledgling party of power represented by the two new blocs, particularly in combination with the slogan "The old nomenklatura is creeping back into power." By Mr. Sedov's estimate, the Chernomyrdin and Rybkin blocs could poll up to 13 percent and 12 percent of the vote respectively, given that many voters (up to 55 percent) have not yet made up their minds and may well give their backing to the new blocs. For this reason, together they can count on over one-half of the active electorate.

All speakers agreed that Yeltsin's electorate has always consisted of the democrats, who have now largely withdrawn their confidence from him, and partly of the proponents of a strong hand across ideological lines, some of whom still support Yeltsin, some of whom have switched to the traditional opposition. But the part of the democratically minded electorate who have largely become disillusioned with the current reform are not rushing to go over to the opposition and are actively searching for new democratically oriented politicians who would offer a more modest policy. This is an asset of Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, who has put forward the slogan of democratic opposition that enables him to pick up this part of the electorate. The disillusioned democratic voters who do not see in him their ideal have so far stopped short of voting for the traditional opposition, but they have largely refrained from turning out at all.

Therefore, a major part of the traditional democratic electorate is looking for a moderately left-wing, or rather left-of-center, niche. And this part of the Russian political spectrum is still relatively unoccupied.

Shakhray's Party May Merge With 'Russia Is Our Home'

LD1905190195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1627 GMT 19 May 95

[By Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Itar-Tass) — A congress of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord will decide whether to merge with the Our Home-Russia movement, party leader Sergey Shakhray told a news conference at the State Duma today. The congress is scheduled for late May.

Shakhray denied a party split over the attitude to the Our Home-Russia bloc but admitted certain difference in positions. In his words, some party members fear the party may lose political and organizational independence in the election process in case it merges with an election bloc. Shakhray does not exclude that his party may participate in the upcoming elections on its own.

He made a supposition that the president may veto the law on Duma elections. In that case, Boris Yeltsin "will have a beneficial role of arbiter in the dispute of the two chambers," noted Shakhray. As known, the Federation Council has voted for election of Duma deputies exclusively in majoritarian districts, while the State Duma insists on giving half of its mandates to representatives of political parties.

"Anyway, we must be ready for conciliatory procedures," noted Shakhray. He stressed that accusations of the president claiming he keeps to the stand of the Federation Council are ungrounded.

New Centrist Political Party Emerges

LD2105172395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1701 GMT 21 May 95

[By Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 21 (Itar-Tass) — Yet another political party has emerged in Russia, the Russian People's Congress.

The Russian People's Congress (RPC) was established by State Duma deputy Nikolay Stolyarov, a former Communist Party functionary and once a supporter of ex-Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy with whom he had set up the Democratic Party of the Communists of Russia.

The new party which has pledged commitment to centrist social democratic principles includes several more Duma deputies and professors who are members of the so-called Arbat Club.

The RPC leaders said they favour "reasonable state regulation in all spheres of public life."

They have not made up their mind yet as to whether or not their party will participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections, saying that a decision to this effect may be adopted by the next party congress to be held in October. However, they pointed out that if such a decision is adopted they will focus on one-seat constituencies and lean on Russia's intellectuals.

Speaking about his former alliance with Rutskoy, Stolyarov told Itar-Tass on Sunday that their paths parted long ago. At the same time, he added that his party remains open to cooperation with all, but will not forge any unions with the forces of "wild nationalism and fascism."

CP To Join 'Patriotic Forces' Bloc for Elections

LD2005152395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1250 gmt 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, May 20 (INTERFAX) — Russia's Communist Party intends to join this year's parliamentary elections as an independent bloc, the party's leader Gennadiy Zyuganov told Interfax on Saturday.

When asked about the possibility of cooperation with Chernomyrdin's electoral bloc Our Home Is Russia, Zyuganov said: "Russia's Communist Party is ready to hold dialogue with all who do not want to have a war in the country, who do not want the state to be destroyed."

The patriotic forces will form a bloc for next year's presidential elections, Zyuganov pointed out. As he said, the Communist Party is now engaged in negotiations on establishing that bloc with a number of parties and public movements.

According to Zyuganov, the bloc is expected to include the Agrarian Party, the Producers' Association, trade unions, veterans' and women's organizations.

Govorukhin Announces Candidacy for President

LD1905125895 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in English 1100 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Another candidate has announced his intention to run for president of Russia next year. He is the leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, deputy of the State Duma Stanislav Govorukhin. At the same time he stressed he would make the final decision only after he received support not only from the Democratic Party but other political forces as well.

In a press interview Govorukhin said: If the Democratic Party comes to power it will begin with undemocratic moves. Extraordinary measures would be required, he added, to take the country out of the economic chaos and the reign of crime.

Earlier intentions to run for president were announced by the leader of the communists Gennadiy Zyuganov, well-known economist Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, and certain other politicians.

Sobchak Critical of Gorbachev Views

954F2294A St. Petersburg SMENA in Russian 16 May 95 p 1

[Report by Ruslan Linkov: "Sobchak and Gorbachev: Competition in Eloquence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The activities connected with the visit to St. Petersburg of Mikhail Gorbachev culminated last Saturday in the workshop "Role of Perestroyka in the Destiny of Russia." It was opened by Yuriy Kravtsov, speaker of the Legislative Assembly, who immediately called on Mikhail Sergeyevich to speak.

In his hour-long speech the president of the USSR spoke of the contributions of the reformers, who had made our society more open. Mr. Gorbachev was very sharply critical of the present leaders of Russia. Specifically, he termed the reforms that they are implementing "cowboyism." The former head of state is convinced of the need for elections of the president of Russia as soon as possible. "The presidential elections, which should take place in the summer of 1996, must not be aborted."

As Mikhail Sergeyevich sees it, those seated in the Kremlin today are manifestly reluctant to leave it and in order to extend their rule are forming Rybkin and Chernomyrdin blocs. Gorbachev declared jocularly that the electorate would now know whom not to vote for and added: "Our people can no longer be fooled." Speaking of perestroyka, the father of it observed: "Perestroyka was forcibly broken off in December 1991." All that has happened in the country since the resignation of M.S. "has had a very remote connection" with the process that he began. Mr. Gorbachev pointed, in addition, to the importance of the unification of the majority of "truly democratic" organizations.

Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak sharply rebuked Mikhail Sergeyevich. He evaluated his speech as a "speech of the traditional length of the last general secretary of the CPSU." Sobchak believes that Gorbachev's opinions were delivered according to the formula: "This is what I think, and this is right." Anatoliy Aleksandrovich termed the text read out by Mikhail Sergeyevich empty words, not a concept of perestroyka. The mayor is sure that the former Union leader regretful of the fact that perestroyka was broken off is in the wrong. "What is happening now is a continuation of the cause begun by Mikhail Sergeyevich. This is his main contribution to the country and the world."

Sobchak also reproached Gorbachev for the fact that the latter had not in the 1980's undertaken a modernization of the economy "but set about clearing the field around himself of the Brezhnev entourage." Had we resurrected the idea of market socialism in 1985, a certain success could have been achieved by 1995, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich believes. For greater persuasiveness the mayor cited the example of the Chinese People's Republic. Anatoliy Sobchak's speech also lasted no less than an hour.

Yegor Ligachev, who was present in the hall, severely criticized both Gorbachev and Sobchak. He advertised from the platform of the Grand Hall of the Mariinskiy Palace his beloved People's Patriotic bloc. The former Politburo member mapped out the range of the communists' priority tasks: the elimination of capitalism; the guaranteed sovereignty of the soviets; the restoration of people's control; an end to the implantation of Westernism and Americanism.

Mikhail Sergeyevich conveyed to the audience his decision not to run at the December Federal Assembly elections, but did not rule out personal assistance to some democratic blocs.

Coded Communication System Near Completion

LD2005175095 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1652 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 20 (Interfax) — Russia's Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information is finishing creation of a coded communications system, agency deputy general director Yuriy Shankin said.

The system, Delovaya Set Rossii (the Business Network of Russia), will be a telephone, telex and telefax grid open for use not only to government authorities but also to businesses and private individuals, Shankin told Interfax.

He said the system would offer a wide range of information services and ensure the secrecy of information.

Delovaya Set Rossii, to be the basis for a future single national telecommunications system, comprises most of the country's existing telecommunications systems, such as INFOTEL, RELKOM and ATLAS, Shankin said.

Military & Space Issues

Kokoshin: Budget Allocation for Defense 'Unacceptably Low'

LD1905133295 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1241 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Interfax) — First Deputy Russian Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin, at the government meeting which approved Thursday [18 May] the concept of the budget policies for 1996, described as "unacceptably low" the planned allocations for the Armed Forces and the defense industry.

The Ministry's press service quoted Kokoshin on Friday as saying that the amount of allocations does not correspond to Russia's requirements to ensure due defense capability for it.

Kokoshin favored "the radical improvement of the current financing of the national defense." "The situation is extremely difficult in this sphere, I should say unbearable," he said.

He said that the concept of the budget policy for the next year, which was submitted by Minfin [Ministry of Finance], does not also reflect "the requirements in gaining strong positions in the world markets of science-intensive products."

Kremlin, Defense Ministry at Loss in Dealing With Lebed

MK1905103095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 1

[Report by Igor Korotchenko under the "Army" rubric: "Kremlin Does Not Know What To Do With General Lebed. Neither Does Defense Ministry."]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] It is clear that Aleksandr Lebed's further presence in the Dniester region runs contrary to the interests of the present political regime. In the time left before the presidential election, the army commander's rating will tend to rise steadily — also due to his unrelenting criticism of state leaders. People usually pay little attention to this criticism at opposition meetings, but they keep citing it ecstatically if the same is said by an experienced acting general. Traditional methods used to manage dissidents within the armed forces cannot be used in this particular case. There are also no grounds to dismiss him from his post. To find them, one has to send a special commission. And Lebed can simply not allow this commission to his army positions, or arrest its head. If the president issues an edict to send the general to take a post at the Trans-Baykal Military District, Lebed may well ignore both the edict and the person who signed it — the situation will be very embarrassing. To arrest him for the incriminating disobedience would be impossible — the Dniester area is far away, and one would need to send a special "snatch" group for that. In addition, the general has several thousand well-trained soldiers at his disposal.

It follows, therefore, that — by the time candidates for the presidency are to be registered — the 14th Army commander may well reach the height of his fame and popularity. And while one can attempt to annul Gennadiy Zyuganov's or Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's victory under the pretext of fighting a "communist restoration" and a "fascist threat to the fate of democracy," to do the same with Aleksandr Lebed would be fraught with consequences. The corporate solidarity of the generals is a serious matter. If something happens, the General Staff, the Moscow Military District Staff, and the Airborne Troops Staff are sure to take care of their colleague. It would take slightly more than an hour after the alarm signal for the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade stationed in Teplyy Stan [southwest part of city] to block off downtown Moscow.

It is generally believed that the situation with Lieutenant General Lebed has no solutions: It is impossible to move him to another place, nor is it possible to leave him in Tiraspol. The Kremlin does not know what to do with him, and neither does the Russian Federation Defense Ministry.

Compensation Law Extended to Chechnya Veterans

MM1905140595 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 May 95 p 1

[Russian Federation Federal Law on the Application of the Russian Federation Law "On Additional Guarantees and Compensation for Servicemen Performing Military Service on the Territory of Transcaucasian and Baltic States and of the Republic of Tajikistan and for Those Performing Tasks in State of Emergency Conditions and During Armed Conflicts" to Servicemen and to Enlisted and Command Personnel, Officer Candidates, and Students at Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs Educational Institutions Who Are Performing or Who Have Performed Tasks in Conditions of the Armed Conflict in the Chechen Republic," adopted by the State Duma 12 April 1995, signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin, and dated Moscow, The Kremlin, 16 May 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text] Article 1. The Russian Federation Law "On Additional Guarantees and Compensation for Servicemen Performing Military Service on the Territory of Transcaucasian and Baltic States and of the Republic of Tajikistan and for Those Performing Tasks in State of Emergency Conditions and During Armed Conflicts" (VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII [Gazette of the Russian Federation Congress of People's Deputies and Russian Federation Supreme Soviet], 1993, No. 6, Article 181; No. 34, Article 1395) applies to servicemen and to enlisted and command personnel, officer candidates, and students at Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs educational institutions who are performing or who have performed tasks in conditions of the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic.

Article 2. The Russian Federation Government is to define the zone of armed conflict in the Chechen Republic, the time spent by servicemen and enlisted and command personnel, officer candidates, and students at Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs educational institutions in performing tasks in this zone, and the procedure for giving them additional guarantees and compensation.

Article 3. This federal law comes into force on the day of its official publication.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin

[Dated] Moscow, The Kremlin, 16 May 1995

Spektr Research Probe Launched From Baykonur

LD2005053195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0456 GMT 20 May 95

[By Viktor Gritsenko and Veronika Romanenkova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW May 20 (Itar-Tass) - The Spektr research probe was launched on Saturday by the Russian Space Military Forces (SMF) from the Baykonur cosmodrome on Saturday at 07:33, Moscow time. Colonel-General Vladimir Ivanov, commander of the Russian SMF, supervised the launching.

Further on Launch of Spektr Probe

LD2005075595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0746 GMT 20 May 95

[By Viktor Gritsenko and Veronika Romanenkova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW May 20 (Itar-Tass) — The Russian Space Military Forces (SMF) launched the Spektr research module from the Baykonur cosmodrome this Saturday at 07:33, Moscow time. Colonel General Vladimir Ivanov, SMF commander, supervised the launching.

Following ten minutes after the lift-off, a booster rocket, Proton-K, put the module into the calculated orbit. The Spektr's orbit is slightly above the orbit of the Mir station to which the module is streaking.

The probe will gradually descend to be at the same altitude with the Mir station by June 1 (date of docking).

Since cosmonauts Vladimir Dezhurov and Gennadiy Strekalov could not prepare all necessary things for the Spektr's docking during their two space walks, the docking was moved on from May 26 to June 1.

Itar-Tass learnt at the Flight Control Centre situated in the Moscow Region that this delay is insignificant, for the module can hurtle around the earth for 90 days independently.

True, experience shows that not a single out of the three modules, making part of the Mir orbital complex, could dock at the first attempt. However, specialists hope that the docking will be a success this time thanks to improvements in the module.

The Spektr is to work at least three years as part of the orbital complex. Its weight is 23.5 tonnes, 1,700 kilogrammes of which is fuel.

The Spektr was developed by the State Space Scientific and Production Centre named after Khrunichev.

It is designed to survey the earth's natural resources, upper layers of the atmosphere, geophysical processes in space and the upper atmosphere as well as to implement the joint Russian-American programmes "Mir-Shuttle" and "Mir-NASA". Equipment aboard the module is American-made.

It will be operated at least one month, under an agreement between the Russian Space Agency and NASA, by U.S. national Norman Thagard who is now aboard the Mir station.

Flight Parameters of Spektr Probe

LD2005084895 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0457 GMT 20 May 95

[By Viktor Gritsenko and Veronika Romanenkova]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Moscow, 20 May (ITAR-TASS) — The Spektr research probe was launched on Saturday by the Russian Space Military Forces from the Baykonur cosmodrom. [passage omitted]

Flight Control Center has reported that Spektr's orbital parameters are: apogee - 337 km; perigee - 221 km; period of revolution - 89.8 min; orbital inclination - 51.7 degrees.

Federal Assembly

Vote on Nuclear Law Said To Reflect Public Mood

MM2205082195 Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 May 95 p 1

[Report by Yuriy Rogozhin: "For the First Time in Russia, Parliamentarians Elaborate 'Nuclear Laws'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 17 May 1995, the State Duma adopted the final version of the first Russian law on "State Policy in the Sphere of Dealing With Radioactive Waste" and the law on "Radiation Safety for the Population." However, the draft law on the "Use of Nuclear Power," presented in the same package with the other two acts, did not pass.

This was contrary to the wishes of I. Rybkin who wanted the ratification of the entire package of "nuclear laws" as presented for its third reading. No doubt that is why, in violation of standing orders, he refused to grant deputies the right to speak about their reasons for voting. It was only when the draft law on the "Use of Nuclear Power" was rejected by a majority of votes, that the speaker was forced to figure out why it was not adopted.

The deputies noted that substantial amendments were made to the above-mentioned draft law by its supporters after it had passed its second reading. Thus the procedural norms were violated. In particular, Article 5, by which ownership of nuclear installations is regulated, authorizes in its latest wording the private ownership of nuclear electric power stations. Whether this is good or bad is a separate issue, but it is impermissible to push it through the legislature without full discussion. The overwhelming majority of State Duma members displayed commendable unanimity on this issue.

On behalf of the Duma, I. Rybkin instructed the Committee for Industry and the Power Industry, which submitted this draft law, together with the legal services, to iron out the deputies' objections so that it could be presented again in the spring plenary session.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the wide-ranging impact of this event. Evidently, it is no accident that the formation of nuclear law in Russia has started "from the end," so to speak. After all, the adopted laws concern the final, but not very favorable, consequences of using nuclear energy; that is, those connected with irradiation and radioactive waste.

Maybe without realizing it themselves, the deputies, with their decision, were expressing the hopes of the citizens of a country that has lived through the horror of the Chernobyl and Kyshtym disasters.

Duma Postpones Report on Chechnya Cease-Fire

LD1905163495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1547 GMT 19 May 95

[By Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, May 19 (ITAR-TASS) — A government report on measures taken to cease fire in Chechnya has been postponed by the State Duma till Wednesday. All the 244 deputies present at today's chamber session voted for this decision.

A proposal to the effect was made by communist deputy Kazbek Tsiku, who said that the report was to be delivered by First Deputy Minister for Affairs of Nationalities and Regional Policy Vyacheslav Mikhailov instead of First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets as it was decided by the Duma deputies.

The Duma insists on hearing about the Chechen situation from the First Vice-Premier.

Duma Briefed on Ossetian-Ingush Conflict

LD1905195295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1918 GMT 19 May 95

[By Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, May 19 (ITAR-TASS) — The Ossetian-Ingush conflict was "crushed down by forceful methods. However, the reasons which caused it have not been eliminated," Vladimir Lozovoi, chairman of the Provisional committee for the elimination of consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, believes. He stated this speaking at a plenary session of the Russian State Duma on Friday.

Deputies of the Duma invited him so that he informed them of the effectivity of the work on the return of forced settlers to the places of their permanent residence in the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia.

According to Vladimir Lozovoi, the main reasons for the non-settlement of the conflict lie in the fact that disarmament has not been effected in the region, restoration works are being carried out very slowly, the process of the return of refugees is also very slack, and finally, the conflict has not been assessed from the legal point of view.

The process of the return of refugees to the Prigorodny district, Vladimir Lozovoi informed, began only on August 1, 1994 and was interrupted repeatedly.

As of today, 391 families returned to the Prigorodny district. The return of forced settles meets with counteraction from the Ossetian side which is intentionally delaying it until the end of the summer after which the return of refugees will become impossible because of a cold weather. The Ingush side is also "playing up to this", the chairman of the Provisional committee stressed.

On the whole, both sides hamper the return of refugees, Vladimir Lozovoi noted. The main task now is to make the process of the return of refugees irreversible before the end of summer, he emphasized.

"We will be marking time until the Ossetian and Ingush sides "take constructive steps towards reconciliation", Vladimir Lozovoi pointed out.

He believes that the Ossetian-Ingush conflict should be settled first of all by legal, social and economic means.

Lebed Proposes Peacekeeping Role in Moldova

MK2005072095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 May 95 p 2

[POSTFACTUM report from the "In Brief" column: "Aleksandr Lebed's Statement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A statement by Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed, Russian Federation 14th Army commander, which was circulated yesterday in the State Duma, says: "I have not the slightest intention to burden Gen. Grachev's Army with my presence. I am ready to leave immediately." The general explains his presence in the Army ranks only by his "moral responsibility for tens of thousands of people left to their fate" in the Dniester Moldovan Republic. The Army commander proposed that the 14th Army's units be given peacekeeping functions. In his opinion, to treat the current conflict "as a kind of Lebed-Grachev duel" is a fallacy. He added, however: "I am unaware of the defense minister's true intentions."

Ilyukhin Says Security at 'Critical Level'

LD1905133495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1241 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, May 19 (INTERFAX) — Russia's security is at a critical level, Duma Security Committee chairman Viktor Ilyukhin has said. He was speaking at a conference of independent scholars in Moscow Friday.

Ilyukhin said that the Russian leadership did not have an integral well-considered concept of national security.

Ilyukhin said that Russia's national security must rely not only on economic or political principles, but on the spiritual and moral sovereignty of the nation.

He believes that Russia has lost part of its land. "The country has become vulnerable in all respects", Ilyukhin said.

He fears that if the Baltic countries are admitted into NATO, there will be no guarantee that NATO will not deploy its military bases in their territory. He said that according to some estimates still requiring confirmation that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had issued $10 million to finance Turkey's expansion into Crimea.

Ilyukhin said that Russia was spending $10-12 billion a year on national defense, a mere tenth of what the army and the navy actually need.

He believes that the destruction of the country's economic potential is one of the chief national security problems. Ilyukhin recalled that industrial production had been down by half since reforms began. "Oil production has been falling 10%-15% every year, and the commissioning of new oil fields is coming to an end", he said.

Ilyukhin warned that Russia, once a producer nation, was turning into a consumer country. Imports account for more than 50% of its trade turnover, he explained. He said that more than $20 billion of Russian money ended up in Western banks every year.

Ilyukhin said that currently 70%-80% of all shares of Russian enterprises appearing on the market were purchased by foreign firms. "If this trend continues, Russia will be fully controlled by Western countries within several years," he said.

As to the disastrous position of science Ilyukhin said that the brain drain cost Russia an annual $60-70 million.

As he reviewed the crime situation, Ilyukhin said that according to some sources 10-12 million crimes were committed a year and about 500,000 people died violent deaths. Ilyukhin believes that the sole means of beating crime is through undermining its financial and economic potential.

Ilyukhin Urges Inquiry of Chernomyrdin Bloc Funds

LD1905131695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1241 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, May 19 (INTERFAX) — Head of the State Duma Committee for National Security Viktor Ilyukhin says he has sent a letter to First Deputy Prosecutor General Vildan Uzbekov asking to check who exactly funded the inaugural congress of the Our Home is Russia bloc (NDR) held on May 12.

In a Friday interview with INTERFAX he said that "according to some information yet to be verified," Russia's Gazprom company alone had remitted 4 billion rubles to this end. Ilyukhin spoke of other evidence, also to be verified, saying Kemerovo region remitted up to 1 billion rubles towards an election campaign of the prime minister-led NDR.

In his words, the media has already raised the question of shady resources used to cover the cost of such an expensive function. Ilyukhin says if the money came from state companies, this is a case of office abuse and financial irregularity entailing criminal charges. Alternatively, if it came from private commercial structures, this is a case of flagrant corruption, he said. The Prosecutor General's Office has been asked to inform the State Duma about its findings and measures taken.

Regional Affairs

Dudayev Says Chernomyrdin's Proposed Roundtable 'Absurd'

LD1905202395 Moscow NTV in Russian 1500 GMT 19 May 95

[Report by Aleksandr Poklad; no video available]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Military actions in Chechnya are intensifying again. [passage omitted on roundup of today's fighting] According to the press center of the Interior Troops, during the war in Chechnya federal troops eliminated 74 tanks, 111 armored personnel carriers, 146 guns, and 266 aircraft. They captured 18 tanks and 71 armored personnel carriers. All of this equipment had been left to Dzhokhar Dudayev by the country's top military command.

The press service of the Interior Troops also announced that on 15 May Dudayev's supporters managed to capture three Russian servicemen who were accompanying a truck convoy in southern Chechnya.

Meanwhile, Dzhokhar Dudayev has conferred with his closest entourage at a base in the mountains. In reply to Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's proposal to convene a roundtable on the settlement in Chechnya, Dudayev said such talks were absurd.

Chechen Leaders Welcome New Initiative From Moscow

LD2005192595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1918 GMT 20 May 95

[By Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, May 20 (Itar-Tass) — "Chechen leaders welcome the new initiative of Kremlin that aims to search for a peaceful settlement of the Chechen conflict. They are ready to meet Kremlin halfway," a well-informed source in the Dudayev circle told Itar-Tass today. He reached the Groznyy office of Itar-Tass over the telephone after yesterday's TV report on the instruction of Boris Yeltsin to the Russian state head to continue the search for peaceful Chechen settlement.

Boris Yeltsin instructed Viktor Chernomyrdin to take additional measures for political settlement of the Chechen crisis, assistant to the Russian state head told Itar-Tass earlier today.

In his words, the presidential instruction aims at goals listed in the law on "Temporary Measures for Chechen Crisis Settlement" adopted by the State Duma on April 12. The President rejected the law on Friday by saying it violates the principle of division of powers between the legislative and executive branches. At the same time, the President "has nothing against the essence of this law," said Krasnov.

The source refuted rumors claiming Dzhokhar Dudayev has left the zone of combat operations in Chechnya.

Yeltsin Tells Chernomyrdin To Pursue Chechen Peace Efforts

LD2005104995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1022 GMT 20 May 95

[By ITAR-TASS observer Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 20 May — Boris Yeltsin has given an instruction to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to implement additional measures to seek a political settlement of the Chechen crisis. The ITAR-TASS observer was infonmed of this today by Mikhail Krasnov, aide to the Russian president.

Krasnov said the president's instruction is in effect directed toward achieving the same aims that were envisaged by the law adopted by the State Duma on 12 April "On interim measures to achieve a political settlement of the crisis in the Chechen Republic." Although the president declined this law on Friday on the grounds that it violated the principle of the separation of the legislative and executive branches of power, "nonetheless, the president has nothing against the essence of this law," Mikhail Krasnov said. Therefore, the head of state has instructed the prime minister to continue to seek for a peaceful settlement of the situation in the Chechen Republic.

The president's instructions to the prime minister are now being subjected to expert study by Yuriy Baturin, the head of state's assistant for national security; after this they will be passed to Viktor Chernomyrdin for implementation.

Dudayev To Announce Plan for Ending Chechen War 'Shortly'

LD2205104495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1003 GMT 22 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ARSHTY (CHECHNYA), May 22 (Interfax) — Dzhokhar Dudayev intends to make public his plan for ending the war in Chechnya shortly, a source in the Chechen Headquarters reported to Interfax on Monday.

The plan, according to the source, provides for ending combat actions and settling the conflict by political means.

Moscow-Dudayev Talks Under OSCE To Begin 25 May

LD2205123595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1203 GMT 22 May 95

[By Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, May 22 (Itar-Tass) — The first round of talks between Moscow and Dudayev will probably take place on Thursday, May 25, leader of the territorial branch of the Federal executive bodies for Chechnya Nikolay Semenov told a briefing here today.

According to Semenov, the initiative came from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and will be held under OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] aegis. Official invitations to attend have been sent to Nikolay Semenov, Umar Avturkhanov and Dzhokhar Dudayev.

The OSCE proposed that the warring parties stop all combat activities by 00.00 on May 25 and sit down at the negotiating table at 10.00 Moscow time on the same day.

Nikolay Semenov told journalists that the OSCE mission in Groznyy has information that today has accepted the invitation and will participate in the negotiations. [sentence as received]

Ingush Officials Believe Cuny Still Alive

LD2005112995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1040 GMT 20 May 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ruslan Maysigov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nazran, 20 May — Radimkhan Mogushkova, an official of Ingushetia's Ministry for Emergency Situations, today assured the ITAR-TASS correspondent that the body awaiting identification in the Chechen village of Shatoy is not that of U.S. citizen Fred Cuny. "I know Fred Cuny personally, and I have seen the body that was found near the village of Geldagen," she said. "The dead man looks about 28-30 years of age."

It is known that the official of the Soros charity foundation, who disappeared at the beginning of April together with two Russian Red Cross officials and an interpreter, is 50 years old.

Magomed Daurbekov, deputy minister of Ingushetia's Ministry for Emergency Situations, together with Radimkhan Mogushkova, in a conversation with the ITAR-TASS correspondent, expressed certainty that Cuny and those accompanying him were still alive, but he refused to say what his confidence is based on, saying that divulging these data would hamper search work.

Meanwhile, it has so far not been possible to carry out an identification of the body, which is in the hands of the Dudayevites in the village of Shatoy to the southeast of Groznyy, despite attempts since 16 May. Search groups are unable to get to the village because of the combat operations being conducted in this region.

Update on Battlefield Situation in Chechnya

'Militants' Reportedly Kill Religious Figures

LD1905195395 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1826 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Interfax) — The Russian Defense Ministry Press and Information Department said that a few days ago pro-Dudayev militants shot three religious figures, including their leader Said-Akhmed, in the Chechen village of Vedeno.

The department's statement says that "they were killed because at a local rally they had demanded that the militants leave the village."

The department said the militants' activities are "acts of terror" against the population of foothill settlements, most of which have concluded truces with the Russian military and do not admit militants on their territory.

Clashes Continue in South, Southeast

LD2005074295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0734 GMT 20 May 95

[By Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY May 20 (Itar-Tass) — The past 24 hours have not changed much in embattled areas of Chechnya, Itar-Tass was told in the press service of the command of federal allied operations.

Clashes were continuing between the federal troops and rebels in the south and southeast of Chechnya. The toll of the clashed is unknown so far.

The federal airforce resumed strikes on rebel strongholds early on Saturday.

The night passed relatively quietly in Groznyy.

Russians Claim Capture of Chiri-Yurt

LD2005140495 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1250 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 20 (Interfax) — Saturday morning Russian troops captured the village of Chiri-Yurt in the south of Chechnya, the commander of united federal forces Colonel-General Mikhail Yegorov told Interfax.

As he said, negotiations with the militants entrenched in the village's cement plant went on for four days, but yielded no results. "The cement plant exists no longer," the commander said.

According to him, the Russian troops sustained no casualties when capturing the village. "However there are corpses of Chechen militants," Yegorov noted.

Mortars and mines have been found in the plant's territory, he said. Sappers are now working there to find out if the plant had been mined.

When asked whether the Dudayev loyalists have heavy military equipment or not, Yegorov said "Yes". Intelligence units spotted two tanks outside the village of Nozhai-Yurt. The tanks periodically enter the village and open fire on positions held by the federal troops, he said.

"I pledged not to open fire on population centers. But if the militants persist in this kind of tactics, I will have to open fire," Yegorov declared.

Chechens Said To 'Repulse' Russian Attacks

LD2005141595 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1250 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ARSHTY (Chechnya), May 20 (Interfax) — Chechen formations managed to repulse attacks by federal troops in the area of Serzhen-Yurt-Agishty (south Chechnya). As Interfax learned from the Chechen General Staff, Russian troops lost several armed vehicles, sustained heavy losses and had to retreat.

The Chechen side lost 9 men; 46 men were wounded.

According to the Chechen General Staff, another direction of fierce military actions was Jalka Gorge (eastern Chechnya, 10 kilometers off the town of Argun), where on Friday a column of Russian armored vehicles tried to move south after a six-hour preparatory bombardment. However, the Chechen military claim, federal forces had to retreat when militias had destroyed a number of their armored vehicles.

According to the General Staff, Friday evening Chechen formations attacked seven posts of federal troops along the Rostov-Baku motor road (western Chechnya). As a result of fire exchanges both sides sustained casualties and fatalities.

As the General Staff spokesman claimed, fighting continued south- west of Groznyy throughout Friday night. Chechen formations fired at the positions held by Russian troops on the outskirts of Groznyy. They used 120-mm mortars and 122-mm guns.

At dawn on Saturday Chechen units retreated from the outskirts of Groznyy to the adjoining forests.

In the meantime, in his Saturday's interview with Interfax, the commander of the united group of federal troops Mikhail Yegorov said nothing about fighting in Grozny's suburbs.

Federal Troops Face Criminal Proceedings

LD2005155495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1509 GMT 20 May 95

[By Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, May 20 (Itar-Tass) — Rocket shelling of the Shalazhi settlement, Chechen South, by federal helicopters was confirmed today by the Groznyy Military Prosecutor's Office. A statement of the office was circulated here today to announce an investigation into the incident and plans to institute criminal proceedings upon the investigation completion.

The Shalazhi settlement known as a stronghold of the anti-Dudayev opposition was twice shelled by federal choppers in early May. The fact militants were prevented from entering the settlement by local residents provoked bewilderment in Chechnya and was used by Dudayev propagandists.

At first, the military bluntly refuted their involvement in the tragedy which claimed the lives of four people, and said that the settlement might be mortar shelled by Dudayev militants. A commission formed on the initiative of deputy chairman of the Chechen national accord committee Lecha Magomadov brought several items of material evidence from the settlement to refute an attack of Dudayev supporters.

The Military Prosecutor's Office instituted criminal proceedings on other possible offenses of federal troopers. For instance, criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with Gudermes riots of April 23. At that time army servicemen and interior troopers used guns, several civilians were killed and a number of houses burnt down. The death of four civilians on May 5 in the Kalinin settlement near Groznyy is being investigated into as well.

The information was collected and registered by the United Inspection for Rapid Reaction set by the Chechen authorities. The Inspection is preparing a report to be sent to the Russian leadership.

Fighting Under Way in Foothills

LD2005183795 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian
1600 GMT 20 May 95

[Video report by A. Sladkov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sladkov] The fighting in Chechnya is in the republic's foothills. The military command says that Dudayev's fighters in the west and east are having problems with supplies and are breaking through into Dagestan and Ingushetia. The center of fighting has moved toward the Georgian border. [video shows artillery]

[M. Yegorov, identified by caption as commander of combined troops in Chechnya] The troops have moved right up to the foothills. There have been no attempts to break through, no sudden action.

[Sladkov] This settlement of Chiri-Yurt is regarded as the gateway to the mountains. Nearby is Chechnya's biggest cement plant, which Dudayev's men have turned into a major stronghold. Talks went on here for four days.

[G. Troshev, identified by caption as commander of the combined group of Defense Ministry troops in Chechnya] This morning the cement plant was taken, a lot of weaponry, mines — antitank and anti-infantry — have been confiscated. An APC belonging to the fighters has been destroyed.

[Sladkov] The situation in the foothills has yet to develop. Commanders have called press reports about an advance premature.

[Troshev] There has not yet been any attack. The troops have moved to their original positions; have cut off the whole gorge, the ways in and out; and now bombing raids and artillery fire are being launched against concentrations of fighters outside populated areas.

Federal Forces Deny Use of Banned Weapons

LD2105074995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0730 GMT 21 May 95

[By Sharip Asuyevv]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, May 21 (Itar-Tass) — The staff of allied federal forces in Chechnya denied circulating rumours that federal troops use needle and pellet bombs, and chemical weapons banned by international conventions.

A enquiry commission has been set up in Chechnya's Vedeno district.

Residents of mountain villages contend that woods have been shedding foliage after federal troops shelled wood areas with rounds releasing yellow smoke after explosion. The locals think the troops are defoliating the woods which they think hide Chechen rebels.

Federal forces are shelling rebel emplacements for the second day in southern, southeastern and western parts of Chechnya.

Groznyy remains quiet. Rubble is cleared in the city on Sunday.

Expert Estimates Chechen Damage at 5-15 Trillion Rubles

LD2005173295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1649 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 20 (Interfax) — The head of the information team of the federal commission for the reconstruction of the Chechen economy Yuriy Mikhailov says that the Chechen economy suffered 5 to 15 trillion ruble damages.

This year alone 2.3 trillion rubles will have to be spent to keep the people alive and the economy functioning. Another 720 billion rubles must be spent on the restoration of the oil and gas, and oil-processing industries.

Experts see the economic situation as highly difficult. Both Dudayev rule and ongoing fighting have done much damage to the Chechen economy. The gross domestic product dropped 70% and oil production dropped more than twofold.

Thanks to reconstruction efforts, the city public transportation authority opened 24 bus routes in the hardest-hit city of Groznyy. Fourteen hospitals, six out-patient clinics and fifty schools are functioning in the Chechen capital. As many as 280 kilometers of electricity lines and 238 kilometers of pipelines have been restored. As of date, Groznyy has a population of 275,000.

On May 22 a mission of the federal commission for the reconstruction of Chechnya is taking a plane for Groznyy where it will be expected to familiarize with the reconstruction efforts of the past five months and visit the Naursky District. The mission is led by the commission's first deputy chair Petr Surov.

On May 26 the National Revival government and the mission will meet in Groznyy to discuss the Chechen budget for 1995.

Tula's Governor Favors 'Home,' Doubts Communist Strength

MK2005125095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 20 May 95 p 2

[Report by Yelena Tregubova under the "Allies" rubric: "Tula Governor Sevryugin Favors 'Our Home'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Tula Governor Nikolay Sevryugin said yesterday to your SEGODNYA correspondent that he is ready to give his backing to Chernomyrdin's fledgling bloc, "Russia Is Our Home," which he sees as "an association of reasonable people." In the governor's words, the parties "that are currently crying loudest about citizens' social protection" — the agrarians and the communists — are in fact very weak in the regions in terms of numbers. "I once proposed that all the oblast's communists and agrarians come together to check how many members they have; they turned out to be several times less numerous than their documents say," the governor asserted. [passage omitted]

Tatarstan Presidential Council Created

954F2312A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in Russian 18 May 95 p 1

["Edict of the Tatarstan Republic President: On Formation of the Presidential Council of the Tatarstan Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the aim of developing a coordinated approach with respect to the most important issues of state life and the political and socioeconomic development of the Tatarstan Republic, **I decree**:

1. To form the Presidential Council of the Tatarstan Republic, consisting of the following:

Chairman of the Presidential Council

SHAYMIYEV, Mintimer Sharipovich, president of the Tatarstan Republic

Members of the Presidential Council

MUKHAMETSHIN, Farid Khayrullovich, prime minister of the Tatarstan Republic

LIKHACHEV, Vasiliy Nikolayevich, chairman of the State Council of the Tatarstan Republic (for coordination)

MURATOV, Ravil Fatykhovich, first deputy prime minister of the Tatarstan Republic

GAZIZULLIN, Farit Rafikovich, deputy prime minister of the Tatarstan Republic, chairman of the Tatarstan Republic State Committee for the Management of State Property

KHASANOV, Mansur Khasanovich, president of the Academy of Sciences of the Tatarstan Republic

NAFIYEV, Sayfikhan Khabibullovich, procurator of the Tatarstan Republic

BOGACHEV, Yevgeniy Borisovich, chairman of the National Bank of the Tatarstan Republic

ISKHAKOV, Kamil Shamilyevich, head of the City of Kazan Administration

ALTYNBAYEV, Rafgat Zakiyevich, head of the City of Naberezhnyye Chelny Administration

VASILYEV, Valeriy Pavlovich, chief of the Control Directorate of the Tatarstan Republic President

PAKHOMOV, Aleksey Mikhaylovich, chairman and general director of the joint-stock company Melita

DEMIDOV, Aleksey Ivanovich, head of the Alekseyevskiy Rayon Administration

NIZAMOV, Khalyaf Mirzamukhametovich, director of the apparatus of the Tatarstan Republic president (council secretary)

2. To approve the Statute on the Presidential Council of the Tatarstan Republic (attached).

3. This edict enters into force as of its date of signature.

[Signed] President of the Tatarstan Republic M. SHAYMIYEV

Kazan, the Kremlin. 17 May 1995.

Novosibirsk Officials Unhappy With Share of Oblast Budget

954F2303B Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 15 May 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Villagers Offend City Dwellers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our city authorities highly resent the oblast leadership.

Of all of the cities and rayons of the oblast, only Novosibirsk will not receive one ruble in subsidies this year. That is what is envisioned in the oblast budget. Of those taxes that the city collects and transfers to the oblast, Novosibirsk will receive even less than last year. This is what the oblast authorities have decided.

V. Krivoshchekov, deputy chairman of the city assembly of deputies, says: "This is an obvious violation of the law of the Russian Federation 'On the Fundamentals of Budget Rights,' because the oblast should have coordinated the decrease in the allocations norms with us, but it did not do so."

Therefore, the city assembly of deputies decided to submit appropriate amendments to the draft budget to the oblast leadership. It can be said beforehand that the session of the oblast soviet will simply brush these recommendations aside. Arithmetic is the basis for such a confident prediction: The oblast soviet has 16 deputies who were elected on the city's territory, the remaining 24 are "village deputies," and in addition, many of them are heads of administration of rural rayons, so it is clear what the breakdown in voting will be.

Novosibirsk Oblast Deputy Views Law on Budget

954F2303A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 15 May 95 p 5

[Interview with Stanislav Labetskiy, deputy of the Novosibirsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, by Yelena Shatskaya; place and date not given: "When It Is a Question of Survival, There Is No Talk of Patriotism: Stanislav Labetskiy Has His Own Opinion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the time the Government of Russia was examining the results of implementation of the budget for the first quarter of 1995, Novosibirsk Oblast was living on the whole without a budget.

The last session of the oblast soviet of deputies examined the draft law on the budget this year in the first reading. However, as was to be expected, there was no unity on this question. One of the deputies, Stanislav Labetskiy, has his own opinion regarding the principles of forming the oblast treasury; however, in his view, the oblast head of administration is still not in the mood to make serious changes to the usual approach to "sharing the little budget pie."

[Labetskiy] As the governor said about the draft that was presented at the session, this is a survival budget. But to my understanding, this budget destroys Novosibirsk Oblast as a component of the Federation. Why? Because, like the budgets of previous years, it does not have any kind of general concept. The main thing was to divide up the money among all the branches of the economy. The consequences of such an approach are already visible: demographic crisis, social tension (95 percent of the oblast population can barely make ends meet), and an economic situation on the brink of crisis—not one rural rayon can live without subsidies, and neither can most city rayons. All the factors confirm the transition of the oblast to a stage of economic ruin.

[Shatskaya] In your opinion, is there a way out of this situation?

[Labetskiy] Yes, and the root of it lies in the kind of principles we are guided by in forming the oblast budget. All previous and current budgets were formed on the principle of a deficit-free budget. On the contrary, I am proposing making a budget with a deficit. Expenditures must exceed incomes. At the same time this entire deficit, down to the kopek, must be directed toward developing the most promising production, not at reducing investment.

[Shatskaya] But how can resources be used when, it would seem, they do not exist; that is, the deficit?

[Labetskiy] Two plans exist for filling a deficit. These are internal loans of the state (vouchers, bonds) and long-term foreign credits. The first path is unacceptable, inasmuch as people have already been deceived repeatedly and forcefully, and, being depositors in every possible kind of funds, banks, and companies, I think it is unlikely that they will hand over their last money even to the state. This leaves the second path, but the question arises: Who will grant us credits from abroad, and on what conditions? There are three conditions. First—an investment project has to be prepared on our side, with the return of the credits clearly calculated. Second—the credit must be guaranteed with collateral, for which capital funds or circulating funds of enterprises can be used. Finally, the third condition is that the return of the credits must be guaranteed by the executive authority of Novosibirsk Oblast.

If we are able to acquire the necessary large loan, it will be possible to resolve two very important problems, specifically, to stop the increase in unemployment, inasmuch as money-nourished plants will begin to work, and, as a consequence, to ensure tax revenues for the oblast budget.

[Shatskaya] But your proposal to present our enterprises, blocks of stock, etc. as collateral to capitalists evokes natural internal resistance: It is somehow unpatriotic....

[Labetskiy] The question is not one of patriotism but survival. Incidentally, here are two examples: The United States before the war and Germany after the war came out of difficult economic crises precisely by taking this path—the formation of a budget deficit. Of course, at the same time they sharply reduced the tax pressure.... As we see, both countries are now living rather well.

[Shatskaya] But what will happen if we are unable to repay the credit?

[Labetskiy] This situation is unlikely, inasmuch as every economic settlement implies a certain reserve of stability and, if our enterprises are fully powered, they will be able to repay any loan in 10-15 years.

It is more reasonable to raise another question: What will happen if the administration in the near term does not resolve to take a serious step on budget policy? Remember the March ultimatum of the managers of 12 of the largest enterprises, mainly defense enterprises? In the event that no cardinal decisions are made on the defense industry, they planned to refuse to maintain the social and cultural facilities that belong to them and to reduce the number of workers by 30-50 percent. Naturally, those who are dismissed will come to the doors of the oblast administration with demands for bread and work. But there is no possibility of providing them with either money or work. In order to suppress the growing social discontent, the authorities will be forced in quick order to try to find resources, thereby ruining any kind of budget. And our erstwhile strong oblast will be transformed from a component of the Federation into an economic corpse.

[Shatskaya] Why was the chief of the oblast executive authority not interested in your proposal, do you think?

[Labetskiy] Ivan Ivanovich said at the last session that in building an economic policy he is trying to balance between a bad situation and a very bad situation. But evidently the situation is not yet bad enough to get him to think about the need for urgent measures with respect to the oblast budget.

Novosibirsk, Nizhniy Novgorod Compared

954F2284A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 12 May 95 p 5

[Article by Sergey Krupoder: "Life Is Hard Enough In Nizhniy, Too, But.... But Life in That City Differs From Ours. Starting With the Streets"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Novosibirsk—Nizhniy Novgorod — Novosibirsk—Once upon a time, during developed socialism, there were two twin brothers—two cities. In one there were a million and a half people—and in the other, 1.5 million all told. One is on a large river—and the other as well. One started to develop a defense industry on its territory—and the other rushed into that same undertaking.... In one, foreigners were not very popular, while in the other, they were popular, but somehow, not very. The name of one starts with the letter N—and the other recently changed its first initial from G to N. And the only difference, at first glance, between Novosibirsk and Nizhniy Novgorod is that one is in the east, and the other, a little farther to the west. But that is only at first glance.

A city begins with its streets. The Nizhniy Novgorod streets are the object of the blackest envy for Novosibirsk automobiles. There are neither pits nor potholes in the asphalt—everything is taken care of by powerful road equipment of German manufacture, purchased by the city administration. In the stream of traffic, there are practically no insolent foreign cars, or ones that are not insolent, either—the local mafiosi are a little more patriotic than the Siberian ones, and a little less foppish.

"We execute...." this billboard by the train station could throw more than one Nizhniy Novgorod guest into consternation.... But after the guest has mechanically sifted through his memory for potential candidates for an order—from a hated neighbor to a beloved mother-in-law—his eye runs over the following line: "....with a construction-installation pistol! Telephone....", and joyful bewilderment changes to just as joyful a smile. Now, a city that evokes a smile from the first minutes of acquaintance is, you must agree, a nice spot, after all....

Nizhniy Novgoroders can make snide remarks not only about those arriving in town, but also about the Government of Russia itself. Thus, one of the local defense plants became famous for a new method of distributing earned pay. The workers were issued their salaries in the amount of the minimum wage (until recently, 20,500 rubles [R]), and the rest, no small sum, was given out also, but....as loans taken from their own enterprise. Of course, no one ever returned these "loans," for the charm of the scheme lies in the fact that neither the minimum wage nor the loan is subject to income tax. Moreover, with such an arrangement, all of the plant's workers also fall into the category of those with low income, with payment of the corresponding assistance from the state....

But let us return to the streets of this city. I will not write about the beauty of the local architecture—Nizhniy Novgoroders carefully preserve their antiquities, while Novosibirskers at one time tore down a large portion of the little they had.... But it would be worthwhile to make mention of the local Arbat—Bolshaya Pokrovskaya. Imagine an ancient little street a couple of kilometers long, completely closed to traffic, with an abundance of hawkers' trays, kiosks, and small shops. Each of them is income for the city treasury, and not a little.

The Nizhniy Novgorod administration's political principles are a complete separation of economics and populism, and, correspondingly, an almost complete lack of petty prohibitions, including even "No Parking!" signs, which you will not be able to find even with the aid of a dog. You can do everything here—and all the kiosks sell strong drink around the clock—just as long as they pay the tax conscientiously. A third of the Nizhniy Novgorod buses advertise Camel cigarettes—that same ad that in Novosibirsk, it may be recalled, was scrubbed mercilessly off the sides of the buses, along with the paint.... When I mentioned this in a conversation with one of the assistants of the Nizhniy Novgorod governor, my interlocutor was thoroughly amused by our puritanical action: "Well, out with it, you guys.... What is this—are you all so rich there? This is how it is for us: The transportation people earn money from the ad—well, and thank the Lord, it will be easier to maintain them. Especially since, as you have seen for yourself, there are no long lines for Camels, just as there were none before...."

And now—Shhh! In a whisper: In Nizhniy Novgorod for more than a month already, an erotic television channel, with more than candid footage, has been operating on an entirely official basis. Enthusiasts of the titillating pay a hefty sum, receive a decoder (the channel, of course, is closed-access)—and look to your heart's content! And, improbable but true, no one goes running around the city with his pants unzipped; as the local police officials assert, sex crimes have even declined. And the pernicious (by Siberian standards) channel assiduously brings money into the city treasury.

I foresee in this place the whispering of others of our guardians of morality. Depravity! Turning us all into a nation of drunkards! The undermining of the health through tobacco! I do not think that there is less of these vices in Novosibirsk, but then, a small loaf of bread in Nizhniy Novgorod today costs R800, and butter has not risen higher than R15,000 a kilogram. So—there are things for some to like....

The city transport in Nizhniy Novgorod is a separate poem. The cost of a fare is from R500 for ordinary routes to R600 for express trips and fixed-route taxis. But in reality the trip is even less expensive—here, besides the ordinary fare ticket (R21,000 a month), one can buy a fare ticket for five days (R2,700, except the subway and the fixed-route taxis), and even for any single day (R800). Therefore, there are practically no fare-dodgers here. The absolutely empty subway (12 stations) produces a strong impression— even at rush hour, there are unoccupied seats in the cars....

It remains for me to mention two more local wonders: the beer, of which there are about a dozen magnificent kinds (our Vinapovskoye cannot hold a candle to it) and Governor B.Ye. Nemtsov. One's first impression is of an ordinary scientific worker, which, in fact, he is. But....he is a very smart man, a tough pragmatist ("Do not prohibit anything!"), and an intelligent business manager, who contrives even to make investments in his defense industry, which, thanks to this, is beginning slowly to rise from its knees.

The thesis "Morality is everything that helps to raise the economy" may indeed be controversial, but it is a powerful lever. However, even here there are limits. Every week, Nemtsov appears in the Nizhniy Novgorod press (also an example worth imitating). Here is a fragment from an April interview:

[Nemtsov] If here in Nizhniy Novgorod there is ever even a semblance of the fascist orgy that is going on in Moscow, I personally, as governor, will take all measures to burn those swine with the swastikas out with a red-hot iron. They will not yell, 'Heil Hitler' here. If Yeltsin had really wanted to, he could have dealt with those scum long ago.

[Question] So why does he not do it?

[Nemtsov] In my view, out of faint-heartedness and weakness.

There you have it—a perfectly clear understanding of a real danger. But for us Siberians, to this day there is no beast more terrifying than tobacco and erotica....

Economic Issues

Share of Arms Exports Expected To Decrease

LD1905150695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1444 GMT 19 May 95

[By Vladimir Zadera]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow May 19 (ITAR-TASS) — The world market of arms is changing considerably and most of these changes are unfavourable for Russian arms manufacturers, Vladimir Korneyevets, chief of the main information-analytical agency of the Russian State committee for military-technical policy, told ITAR-TASS.

According to foreign analysis, the volume of the world market of arms for the period upto the year 2000 is assessed approximately at 40 billion dollars a year, and it will be decreasing. By late 80s the USSR accounted for 38 per cent of the arms market, the United States for 20 per cent. According to U.S. sources the United States share by the year 2000 will amount to 60 per cent while Russia's only to five-six per cent.

In 1994 Russia sold military goods and services to approximately 1.7-1.8 billion dollars, which amounted to only about 3.5 per cent of the entire export. Although Russia is now able to put on the world market arms worth up to ten billion dollars a year it will be unable to sell this amount in the present situation. In the years ahead Russia may expect to sell no more than four billion dollars worth of arms in the world market, and even this will require considerable efforts for marketing, Korneyevets believes.

Chechnya Reconstruction To Cost R1.34 Trillion

MK1905115095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 1

[Report by Nikolay Vishnevskiy under the "Government" rubric: "The Extent of Destruction Does Not Fit in With Public Expenditures. Oleg Soskovets' Commission Backs an Increase in the Budget Deficit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The schedule for financing restoration work in Chechnya in May 1995 was approved yesterday. By the end of this month, the total amount allocated for restoring Chechnya's economy and social services will reach 1.34 trillion rubles [R], but the volume of the work already performed and previewed will require greater public expenditures. This was stated at one of the recent meetings of the State Commission, headed by Oleg Soskovets, where some 50 leaders of various federal ministries and agencies were present. The first vice premier noted: "Something disastrous has happened. Chechnya does not fit in with the earlier planned expenditures. So, one can not remain a virgin in this case. We must agree on a budget deficit."

Given the fact that financing is being significantly delayed and work remains largely unpaid, new problems are constantly emerging that require additional funds. As stated at the meeting, this includes not only restoring television services, homes, and fuel supplies, but also repairing military equipment, which has been worn down over the past five months, and constructing barracks for the military personnel who are living there, in Oleg Soskovets' words — quite correct in this particular case — "in unbelievable conditions."

One important question concerns electric energy, which Chechnya now gets from Stavropol. Four local power stations have been completely destroyed, especially the one in Argun, which suffered most from artillery shelling. According to Yuriy Korsun, deputy fuel and energy minister, power engineering workers were supposed to receive R150 billion as early as April. As of today, however, only the first R55 billion are en route to Chechnya, but have not arrived yet.

Similar situations have also been reported by representatives of other agencies. They noted that this may result in the complete disarray of all work schedules.

Oleg Soskovets emphasized that the state must continue to carry the burden of military actions ("Do any of us have any doubts that the gangster groups need to be eliminated?") and, at the same time, to restore the ruined national economy. The people of the republic — having seen specific results from productive activities — "will get rid of these persons themselves."

As observers note, Chechnya-related expenses could indeed cause some (depending on how the situation develops) rise in the budget deficit — by R73 trillion, or about 5 percent of the GDP. The government had initially planned to spend about R5 trillion on the reconstruction of Chechnya this year, but this minimal sum could rise significantly, under conditions of continued war and destruction. In this case, some other budget-financed programs will probably have to be downsized. Some reliable government sources suggest, first of all, some industrial and social programs, including aid to those who suffered from the Chernobyl and other accidents, the financing of which has always been at a very low level.

"As usual, nobody is guilty," one high-ranking government official, who wished to remain anonymous, told your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent. "When they spoke about a rigid budget and stabilization, no one predicted Chechnya and its subsequent destruction, which simply shocked me — a man who is rather well-informed — when I was there."

Central Bank Holds Back Funds to Chechnya

MM2205093995 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 19 May 95 p 2

[Report by Valentina Vedesova: "Central Bank Delaying Financing of Restoration Work in Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As we know, even if the government has allocated money for particular purposes, it is always late in arriving. This is explained not only by the Finance Ministry's stinginess and delaying tactics. If only there were some money; that is, the Finance Ministry is waiting for taxes, customs, and other revenue sources to come in. There are, however, instances when it is impossible to wait; such as, the costs of reconstructing Chechnya. Unless restoration work is done this summer, the people will have no place to live next winter.

With this situation in mind, the heads of the commercial banks have proposed an initiative for organizing credit for construction work and paying wages, equipment deliveries, transport facilities, and electricity. The government has accepted this proposal and, considering the importance and scale of the work, has suggested reducing the credit interest rate to 120-170 percent. Here the banks have to initiate financing, relying on the government's integrity, without drawing up documents with the Russian Federation Finance Ministry for the subsequent reimbursement of their expenditure, as this would further delay restoration.

The agreement on allocating 740 billion rubles [R] set by the federal program has been signed by 10 banks. The Agro-Industrial Bank, the Agrostroybank [expansion unknown], the Promradbank [expansion unknown], and the Mortgage Commercial Bank have already begun to supply credit to the consumers assigned to them and have paid out over R130 billion. The Yugorskiy bank has opened accounts for four clients, including enterprises of the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Power Engineering. "Menatep" has taken on eight clients and allocated R433 million in grants to Great Patriotic War veterans. The leaders of the Rosstroybank [expansion unknown], Mosstroybank [expansion unknown], and Investkredit [expansion unknown] have stated they are ready to allocate money tomorrow, but again they are not turning to those who need it. This has given rise to some distrust in Petr Surov, deputy chairman of the State Commission for the Restoration of the Chechen Republic's Economy. He has threatened to strike from the list of creditors those banks which delay allocating funds. It turns out that there are plenty of people anxious to join this noble and, in fact, advantageous campaign.

Meanwhile, Tatyana Paramonova, acting chairman of the Central Bank, has not actually given the go-ahead to such a drastic reduction in credit rates (200 percent is the current rate). As a result, commercial banks have been placed in an unusual condition. The money they are releasing is cheaper than the money they are receiving from Russia's chief bank.

Clearly, this intractability on the part of the head of the Russian Central Bank could delay financing Chechnya reconstruction.

Shakhray on Funds for Russians in CIS, Baltics

LD1905184895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1546 GMT 19 May 95

[By Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, May 19 (ITAR-TASS) — Some ten billion rubles will be allocated in

1995 to support Russian compatriots in the Commonwealth member-states and the Baltic republics, [said] Russian Vice-Premier Sergey Shakhray.

Deputy head of the Russian Ministry of Finance's Budget Department Viktor Mezhuritskiy told a meeting of the Commission for Compatriots that the money will be allocated to purchase textbooks, open cultural centers and render humanitarian aid. In his words, the financing will be done through the Ministry for Affairs of Nationalities and Regional Policy, and supervised by the Commission.

The Commission chaired by Sergey Shakhray is planning to propose to the government the creation of a federal fund for support of compatriots. It is also offered to prepare a state program on formation and support of the Russian Diaspora in 1996-1997.

The June meeting of the Commission will discuss support to public organizations of compatriots and Russian-language press in the Commonwealth and the Baltic republics.

Pre-Customs Control on Oil Exports Planned

MM1905134095 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 19 May 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Pre-Customs Control System Will be Created"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The session of the government operational commission for improving the system of payments and settlements, chaired by Anatoliy Chubays, yesterday decided to create a system of expert pre-customs control over the quality and volume of the export of petroleum and petroleum products. The first vice premier's press center has reported that this measure is designed to reduce losses in currency profit when these goods are exported.

Edict on Distributing Privatization Receipts

MM2205095795 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA First Edition in Russian 17 May 95 p 3

[Russian President's Edict No. 478 "On Measures To Ensure the Guaranteed Receipt of Revenue From Privatization Into the Federal Budget," signed by President Yeltsin at the Kremlin on 11 May 1995: "Privatization Revenue To Be Paid Into the Budget"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the purpose of ensuring the guaranteed receipt of privatization revenue as envisaged by Article 9 of the Federal Law "On the 1995 Federal Budget" and in implementation of the Basic Provisions of the State Program for the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation after 1 July 1994 as ratified by the Russian President's Edict No. 1535 of 22 July 1994, I decree:

1. That the early sale of blocks of federally owned shares in joint-stock companies formed during privatization which produce output (goods, services) of strategic significance for the country's national security and are included on the list approved by the Russian Government shall be prohibited in accordance with procedure laid down by this edict.

2. That previously imposed restrictions on the sale of shares in joint-stock companies created during privatization in the shape of blocks of shares retained in federal ownership be revoked and that they be sold in stages with the exception of the blocks of shares mentioned in point 1 of this edict.

3. That a Federal Commission for the Formation of Federal Budget Revenue Using Privatization Resources (hereinafter known as the Commission) be instituted under the Russian Government.

That the Commission is instructed to prepare and present to the Russian Government a draft list of joint-stock companies formed during privatization producing output (goods, services) of strategic significance for the country's national security.

That the attached Statute on the Russian Government Federal Commission for the Formation of Federal Budget Revenue Using Privatization Resources and Its Composition (not published) be approved.

4. That the Russian Federation Government shall:

— within one month approve the list of joint-stock companies formed during privatization which produce output (goods, services) of strategic significance for the country's national security whose federally owned shares are not subject to early sale; and,

— within two months present to the Russian Federation Government a Russian presidential draft edict to regulate the procedure for depositing federally owned shares in joint-stock companies with corporate entities to be managed by them in trust and ensure the guaranteed payment by them into the federal budget of revenue derived from privatization as well as the subsequent sale of shares in accordance with the procedure and by means of the methods prescribed by the Basic Provisions of the State Program for the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation after 1 July 1994.

5. The attached normatives are to be established for the distribution of resources resulting from the privatization of enterprises by auction or by tender as well as from

the sale of blocks of shares in joint-stock companies formed during privatization.

6. The opening price of shares for sale in joint-stock companies is to be set by the vendor no lower than the price determined by the methodology approved by the Commission.

7. The normative price for land when plots of land are sold to privatized enterprises located on them is to be set at 10 times the rate of the land tax per unit area of the plot of land.

The Russian Federation Government shall within one month determine the procedure for converting the federal budget debt to enterprises into special bonds which may be used by them as a means of payment for the plots of land.

8. The attached normatives are to be established for the distribution of resources derived from the sale of real estate, including plots of land to the privatized enterprises located on them.

9. The Russian Federation State Commission for the Management of State Property together with the Federal Commission for Securities and the Stock Market are to elaborate a mechanism which makes it possible to sell a proportion of the federally owned shares in the international stock market.

10. The Russian Federal Property Fund is to adopt exhaustive measures to ensure the sale in 1995 of blocks of shares previously retained in federal ownership in accordance with the established procedure as well as the remaining shares held by the Russian Federal Property Fund and relevant property funds in accordance with the decisions adopted on their phased early sale.

11. This edict enters into force from the day of its publication. Point 1 relating to Russian presidential edicts and Russian Government decrees on the retention in federal ownership of blocks of shares in joint-stock companies formed during privatization is to enter into force one month from the entry into force of this edict.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation

[Dated] 11 May 1995, the Kremlin, Moscow
Edict No. 478

Normatives for the distribution of receipts from the sale of real estate in state and municipal ownership, including plots of land on which privatized enterprises are located:

Category of Recipient of Funds	**Normatives for Distribution of Funds (as a percentage)**
Local budgets	37
Republic, kray, oblasts, autonomous oblast budgets	40
Federal budget	10
Russian Goskomimushchestvo [State Committee for the Management of State Property]	1
Property management committees and territorial agencies of the Russia Goskomimushchestvo	4
Russian Federal Property Fund	0.8
Property funds of national-state, national-territorial, and administrative-territorial entities	4
Russian Committee for Land Resources and Land Management	1
Local architecture and town planning organ	1
Local land resources committee	1.2
Total	100.0

Normatives for the distribution of receipts from the privatization of enterprises by auction or tender and also from the sale of blocks of shares in joint-stock enterprises created in the process of privatization (as a percentage):

Category of recipient	**Federal property**	**State property of components of federation**	**Municipal property**
Local budgets	4	9	19
Republic, kray, oblast, autonomous oblast budgets	10	20	10
Federal budget	55	10	10
Russian Goskomimushch-estvo	1.2	1.2	1.2

Category of recipient	Federal property	State property of components of federation	Municipal property
Property management committees and territorial agencies of the Russia Goskomimushchestvo	4	4	4
Federal Enterprise Support Fund	5	-	-
Russian Federal Property Fund	0.8	0.8	0.8
Property funds of national-state, national-territorial, and administrative-territorial entities	4	4	4
Specialized Budget Fund for Financing Securities Market Infrastructure	2	-	-
Development of privatized enterprises (Footnote: applicable only during the sale of shares in joint-stock enterprises created in the process of privatization)	14	51	51
Total	100	100	100

Expert Predicts Zero Budget Deficit in 1996

MK1905124095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 19 May 95 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Bekker under the "Analysis" rubric: "Experts Think the Budget Deficit Can Be Brought to Zero Next Year. Social Spending Has Not Declined, the Funds Are Simply Being Frittered Away"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 24 May the Economic Analysis Institute (EAI) is due to submit a report entitled "Financial Stabilization in Russia," which "factually analyzes four attempts at stabilizing the economy," Mikhail Dmitriyev, institute deputy director, said. He preceded our conversation on the document with a remark to the effect that a recent report by the State Statistics Committee has for the first time in the past several years offered the fullest possible picture of Russia's consolidated budget and extra-budget funds. Analysis of what Mr. Dmitriyev termed "this complex edifice" makes it possible to reveal the economic prospects of this and next years. The researcher pointed out that the "image" of the federal budget has changed drastically: Spending fell from 45 percent of the GDP in 1992 to 22 percent in 1994. The state is "withdrawing" from the national economy as it has lowered its spending on economic purposes five-fold and cut its foreign economic activity 15-fold. Both enterprises and the population are feeling the effects of this overhaul. At the same time Mr. Dmitriyev pointed out a lack of positive changes in the structure of local budgets: Their expenditures have risen 1.5-fold from 12.5 percent of the GDP. "The subsidizing of enterprises by the authorities," he said, "is by half an outright waste of funds, which only prolongs the agony of inefficient sectors of the national economy." Typically, the share of subsidies for these sectors is 3 percent of the GDP at the federal level and 8 percent locally.

The EAI deputy director refuted a widespread belief that the weakening of the state has hit social spending most of all. According to statistics, in 1992, health spending was 2.6 percent of the GDP in 1992 and 4.1 percent in 1994. Even while making provision for the shrinking of the GDP, Mr. Dmitriyev concluded that health service, education, and culture expenditures have at least not diminished. Overall social insurance spending was 1.48 percent of the GDP in 1992, 1.8 percent in 1993, and 2.24 percent in 1994. Comparing these figures with the actual woeful plight of the social sector, the researcher concluded that "only a tiny share of the government's appropriations reaches the end consumer, while the main part is being frittered away." Hence, his second conclusion: "We will not be able to mend the situation without a drastic overhaul of the entire social sector. An extra infusion of funds is only set to boost corruption and the degradation of social ministries."

By the EAI's estimates, revenue and spending of the 1995 budget are short by 1-2 percent of the GDP. Under a forecast GDP of 1,350 trillion rubles [R], the deficit will be 5-6 percent of the GDP. Given infusions of foreign loans, the government will have to cover the deficit by noninflationary methods, using its own money to the tune of over 3 percent of the GDP, which is fully realistic, Mr. Dmitriyev thinks. At the same time, judging from the experience of the past two years it is clear that owing to the arrhythmic quarterly deficit financing there is a threat of slipping up in the third quarter. During this "critical" period, as the economist put it, the Finance Ministry will have to sell on the stock market securities at a net profit of R10 trillion. The state has not yet managed to reach such a scale of domestic borrowing. In the EAI's view, this can be achieved in an unconventional way: Initially, loans should be given to the agro-industrial sector and the northern areas, and then they should be pumped off via the currency market and short- term treasury bonds. This may be not to the IMF's liking, however, prompting it to freeze the release of about $2 billion in installments of its standby loan. Then the gap in the budget will have to be breached by printing money. "Financial stabilization may stumble over this step in 1995," Mr. Dmitriyev concluded.

A new attempt at it, he thinks, will be delayed until next year. Moreover, in 1996 the government will have a chance "for the first time in history" to achieve a zero budget deficit, and "without risking the triggering social upheavals." This assurance of the EAI deputy director is based on the following circumstances. Tax reform will make it possible to introduce new procedures of charging the value-added tax without raising its rate, which is envisioned in an agreement with the IMF. This measure is tantamount to a 3.7-percent increase in the GDP. Reorganization of the fiscal service and an increase in the collectibility of taxes will add another 1 percent. But the revocation of a special tax and excess-wage tax will pull revenue down by 1.2 percent of the GDP.

Thus, the net increment of federal budget revenue in 1996 may reach 3.5 percent of the GDP. But the possibilities of deficit cutting do not end there. Inefficient spending by the regional authorities has already been mentioned above. In Mr. Dmitriyev's view, acting within the limits of budget federalism, Moscow could move to reallocate revenue between the center and the territories in favor of the former. Still, Mr. Dmitriyev himself called such a reallocation "dramatic."

Article Views Lowered Interest Rate on Savings

MM1905131495 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 May 95 p 2

[Article by Ivan Zhagel: "Reduction of Interest Rates on Private Investments Has Begun Throughout Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Savings Bank Council of Directors has decided to lower the interest rates on ordinary citizens' investments. Because the bank accounts for two thirds of all private savings in our country, this event will, without exaggeration, affect the interests of millions of Russians.

The size of the reduction in interest rates can be seen in the Savings Bank's most popular fixed-term deposit with a monthly interest payment. In the bank's Moscow City and Moscow Oblast, Murmansk, Tver, Karelian, Omsk, and Tyumen branches the interest on private accounts will decline from 8 to 6 percent and on all other deposits from 7 to 5.5 percent a month.

It would be wrong to think that such unpopular methods are being used only at the Savings Bank. At the Russian Industrial Construction Bank I was told that here they are also examining the possibility of reducing interest rates on private deposits, and most likely these new rates will take effect 1 June. At the Innovations Commercial Bank they replied that so far they have not made any specific decisions but are keeping a close watch on the market situation. In a number of small banks the review of interest rates began back in April.

Let me recall that we have already all experienced a similar process in the early fall of last year when the financial stabilization which had continued all summer ended in a reduction in interest rates on private investments.

It is true that at the time ordinary citizens had the possibility of closing their ruble accounts and "going into currency" as the dollar exchange rate had risen rapidly and the purchase of currency was very advantageous. Today, however, there is no such possibility, and most likely it will not appear in the immediate future. Since "Black Tuesday," the Moscow interbank currency exchange has made a number of decisions restricting the possibility of upsetting the currency market. Now the financial opportunities of the banks themselves are also substantially restricted. The increased demands introduced 1 May by the Central Bank for the compulsory reservation of funds have led to a considerable outflow of financial resources from commercial banks.

This position on the Central Bank's part is approved by many specialists and international financial organizations have not voiced any critical remarks. Russian bankers, however, are arguing that the Central Bank decision is extremely harmful and are demanding its repeal.

Here are the figures supplied to IZVESTIYA by the Association of Russian Banks: Since 1 May, payments into compulsory reserves have increased 50 percent for the Moscow Business Bank, 80 percent for the "Innovations Commercial Bank," and over 200 percent for "Imperial" and 250 percent for the International Moscow Bank! Here some banks are for this reason literally on the verge of collapse. Thus, the well known "Vostok" bank, which is not going through the best of times now in connection with the fact that a temporary administration has been appointed there, used to pay 7-8 billion rubles [R] into compulsory reserves but now it must give the Central Bank over R30 billion (!).

The Russian Government has also expressed itself against these reservation norms, which have undoubtedly also influenced the interest rates for private deposits. The banks have few levers left for pressuring the Central Bank. The main one is the forthcoming approval of the head of the Central Bank in the State Duma, which is to take place a month after the president has signed the law on the Central Bank, which means that these cadres question will be examined in May or early June. The banks already have influence on many deputies, and unless T. Paramonova makes concessions, she will not be approved. It is hard to say how events will develop, but the fact that T. Paramonova has risked setting higher reserve demands on the threshold of her new approval in the Duma makes one suspect her either of deliberately committing professional suicide or of being loyal to the cause, not the job.

International Affairs

Kiev To Establish 'Special Relations' With NATO

LD2005183695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1646 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, May 20 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Secretary of the National Security Council under the Ukrainian president Vladimir Gorbulin said that Kiev could claim to establish special relations with NATO in the near future.

He told journalists in Kiev today that an "individual program" could be adopted for this purpose within the scope of the NATO Partnership for Peace program.

Gorbulin said, "Ukraine's geo-political and geo-strategic situation is so that it can be either a buffer between NATO and Russia or a cross two-side road."

He said he believed that any improvement of relations between Ukraine and NATO would contribute to improvement of relations between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance. "Russia, as a powerful military state, has the right to a special position towards NATO," Gorbulin added.

Gorbulin said he believed that NATO should take into consideration Russia's geo-political interests and must conduct consultations with Russia when enlarging itself.

Security Adviser on Approach To NATO

LD1905203795 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] For the first time during their term in office the Supreme Council and the president achieved understanding in principle on one of the main domestic policy issues. This summary of yesterday's parliamentary voting on the draft law on power came from the secretary of the National Security Council and national security adviser to the Ukrainian president, Vladimir Gorbulin, at a meeting with the editorial staff of the UKRAINA MOLODA newspaper today. [passage omitted]

Vladimir Gorbulin was confident that the parliament's support for the law on power in the second reading proved that the nation has retained its intelligence and will secure its survival and progress. The task today is to form a capable government and make it work effectively, he said. The primary cause for concern is our economic backwardness, our lack of ability to coordinate market reforms in a way that every person is guaranteed normal living standards, Gorbulin continued. He was then asked about his view on Russia's and Ukraine's special relationships with NATO.

[Begin Gorbulin recording in Russian] Undoubtedly, Russia as a powerful military state is entitled to a special relationship with NATO. Russia's political interests must be always taken into account in the event of NATO's expansion. The process of expansion itself, I think, is predetermined objectively. Therefore, there should be a balanced approach, and three aspects should be considered. First, I think it should happen within the framework of mandatory consultations between NATO and Russia; second, the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the new NATO countries must be by all means discussed; and third, I think, a very important step would be to create new joint military systems. The extent of trust should be determined by Russia's more active participation in Partnership for Peace, as there is none today, and, possibly, joint exercises which make relations between defense ministries more trustful, as well as perhaps in some peacekeeping operations. This is extremely important.

Now, Ukraine's approach to NATO. I would like to reiterate that Ukraine is geopolitically and geostrategically in a situation where it can assume two roles: either that of a buffer between NATO and Russia, or a crossing point in a two-way traffic. I would like Ukraine to act as a crossing point. I think all steps that are being made by Ukraine today, including its individual program for peace, its readiness to hold joint exercises and other steps, allow it to claim a special relationship with NATO. I think any improvement between NATO and Ukraine would to an extent promote improvement in the relations between Russia and NATO. [end recording]

NATO Officers End Black Sea Fleet Inspection

LD2105151895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1502 GMT 21 May 95

[By Lev Ryabchikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SEVASTOPOL, May 21 (Itar-Tass) — Everything is okay in the land-based units of the Black sea Fleet, according to a delegation of NATO officers who have wound up their inspection here.

The commanders had learnt about the inspection just four hours before the delegation's arrival. The NATO inspectors — six German officers, one officer from the United States, one from Belgium and one from the Netherlands — spent two days with the units and noted their high combat efficiency.

The inspection was carried out in conformity with the Vienna agreement signed by ex-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991.

Ukrainian Zone Proposal Considered in Bosnia

LD2005175695 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1640 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] New York — The UN Secretariat has proposed that Ukraine should redeploy its 60th independent special battalion of peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslavia from the territory of Croatia to Bosnia, Anatoliy Zlenko, Ukraine's representative at the UN, told UNIAN in an exclusive interview on today.

According to Zlenko, the UN is considering a proposal to set up a new zone on the territory of Bosnia, where the two Ukrainian battalions will play the leading role. According to tentative plans, the Ukrainian sector will probably be set up near the town of Zepa (to the northeast of Sarajevo) where one of the subunits of "Ukrbat-1" [1st Ukrainian battalion] is currently stationed.

Commentary on Yeltsin Decision Not To Come to Kiev

AU1905160895 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY
in Ukrainian 18 May 95 pp 1, 2

[Commentary by Valentyna Pysanska: "A Special Kind of Friendship. Had It Also Been Without 'Buts'...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] It might seem that efforts, sometimes inconceivable, made by diplomats and politicians to establish normal partnership relations between Ukraine and Russia would be crowned with success quite soon: That the large-scale Agreement on Friendship, Good-Neighborly Relations, and Partnership that was already initialed by heads of state delegations during the recent visit to Kiev by Oleg Soskovets, Russia's first vice premier, would be signed. If something was missing there at all, it was the royal "full stop" to be put by the head of the neighboring state, who still cannot make it from Moscow to Kiev, although this is not such a long distance to cover (following so many rounds of negotiations, meetings, and accords!).

No doubt, the state visit to Ukraine by U.S. President Bill Clinton also contributed to normalizing these relations and bringing the positions of our countries closer. Mutual relations between Moscow and Kiev were not last among the issues tackled at the negotiations.

Ukrainian Embassy adviser in Moscow Vadym Dolhanov told journalists that Boris Yeltsin's visit to Kiev would take place "in the very near future."

It might seem that there are no visible reasons for clouds to gather in this sphere. However, Boris Yeltsin's statement at a conference attended by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, a number of "power ministers," and Feliks Grovov, chief commander of the Black Sea Fleet, came like a bolt out of the blue when he said that... "today, we have one problem — how to be with Ukraine, for we cannot continue accumulating problems any further, but must make up our minds and adopt a decision today."

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev commented upon this passage in an original manner. He believes that Yeltsin's visit to Ukraine will not take place until the Black Sea issue is resolved. Having stressed that relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine must be friendly, Mr. Kozyrev pointed out, however, that "the present situation when the Black Sea Fleet issue has not yet been resolved cannot suit either Russia or Ukraine. As soon as this problem is settled, the clouds in the Russian-Ukrainian relations will dissipate."

It is interesting to note that the minister of the Russian external political department associated this separate problem with the results of the referendum in Belarus and gave listeners to understand that the Russian Federation would like the trends observed in the course of the referendum in Belarus to be characteristic of Ukraine, too.

So, perhaps, gentlemen, this is what you should have started with? However, you should first have asked the people of Ukraine whether they approve of such "trends"? Whether, for example, our mothers would like their sons to establish "constitutional order" in Chechnya? All the more so since Mr. Kozyrev agrees that "the people are always right."

Well, maybe Russian politicians really believe that, in this way, they will manage to obscure the issue and cover up their appetites? Because when friendship, in particular a "special" friendship is on the agenda, decent people avoid "buts." Perhaps we do not need "special" friendship, but just a normal human friendship on mutually advantageous terms of good-neighborly relations and partnership? This is how we had previously agreed to act. As the Czechs and Slovaks, for example, managed to do....

Article Views Clinton Trip, 'Disappointment'

WS1905134595 Kiev VECHIRNIY KYYIV
in Ukrainian 16 May 95 pp 1, 3

[Commentary by Hryhoriy Musiyenko: "Ukraine Face to Face With the United States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first state visit to Ukraine by the U.S. President ended 12 May 1995. In his conversation with journalists on board the plane after his return, Bill Clinton was enthusiastic about Ukraine, and the inexhaustible ingenuity and truthfulness of the Ukrainians.

On Saturday, in his weekly address to the nation, the President's first summary of his visit to Ukraine was very vague: The visit has strengthened U.S. security. With some reservations, we can say the same about Ukraine, too.

The U.S.-Ukrainian summit is already an event in our history.

Quite recently, our foreign policy doctrine determined Russia as Ukraine's main strategic partner. This was a tribute to the imperial period tradition. The United States also attached priority importance to Russia being a strategic partner in the struggle for global leadership [as published], despite the fact that the first place in the U.S. sphere of geopolitical interests was occupied by Israel, the second — by Egypt, and the third — by Russia. Ukraine came fourth in this ranking.

Proceeding from this, Ukrainian leaders, in their fulfillment of priority tasks, planned to draft a treaty on friendship and partnership with Russia first, while the United States was next in line. While Russia continued to treat Ukraine from a dictatorial position, the United States proved more skillful. The U.S.-Ukrainian treaty was signed quickly, even though we must pay for this with complete nuclear disarmament and a few other things. Russian President Yeltsin was deferring his visit to Kiev in the hope that Kiev itself would ask Moscow to condescend to this trip. The U.S. President took advantage of the happy opportunity — the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the victory of World War II — and visited both Moscow and Kiev in one trip. Clinton took over the political initiative, while Yeltsin remained on the sidelines. He was forced to give his assent to suspending sales of nuclear technology to Iran, and seeking compromises in the resolution of the Crimean issue jointly with Ukraine. Launching a new phase in the war with Chechnya makes Yeltsin's visit to Ukraine a problematic issue. At the same time, the United States, through its President, declares Ukraine to be its priority partner and in its sphere of vital interests. This step, however, has not been taken for philanthropic reasons.

Europe wants to protect its political and economic interests, as well as its spiritual heritage and culture from the invasion of Americanization. Therefore, the position of the United States in West and Central Europe has recently weakened, which can be seen, in particular, in attitudes toward the U.S. embargo on Iran. The embargo has not been supported by Europe's leading countries.

There has also arisen an acute U.S.-Japanese trade and economic controversy in the Asian Pacific region. The United States faces an unfavorable situation in the region from the Pacific western coast to the Atlantic eastern shore. Ukraine is in the middle of this geopolitical conflict of interests. Taking into account Ukraine's powerful potential, one can understand the attention paid by the United States to our country.

It goes without saying that Ukraine, due to its specific political, economic, and military situation, may benefit from a geopolitical partnership with the United States. The Ukrainian leadership, in particular — President Kuchma and acting Prime Minister Marchuk, are apparently aware of this and take adequate steps. It is no secret that Russia will not behave toward such a U.S.-Ukrainian rapprochement favorably. Ukraine, too, should be careful not to cherish too many hopes for its protection by the United States. The United States looks out for its own interests, not ours.

We should have learned wisdom from historical experience. At one time, hetman Bohdan Khmelnitskyy, while liberating the country from under Polish rule, pinned his hopes on Moscow, which was of the same religion as Ukraine. Hetman Petro Doroshenko pinned his hopes on Turkey. In the 20th century, hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyy placed his trust in Germany. Vynnychenko and Hrushevskyy believed in the principles of democracy and humanism, and were the first to disarm themselves in the armed-to-the-teeth world. Petrovskyy and Skrypnyk lead Ukraine on the road to the World Communist International. We are all well aware of how those attempts ended each time. Our leaders must take this into account in implementing their policies — while maneuvering between the interests of Ukraine's neighbors, they should pin their hopes only on their own people, the Ukrainians.

U.S.-Ukrainian agreements on cooperation in the space industry on the basis of the Zenith rocket system and the aviation system for launching rockets from An-225 "Mriya"-type aircraft are worthy of our support.

At the same time, certain agreements evoke our doubts and distrust. Thus, Ukraine agreed to become the legal successor to at least 38 treaties signed between the USSR and the United States. Not everybody knows, however, which treaties were taken into account, and what legal and financial consequences they entail for Ukraine. This may produce unexpected and extremely unfavorable surprises for us.

Here is an example. A congress of the World Zionist Organization, which took place in New York at the end April 1995, adopted a resolution regarding post-communist countries in East Europe, including Ukraine. The resolution demands that the property confiscated by Communist regimes of the aforementioned countries from the Jews be returned to them. The World Zionist Organization leaders appealed to President Clinton, on the eve of his visit to Moscow and Kiev, requesting that he uphold this resolution and demand its implementation by the Russian and Ukrainian leadership. According to Radio Liberty, Clinton has backed this resolution, and promised to advocate its implementation. Does Ukraine need, then, to declare itself a successor to the Communist regime just to experience — after terror and famines — devastating robbery once again? Who will return the confiscated property and the lives of 60 million Ukrainians to us? [sentence as published]

President Clinton delivered a speech at Shevchenko University during a ceremony awarding him an honorary degree. He was sincerely enthusiastic about the poetry of Taras Shevchenko and cited some lines from memory. This deeply moved all participants, and added trustworthiness to Clinton as an envoy of the U.S. people, who brought together the geniuses of Taras Shevchenko and the U.S. national hero George Washington in Kiev. Therefore, Kievans and all Ukrainians were deeply disappointed that the President did not lay any flowers at the monument to Shevchenko. Possibly, there were some important reasons for this.

A similar situation could be observed during the ceremony in commemoration of the Babyn Yar victims. President Clinton, in accordance with Judaic custom, laid a stone at the Jewish menorah, while his wife Hillary laid flowers. To make his speech, the U.S. President placed a Jewish skull cap on his head, which testified to his special respect to the Jewish community.

Why has President Clinton not devoted even a minute to honoring the lonely cross that stand at the place of execution of many thousands of Ukrainians, including Ukrainian poetess Olena Teliha, a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists?

Finally, according to unofficial sources, it was the U.S. side from Washington that requested cancellation of a news conference for Ukrainian journalists. They found themselves on the sidelines.

The visit of the U.S. highest-level guest was sincerely welcomed by Ukraine, even though it also left a bitter taste of disappointment.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian-U.S. rapprochement has a solid foundation. The spirit of Kiev is gaining strength and weight in the world. This is an opinion supported both in Ukraine and the United States. U.S. Senator from Kentucky Mitch MacConnell has recently stated that "Ukraine's best days are still ahead." Given good and equal partnership with the United States, Ukraine can bring these days nearer.

Kuchma Against U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba

LD2005174995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, May 20 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Ukraine is against the U.S. applying economic sanctions to Cuba, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said during a meeting with Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina on Saturday [20 May].

Gennady Udovenko, the Ukrainian foreign minister, told journalists after the meeting that Ukraine believed that "the sanctions were not a method to resolve disputes".

Udovenko told an Interfax-Ukraine correspondent that during the meeting the issue of military-technical cooperation had been discussed.

"In the USSR epoch, Cuba received a lot of military equipment which must be repaired and supplied with spare parts," Udovenko said. "At the same time, that was not the main issue either for Cuba or for Russia."

He said that Cuba was interested first of all in broadening economic cooperation. Robaina transferred to Kuchma an invitation from Fidel Castro to visit Cuba, Udovenko said.

The Ukrainian and Cuban foreign ministers will sign a package of bilateral documents in Kiev on May 20.

Cuban Foreign Minister Begins Ukraine Visit

LD1905170895 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Roberto Robaina Gonzalez, member of the Cuban Council of State and Cuban minister of foreign affairs, has arrived on his first official visit to Ukraine. He will meet with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Serhiy Osyka, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hennadiy Udovenko. The two sides will discuss present and future Ukrainian-Cuban cooperation and sign relevant documents.

According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press center, the two countries are currently bound by 10 intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements. Eight more are under negotiation.

Anti-Blockade Stance Acknowledged

LD2005115595 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1000 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukrainian Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz on 19 May received Cuban

Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina Gonzalez who, earlier the same day, arrived in Ukraine on an official visit. Talks held focused on Ukrainian-Cuban relations, including interparliamentary contacts and international cooperation.

Roberto Robaina Gonzalez conveyed deep gratitude for the statement by the Ukrainian Supreme Council against the blockade of Cuba, adding that the situation in that country was complex but that the most trying stage was over. This, he said, laid a foundation of mutually beneficial economic cooperation to extend long-standing good relations between Ukraine and Cuba.

Oleksandr Moroz said he shared this view and that the Ukrainian parliament expressed the will of its people in desiring to further democracy worldwide and opposing any form of political and economic pressure.

He went on to say that Ukraine predicated its foreign policy, including as regards Latin America, on the principles of equal relations and a favorable basis, primarily to develop mutually advantageous trade and economic cooperation. The great distance between Ukraine and Cuba, he said, is and can be no obstacle.

Roberto Robaina Gonzalez recalled that Oleksandr Moroz had been invited to pay an official visit to Cuba and asked if it could take place as soon as possible.

Cuban Minister Looks at Trade Prospects

LD2005130495 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1130 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no dateline as received] — The shortage of currency reserves dictates that an increase in goods turnover can be achieved by restoring old cooperation ties between the two countries. This was the consensus reached by a meeting between Ihor Podolyev and Andriy Honcharuk, Ukrainian deputy foreign economic relations ministers, and Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina Gonzalez. Previously, Ukraine supplied Cuba with agricultural and consumer appliances components serviced agricultural machinery and processed sugar cane.

At present, Ukraine can offer Cuba spare parts, assistance in repairs, and specialist training to revamp the latter country's energy industry. A Ukrainian-Cuban intergovernmental commission for trade, economic, scientific, and technological cooperation is to start work in Havana soon. Future plans include a Ukrainian-Cuban trade organization that will settle operational matters in trade and the economy and will boost business ties.

Foreign Minister Signs Agreements

LD2005164095 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A number of bilateral agreements between the Governments of Cuba and Ukraine were signed today at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry. Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina Gonzalez signed an agreement on promotion and mutual protection of investments. The agreement was signed for Ukraine by Viktor Petrov, minister of machine building, military-industrial complex, and conversion. An air transport agreement was signed for Ukraine by Oleksandr Artemenko, first deputy minister of transport. The Cuban and Ukrainian foreign ministers also signed an agreement on travel between the two countries.

Udovenko Seeks Insight Into Non-Aligned Movement

LD2205091695 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 22 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukraine counts on Cuba's assistance, as far as Ukraine's presence at the forthcoming conference of heads of the Non-Aligned Movement states is concerned, Ukraine's Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko told journalists. He said the Republic of Cuba is one of the founders and authoritative members of the movement, whose opinion carries weight. The minister said Ukraine could attend the above conference in the capacity of guest or observer. The move is dictated by Ukraine's wish for deeper insight into the current processes within the Non-Aligned Movement. However, Ukraine's accession to and membership in the Non-Aligned Movement is not on the agenda at the moment, Hennadiy Udovenko said.

Hungary Premier Comments on Cooperation Talks

LD1905211895 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1420 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Main attention at the negotiations between Ukraine and Hungary was focused on the situation on the Ukrainian-Hungarian border, Hungary's Prime Minister Gyula Horn told journalists on 19 May.

According to the Hungarian prime minister, both sides agreed that the situation at the border is very unsatisfactory. Gyula Horn said a special operations group will be set up to improve the situation. It will include specialists from the Foreign Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and representatives from the customs and border services. Proposals concerning necessary measures, including toughening the border-crossing procedure, will be made by 1 July 1995.

Regarding the economic sphere, an agreement was reached on cooperation in power engineering, including the export of energy produced in Ukraine, the Hungarian prime minister said. Agricultural cooperation was also discussed.

According to Gyula Horn, the setting up special economic zones in the vicinity of the Ukrainian towns of Chop and Uzhgorod and of the Hungarian town of Zahony was coordinated.

The Hungarian prime minister said that two international issues were discussed at the negotiations. Issue number one: Hungary will support Ukraine's accession to the Council of Europe and to the Central European Initiative. Issue number two: Gyula Horn and Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma supported the idea of lifting sanctions against former Yugoslavia.

Ukraine's Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk said that the sides also discussed cooperation in pharmacology, the setting up of a joint Ukrainian-Hungarian bank which will solve the problems of mutual payments and the use of national currencies for mutual settlements.

Specific plans for cooperation in the chemical industry, the use of Ukrainian-made metal ceramics [metaleva keramika] for building engines for "Ikarus" buses and also cooperation in the fields of the machine-building and military-industrial complexes were discussed.

Hungarian Prime Minister Ends Visit

LD2005105595 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1000 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn has ended his official visit to Ukraine, the main result of this being a mutual understanding between Ukraine and Hungary on a number of points on the economic agenda.

In Kiev, Gyula Horn met Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz, Acting Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk, and Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko. The Hungarian prime minister's visit culminated in the signing of a package of bilateral documents. He also invited Yevheniy Marchuk to make an official visit to Hungary.

The talks centered on cooperation between Ukrainian and Hungarian border regions where the sides agreed to set up a special economic zone. The Hungarian prime minister spoke of the Ukrainian leadership's constructive approach to finding a solution to the problem of ethnic minorities. Agreement was reached, in particular, that tuition at a number of schools in Ukraine in the areas with a high concentration of Hungarians would also be in their native tongue.

Gyula Horn reaffirmed that Hungary supported Ukraine in its course toward admission to the Council of Europe and integration into the central European initiative. There is every precondition for Ukraine to do so, he said.

Answering questions from journalists, Yevheniy Marchuk described as positive the negotiations held and expressed the hope that this visit would give a fresh impetus to relations between the two states.

On the same day the Hungarian delegation left for Budapest.

West Proposes Kiev Finance Half Chernobyl Closure

LD1905151595 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1250 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no date as received] — According to the West's tentative proposals concerning the possibilities of financing the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power station — which a G-7 delegation tabled at the request of the Ukrainian side at the negotiations on 16-17 May — Ukraine should allocate about 50 percent of the required sum.

A well-informed source told UNIAN that the G-7 delegation estimated the overall cost of phasing out the Chernobyl nuclear power station, including the completion of the construction of three new nuclear generating sets and the modernization of conventional power engineering facilities, at approximately $3.8 billion, with the West being able to allocate $2 billion. The delegation proposed that Ukraine should allocate $1.8 billion.

The delegation estimated the cost of phasing out the Chernobyl nuclear power station alone, without taking into account the problems facing Slavutich [town where the station's personnel reside] at $1.1 billion, of which 0.6 billion should be raised by Ukraine itself, for example, by means of introducing special duties, taxes, and tariffs on electricity.

Other possible sources of obtaining funds are the nuclear safety accounts of the G-7 and the European Union. Ways of obtaining $200 million have been mapped out so far.

Ukraine estimates the cost of shutting down the Chernobyl nuclear power station, including the solution to the Slavutich-related problems, at $4 billion.

Unlike at previous negotiations, the Ukrainian side proposed that issues of reforming conventional power engineering and completing the construction of new nuclear generating sets within the context of closing down the Chernobyl nuclear power station be not considered but the money be channelled only to phase out Chernobyl, to build "Cover-2" [also referred to as the sarcophagus over the damaged fourth reactor], to ensure safety of handling radioactive waste and used radioactive fuel and to solve the problems facing Slavutich.

The differences in estimating the required funds, determining their sources and trends of their use were not removed at the negotiations in Kiev.

It is envisaged that the differences can be reduced if the G-7 summit in Halifax finds additional possibilities to finance the phasing out of the Chernobyl nuclear power station.

National Affairs

Kuchma Hails Power Law, Hopes For 'Understanding'

LD1905205195 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Leonid Kuchma today attended the Agro-95 international sale exhibition of agricultural produce and equipment [in Chubinskiy near Kiev]. [passage omitted]

After viewing the central pavilion for about two hours, the president emerged on the porch, greeted by hundreds of people whom he did not deny the opportunity to talk.

[Begin recording] [passage omitted] [Unidentified Correspondent] Yesterday, the Supreme Council adopted the law on power. Do you think there is now a chance for different power structures to cooperate? Is it a positive factor or is there still room for improvement?

[Kuchma] I think it is a positive factor indeed. I want first of all to congratulate the parliamentary majority who prefer cooperation to confrontation. Because some of the deputies voted against not because they were against the law but for the sake of voting against whenever the president was mentioned, regardless of what it was all about. This is not a law about power. This is a law about delimitating state powers, whereby every power structure minds its own business. There is nothing else to it. Hearing Mr. Moroz, or should I say Comrade Moroz, deliver his political speech stating how many laws and resolutions they had passed, 100 laws and 300 resolutions, one wonders, what is a resolution? When to sow and when to harvest? People can figure that out themselves! What they need is a legislative framework to be masters of the land. Among other questions asked today is: What about the tax policy? Why are our laws being changed every month? What about the price policy? So I hope understanding can yet be found. The opposite would be bad news both for the Supreme Council and for the president, and mainly, for the people. But we must make up our minds this year, very shortly. Because it is impossible to work in the chaos we have today. [end recording]

Kuchma Staffer Hails Law on State Power

LD1905190895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1711 GMT 19 May 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: No 93 (837); compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The chief of President Kuchma's staff Dmitriy Tabachnik has described the law on state power and local self-government adopted by parliament on Thursday [18 May] as "a victory of common sense over petty factional interests".

IF note: The law was carried by 219 votes; 104 MPs voted against. The session was attended by 357 deputies. At the same time the Ukrainian parliament turned down some clauses of the bill, for instance, the president's right to disband parliament and the possibility of the president's impeachment. Parliament also voted to empower the president to declare a referendum only on the issue of a new constitution until a new constitution is adopted.

Tabachnik told Interfax that the law on power should be regarded as a means of the delimitation of powers.

The chief of the presidential staff believes that the "law contains all the counter-balances that enable the Ukrainian parliament to participate in law-making and to control action taken by executive authorities".

Under the new law all executive functions in Ukraine are performed by the president through the Cabinet of Ministers he forms and through the system of central and local bodies of state executive power.

The Ukrainian parliament issues laws concerning home and foreign policy guidelines, approves of the state budget, sets taxes, controls credits extended to Ukraine and economic assistance to other countries, lays down the rules of forming bodies of state power and local self-government and of their activity, determines Ukraine's administrative and territorial structure, regulates property relations, enterprise, labour affairs, social insurance and other relations requiring legislative control.

The Ukrainian parliament also makes decisions on forming the Council of Defence, on its composition, on electing by agreement with the president the Constitutional Court, on electing at the president's request the chairman of the Supreme Court and chairman of the Supreme

Court of Arbitration and on appointing and dismissing at the president's request the board chairman of the Bank of Ukraine and of the Prosecutor General.

The powers of parliament include the approval of the government's program and a vote of no-confidence in the government, which leads to its resignation.

The Ukrainian parliament uses the right of veto against presidential decrees if they disagree with the constitution or Ukrainian laws and simultaneously files a request at the Constitutional Court.

The president is the head of state and chief of executive government in Ukraine. He forms the Cabinet of Ministers and appoints the prime-minister and government ministers.

In case the president disagrees with any law passed by the Ukrainian parliament, he may use the right of veto and return it to parliament for reconsideration.

However, if parliament overrides the presidential veto by a two- thirds majority, the president has to sign the law within ten days and make it available for publishing.

The president represents Ukraine in international relations, cancels acts by the Cabinet of Ministers, individual ministries and chiefs of local administrations if they disagree with Ukrainian legislation or with presidential decrees or instructions.

The president is the Ukrainian commander-in-chief. In case of aggression against Ukraine or the threat of such aggression he declares the state of war or martial law with the subsequent approval of that decision by the Ukrainian parliament.

The president may declare on his own accord or at the parliament's proposal a national referendum on Ukraine's state system, the organization of state power and local self-government and on other social or state issues.

The president presents to parliament a candidate for the Prosecutor-General.

Regional and district state administrations led by elected heads constitute bodies of state power in regions and districts (except for city districts).

Local councils of the appropriate rank are bodies of local self-government in cities, urban districts and rural communities.

The parliamentary speaker Aleksandr Moroz said just before the bill on power was put to the vote that he disagreed with some of its articles.

He told journalists the bill failed to establish "parity and the balance of power". "There should be no place for competition: he who is the first to declare a referendum gains the upper hand", he said.

Moroz disagreed with that article of the bill which empowers the president to hold a referendum: "Parliament is the sole body that expresses popular thought". He believes that parliament alone should be empowered to declare plebiscites.

Moroz says everything should be left as it is under the current constitution. "The executive authorities must have no right to call a referendum", Moroz said.

In the meantime Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko told Interfax that the "adoption of the law paves Ukraine's way into the Council of Europe and other European structures with which it actively cooperates". He said that he was greatly satisfied with parliament's decision.

Udovenko said that all Ukrainian embassies on Thursday were notified the law had been adopted. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry is drafting all the necessary materials on that question for the Council of Europe.

Udovenko believes that the law on power has lifted one of the main obstacles to Ukraine's admission in the Council of Europe - the lack of a clear delimitation of powers.

He is certain that until Ukraine promulgates a new constitution the delimitation of powers laid down in the law will quite satisfy the Council of Europe.

Moroz: No Conflict Between Executive, Legislative Powers

LD2005195595 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1640 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Uzhgorod — "Everything possible has been done on my part so that the Supreme Council can approve the law of Ukraine 'On state power and local self-government,'" Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz told a conference of leaders of local bodies of power, leaders of enterprises, and managers today.

He believes that the first step has already been made, because "it will not be easy to pass the law on the enactment of the law on power." Up to 70 articles of Ukraine's Constitution will have to be amended for that purpose. Moroz urged that an end should be put to the insinuations that there is confrontation between the legislative and executive powers, and to the idle talk on who became the winner and who became the loser after the law on power was adopted, because "it is a question of the state being the winner."

Oleksandr Moroz said he remained loyal to the idea of retaining councils of people's deputies. "Their dissolution will be a dangerous phenomenon," he believes. According to the parliament speaker, the role of Councils of People's Deputies should grow in connection with the elaboration of a new concept of privatization, under which regions will be given the right to decide independently on the fate of the facilities subject to privatization.

The parliament chairman said the legislative and executive powers should get down to joint work on mapping out a program for leading the state out of the economic crisis.

As regards the future of Transcarpathia, Moroz spoke in favor of stepping up the role of the region as a recreation zone.

Udovenko Praises Law on Government

LD1905140195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1241 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, May 19 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko has expressed confidence that the Law on Government passed by Ukraine's parliament Thursday [18 May] opens for the former Soviet republic the way to the Council of Europe and other European bodies.

"I have met (parliament's) decision with great satisfaction," Udovenko told Interfax - Ukraine Friday.

He said the news had gone to all Ukrainian embassies Thursday and that his ministry was preparing all relevant materials for the Council of Europe.

Marchuk on Process of Forming New Cabinet

LD1905192295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1827 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, May 19 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has instructed acting Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk to work out proposals concerning the composition of the new cabinet, a Ukrainian minister Valeriy Pustovoitenko told Interfax - Ukraine.

Marchuk told an Interfax - Ukraine correspondent, when asked about the principles for forming the new cabinet, that there would be no such "revolutionary" situation where the keys to cabinets are seized from old officials and new officials are employed.

Marchuk said the process of forming the cabinet would proceed from "time requirements and must not be made into a sensation."

Marchuk said he was not going to form a coalition government by sacrificing the level of professionalism just to satisfy all politicians.

He said a competition could be held to select the members of the new cabinet.

Marchuk said the final decision on the cabinet's composition would be made by the president as the head of the executive power.

Committee To Press for Abolishment of Presidency

LD1905141495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1241 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, May 18 (Interfax) — An All-Ukraine Committee has been set up in Kiev to press for terminating President Leonid Kuchma's powers and abolishing the presidency in Ukraine.

As Chairman of Ukraine's State Congress Party Alexander Bazilyuk has reported to Interfax, alongside the Congress the Committee has been joined by the parliamentary group Soyuz, Crimea's Republican Party, the Kiev branch of the Socialist Party, and a number of other organizations.

The Committee's short-term goal, according to Bazilyuk, is to set up initiative groups across the republic to collect signatures in support of a referendum for revoking Kuchma's powers and doing away with the presidency. Such groups must be registered by Ukraine's Central Electoral Committee.

The signature-raising campaign can feasibly start in September, after the summer holidays. Ukraine's legislation provides for 3 million signatures to be collected within three months.

Bazilyuk indicated that the Committee would go beyond its prime task of organizing a referendum on the presidency. At its session on May 17, it decided to move a motion in parliament on holding a referendum with the question: "Do you want to live in the revived Union of the peoples of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan?"

Kravchuk for Disbanding Crimean Parliament

LD1905132795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1241 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, May 19 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Former Ukrainian president, parliament member Leonid Kravchuk believes the Crimean parliament should be disbanded.

"Having the Russian parliament's support the Crimean legislature remains determined to ignore any resolutions by the Ukrainian parliament," Kravchuk said.

About the Russian State Duma's decision on the participation of its representatives in the Crimean referendum on June 25 ex-president Kravchuk said: "The State Duma's decision does not fit in either with international law or with inter-state bilateral relations."

Kravchuk described the Russian parliament's decision as "crude interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine" and recalled that Crimea was an "explosive spot".

Crimean Party Supports Self-Dissolution of Parliament

LD1905211295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2048 GMT 19 May 95

[By Lev Ryabchikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SIMFEROPOL, May 20 (Itar-Tass) — A Crimean centrist party, the Crimean Republic Support Union, has circulated a statement on Friday [19 May] saying that the current political crisis in Crimea has gone beyond the boundaries of the republic, bringing confrontation between Ukraine and Russia to a new critical level. The document characterizes the actions of the majority of Crimean politicians as an "adventurist discrediting of ideas adopted by them."

The party puts the blame for the parliamentary crisis above all on the ruling parliamentary bloc "Russia," which has allegedly got so deeply involved in confrontation with Ukrainian authorities that it is no longer capable of finding a constructive way out of the existing situation. The party also denounces the activities of parliamentarians who proclaim themselves the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous Crimean republic, since in its opinion, a new inner parliamentary rotation will not bring any positive results. The statement stresses that the way out of the crisis lies only through resignation of all deputies of the Crimean parliament and holding new elections to Crimean Supreme Soviet. Meanwhile, the presidium of the Crimean parliament has addressed the presidium of Ukraine's Supreme Soviet with a proposal to hold a meeting of these two bodies or their delegations "for the purpose of coordinating principal positions and elaboration of mutually acceptable decisions concerning the legal-political situation in relations between Ukraine and the Crimean republic."

Left-Wing Union Calls For Reunification of Ex-USSR

LD2005203595 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1640 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Dnepropetrovsk [no date as received] — The Second Congress of Peace-Loving Forces "Against Extremism and Militant Nationalism" completed the unification of Ukraine's left-wing movements in a new political organization, the Motherland Union of Peace-Loving Forces [Soyuz Myrolyubnykh Syl "Vitchyzna"]. The congress, whose 426 delegates represented 20 parties and organizations, 18 regions, and the Republic of Crimea approved the statute of the new organization.

In its final statement the congress welcomed the results of the Belarusian referendum. Most delegates voiced calls for the creation of a new union and criticism of President Leonid Kuchma. Natalia Vitrenko, a parliamentary deputy and member of the Socialist Party's political council, accused the president of breaking his election promises. She said Kuchma had created an authoritarian regime, which could be compared to Hitler's coming to power. Vitrenko declared that after several years of independence Ukraine's GNP dropped to one-third of its former value, the national income declined by 46 percent, and industrial output has been halved.

Economic Issues

World Bank Officials Holds Talks in Kiev

LD2105090495 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 21 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation of executive directors of the World Bank, currently on a visit to Ukraine, has met Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Mityukov, Economics Minister Roman Shpek, State Property Fund Chairman Yuriy Yekhanurov, and other officials responsible for the management and reformation of Ukraine's economy.

The World Bank representatives pointed out that the bank is generally satisfied with the transformations taking place in Ukraine at the macroeconomic level.

Measures Endorsed To Overcome Payments Crisis

LD2005184195 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1640 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no date as received] — At the beginning of next week, President Leonid Kuchma is to endorse measures to overcome the payments crisis and to support domestic producers. The president is to issue a separate instruction toward that end, UNIAN has learned from sources close to the Cabinet of Ministers.

The measures to overcome the payments crisis have been worked out by the Cabinet of Ministers, the National Bank of Ukraine, and the president's administration over the past two weeks. They were finally coordinated by the president and leaders of the Cabinet of Ministers at their regular conference on 20 May.

Kuchma Stresses Need for Domestic Oil Production

*WS1905120095 Lvov INFOBANK in English
1130 GMT 19 May 95*

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At the May 17 meeting devoted to the development of Ukrainian oil and gas sector President Leonid Kuchma emphasized the need to increase the domestic production of petroleum products by at least 20 percent in order to reduce foreign procurement. The meeting was attended by the managers of oil-drilling and oil-refining enterprises, as well as by top executive officials of 14 oil-producing oblasts.

In the near future, 93 oil wells are to be assessed for industrial development in the western region of Prykarpattya [Ciscarpathia] and in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine currently has 4,209 oil wells (the majority of them exhausted) and virtually no new drilling is taking place. According to expert evaluations, Ukraine may count on proved oil reserves of more than 700 million tonnes located mostly in western regions. However, less then 10 percent of them are being developed.

Industry managers urged the president to lower the excise tax on oil production and to decrease the share of profits which is currently being surrendered to the state in order to use the revenues to upgrade the sector instead. President Kuchma has also promised to consider the initiative with regard to the issuance of stocks by pipeline companies. Bohdan Klyuk, director of the UKRHAZPROM industrial concern, said that domestic consumers have accumulated an outstanding debt of 230 trillion karbovantsi for gas supplies. Valeriy Pustovoytenko, a Cabinet of Ministers minister, was instructed to prepare a special protocol on the measures to improve the conditions of the oil and gas sector according to the results of the meeting.

Crimea 1st Quarter 1995 Financial Report

*954F2304A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA
in Russian 16 May 95 p 1*

[Article by State Statistics Committee of Crimea: "Crimea's Socioeconomic Situation in the First Quarter of 1995: Financial Position"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The income of the consolidated budget of Crimea (excluding the city of Sevastopol) in the first quarter of 1995 totaled 7.4977 trillion karbovantsy. One of the main sources of revenue for the budget is the value added tax and excise tax— 41.7 percent of all income, and also the tax on the profit of enterprises and organizations—31.1 of all receipts. Income tax from citizens amounts to only 9 percent of budget income.

Of the expenditures side of Crimea's budget, which totaled 7.7976 trillion karbovantsy, 54.5 percent was spent on social and cultural measures and 14.1 percent, on the national economy. Administration took 3.2 percent of all expenditures, and 22.9 percent of all expenditures went toward social protection of the population.

In the first quarter of 1995 insurance compensation payments and insurance sums of the population of the republic insurance company Krym-Oranta totaled 66.7 billion karbovantsy.

The volume of credit investments by banks in the economy of Crimea increased in comparison with the first quarter of 1994 by a factor of 3.4, amounting to 6.327 trillion karbovantsy on 1 April 1995.

The structure of credit investments underwent some changes. An increase is occurring in the share of long-term loans, from 2.7 percent in the first quarter of 1994 to 8.5 percent in the total volume of loans now. Short-term credits amounted to 91.5 percent.

Overdue credit indebtedness of enterprises and organizations for mutual settlements between enterprises amounted on 1 April 1995 to 9.3255 trillion karbovantsy, and for bank loans—1.432 trillion karbovantsy.

The profit share of republic industrial enterprises is 48.4 percent of the profit of the whole region. In two months of this year every fourth enterprise operated at a loss. These enterprises assumed losses in the sum of 921 billion karbovantsy. The greatest amount of losses of enterprises was in the housing and municipal services sector, trade and public catering, and the sphere of everyday services of the population.

The credit indebtedness of Crimean enterprises to partners from Russia decreased for the month by a factor of 1.3 and amounted to 642 billion karbovantsy. The debt of Russian enterprises to Crimean enterprises and organizations increased by 23 billion karbovantsy and amounted to 1.3555 trillion karbovantsy.

In addition, the debit indebtedness for enterprises of Ukraine amounted to 14.6 trillion karbovantsy, and credit indebtedness—21.5 trillion karbovantsy.

Unemployment on Increase in Crimea

*954F2304D Simferopol KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russia 16 May 95 p 1*

[Article by I. Andreyev: "They Remained Unemployed...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Unemployment is growing in Crimea, albeit, fortunately, slowly. In the first quarter 15,815 persons applied for assistance to the city and rayon employment services, 3,536 more than for the corresponding period last year.

Commenting on this fact, Ye.V. Heklyudov, director of the republic's employment center, told us that more than 9,500 persons are registered as unemployed. Of these, 52.6 percent are laborers and 30 percent are clerical employees. In this category of the population, women constitute 56.3 percent, and youths up to 28 years old—38 percent. The number of applications of persons who wish to get additional earnings increased by a factor of 2.9. In the first quarter, 3,040 persons of those who applied were placed in jobs.

According to preliminary lists, it was contemplated dismissing 3,653 workers, and of these, 84.8 percent were from state enterprises. Actually 1,981 persons were dismissed. For job placement of citizens who require social protection, by a decision of the local organs of state authorities, 7,765 jobs were reserved.

Specialists of the employment service looked into 64 Simferopol enterprises. Some 54.8 percent of their workers were on leave without pay and 32 percent were working on a reduced schedule. This indicates vast hidden unemployment.

To ease the situation, the Crimean employment service concluded a contract in the first quarter to create 2,090 work places associated with the conduct of social work. Eight hundred and sixteen persons were assigned to professional training. There is a total of 1,520 persons in retraining.

In the first quarter 1,320 persons received unemployment benefits. In March the average amount was 1.3055 million karbovantsy. With the assistance of the employment center, 450 new work places were created. It is expected that by the end of the first half year the number of unemployed will increase to 3,500 persons.

Decree on Mercury Contamination Prevention

954F2304B Simferopol KRYMSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 May 95 p 1

["Decree No. 137 of the Government of Crimea Dated 13 May 1995, City of Simferopol: On Measures To Prevent Contamination of the Environment with Mercury"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the purpose of preventing contamination of the environment with mercury and implementing the laws of Ukraine "On Protecting the Environment" and "On Guaranteeing the Medical and Epidemiological Well-Being of the Population," the Government of Crimea decrees:

1. The leased enterprise Krymvtortsvetmet:

1.1. Will organize a collection point and temporary storage of used luminescent mercury lamps and devices that contain mercury, with subsequent transport to the city of Gorlovka to the Nikitovskiy mercury combine for rendering them harmless and for destruction.

1.2. Will ensure the fulfillment of requirements of sanitary rules No. 3183-84 of the 19 December 1984 article "Procedure for Collecting, Transporting, Rendering Harmless, and Storing Toxic Industrial Wastes."

2. Managers of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, where luminescent mercury lamps and devices that contain mercury are used will conclude a contract with the AP [leased enterprise] Krymvtortsvetmet for the surrender and transport of used mercury lamps and devices for salvaging.

3. The state committee of Crimea for the housing and municipal services sector, the Krymselksmmunkhoz, and the city and rayon executive committees will establish strict control to prevent the removal of used mercury luminescent lamps to training grounds and to dumps for solid everyday wastes.

4. The State Committee of Crimea for Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources and the Crimean Republic Sanitary and Epidemiological Station will establish control over storing and rendering harmless used luminescent mercury lamps and devices containing mercury.

[Signed] Prime Minister of the Government of Crimea A. Franchuk.

Simferopol Airport Acquires New Terminal

954F2304C Simferopol KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 16 May 95 p 1

[Article by I. Dyakov under the rubric "Fact and Commentary": "Another Pair of Air Gates"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A new terminal has been built in Simferopol airport next to the old international section air terminal. It was built by a Polish firm on an order from and with the money of the Krym Aviation Company.

Commenting on this fact, V.A. Anufriyev, general director of the aviation company, emphasized that the main objective in creating the new terminal was to raise the quality of passenger service and to expand the traffic capacity of the airport.

The building, with a general area of 3,000 square meters, consists of three spacious waiting rooms. One of them is designated for transit air travelers, the second—for arriving passengers, and the third—for departing passengers. Three counters are equipped here for border and customs control for departing passengers and just as many for arriving passengers. We will mention that there are only two counters in the old air terminal for the arrival and departure of people.

The customs service has assured that it will man the new terminal with personnel and will set up the apparatus to x-ray passenger baggage. This is for safety control. Excellent Polish furniture has been brought in.

The state cannot be relied on; therefore, the Krym Aviation Company financed the construction from its own production development fund. It is very important that the company managed without credits, which means that it is not necessary to pay interest. A people's preregistration rest area is being equipped in front of the new building. There will be a public store with tax-free commodities. This is for those who have already gone through customs control and are like those abroad. Preparations are underway to open buffets and stands selling cold drinks. It was also possible to resolve the problem of toilets at a modern level. Thus, in this respect also it will not be embarrassing for passengers, including foreign passengers.

The new terminal is intended mainly to serve regular noncommercial flights. Passengers will fly out of here to Moscow, St. Petersburg, Tashkent, Istanbul, and Varna.

Belarus

'Changes' Predicted in Defense Ministry, KGB

WS1905124395 Minsk BELAPAN in English
1225 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The leadership of the Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, and the State Committee for State Security [KGB] may undergo serious changes. And it is most likely that the Minister of Defence Colonel-General Anatol Kastenka will be the first candidate for dismissal. Experts predict that he may be relieved of his post because President Alyaksandr Lukashenka was informed of evidence of corruption and other violations of the law in the Belarusian Army, which, in addition, filtered through into the press. In particular, Kastenka's personal participation in the sale of military property was revealed. The experts hold that, most likely, the President will propose that Anatol Kastenka should leave the post of his own free will.

Left-Wing Forces' Victory 'Dangerous' for President

WS1905120195 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian
18 May 95 p 1

[Commentary by Valyantsin Zhdanko: "Red Revenge or Left March?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] How realistic is the possibility of the Supreme Soviet becoming communist? The Belarusian media has disseminated the number of 170 — this is apparently the number of Belarusian Communist Party candidates advancing to the second round of parliamentary elections, that is to say that the new parliament (if it is elected) will thus be "red," or at least will have a strong shade of red.

At our request, the Independent Institute of Socioeconomic and Political Research has provided us with preliminary information about the party membership of successful candidates. This information considerably differs from that presented by parties themselves. Judge for yourself. According to the institute's calculations, the following representatives progressed to the second round:

— The Communist Party — 87 candidates (51 of them came first in their constituencies, 36 — second, and two candidates won parliamentary seats already in the first round).
— The Agrarian Party — 42 candidates (21 — first place, 21 — second, plus four parliamentary seats already won).
— The Belarusian Popular Front — 36 candidates (22 — first place, 14 — second).
— The Party of Popular Accord — 10 candidates (9 — first place, 1 — second, plus one seat).
— The Social Democratic Assembly — 8 candidates (6 — first place, 2 — second).
— The United Democratic Party — 7 candidates (5 — first place, 2 — second).

Two members of the Party of All-Belarusian Unity and the "Nadzeya" Women's Party each also advanced to the second round.

The reports are preliminary, and have been compiled according to information about party membership provided by the candidates themselves in polls conducted during the elections.

The left-wingers' supremacy is thus overwhelming, though it will hardly be enough to begin the first session of the new Supreme Soviet with the singing of the "Internationale" [communist anthem], even if they dominate in the second round.

The correlation between "left-wingers" and "right-wingers" is 129 to 63 (provided that the "agrarians" belong to the "leftist" bloc along with the Communists).

The considerable supremacy of the "reds" in parliament is no less (or even more) dangerous for President Lukashenka than the democrats' predominance could have been, which he feared so much and hastily prevented.

As a matter of fact, our president himself is a left-winger, though not as adamant as the "Chykintsy" [after Communist Party leader Chykin]. Additionally, Mr. Lukashenka's leftist rhetoric is accompanied by many quite market-like economic steps. The "reds," being in the majority in parliament and having the possibility of blocking adoption of laws, will certainly terminate many market-like transformations, and will make the president's life more complicated.

...A symbolic event took place in Minsk on the evening of 16 May — the new "old" flag, red with a green stripe and ornament, was hoisted over the presidential administration building. This flag suits the president, as the president suits the flag. It is quite possible that the new symbols will perfectly harmonize with a new parliament (if it is only elected). This, however, will not resolve the problem of symbols. A considerable part of our society (and this is the majority of all voters) either did not vote for the new symbols, or voted against them. There is another aspect of this problem. Henceforth, the government's entire policy, achievements, and failures will be associated with the new presidential symbols. The attitude toward the new symbols will directly depend on whether the Belarusian people's prosperity grows, idle companies are put back into operation, and prices decrease.

Irregularities Will Not Affect Election

*LD1905191795 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1827 GMT 19 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, May 19 (Interfax-West) — Irregularities found by the Belarussian Central Election Commission in the May-14 parliamentary elections and referendum will not affect the final results, commission secretary Ivan Likhach told Interfax Friday [19 May].

He said that but for the case of hundreds of people whose names were found on the lists of eligible voters in two constituencies, the results of the elections and referendum could be made public today. Likhach said that the final results could only differ from the preliminary reports by one hundredth of a percent.

He said that 18 MPs were elected in the first round and that one more candidate may be declared elected once experts present their official ruling on several controversial ballot papers.

Likhach recalled that there are a total of 260 seats in the Belarussian parliament. At least 174 MPs have to be elected for the parliament to begin work.

He reported the preliminary results of the referendum called by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Nearly 64 percent of the electorate came to the polling stations. Making the Russian language officially equal to Belarussian was supported by 83.1 percent, introduction of a new coat of arms and state flag, by 75 percent, the president's efforts to integrate the country more closely with Russia, by 82.4 percent, and empowering the president to dissolve parliament, by 77.6 percent of the voters.

Lukashenka Meets Top Officials; Discusses Economy

*WS2205112395 Minsk Radio Minsk Network
in Belarusian 1100 GMT 22 May 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has held a four-hour meeting with members of the Presidential Administration, the Cabinet of Ministers, the National Bank, and the Economic Court to discuss the stabilization of the financial-economic situation in the Republic. The president has paid primary attention to resolving mutual nonpayments that is a key anticrisis measure. Ways and means to improve the financial-economic situation in industrial and agricultural sectors have also been discussed. The president has drawn attention to [words indistinct] in resolving problems in the money and credit system, and to the urgent need to stabilize the social protection of the people. [words indistinct] importance to reduce production expenditures and prices to increase the purchasing power of the people has been stressed. Alyaksandr Lukashenka has issued specific instructions — regarding all issues discussed — and demanded that officials at all levels and heads of economic entities take responsibility for the state of things in the finance and credit sector. The president is inclined to discuss compliance with his instructions at a meeting on 8 June 1995. There are plans to outline specific ways to resolve the crisis and [words indistinct] at this meeting.

National Bank Chairman Promises Ruble Stability

*WS1905115895 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian
17 May 95 p 1*

[Report on interview with Belarusian National Bank Chairman Stanislaw Bahdankevich by Ihar Shchuchenka; place and date not given: "Stanislaw Bahdankevich: 'There Are No Grounds for Dollar To Rise'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] While the noncash hard currency market is quiet and calm, passions are flaring on the cash hard currency market. First of all, the population, anxious about increasingly active circulation of the dollar, is stimulating high demand for hard currency, and as a result, conditions favorable for speculation are being created. Meanwhile, the noncash dollar's exchange rate in Belarus has not changed for a month.

Still, people's exaggerated concerns over the situation in the cash hard currency market can be explained. Commercial banks are currently acting as a particular barometer, toward which people are oriented. They have been stepping up their hard currency operations for a week now. As we have previously reported, many commercial banks are currently in an unenviable situation: Given a severe shortage of rubles, they have to pay high interest rates on time deposits. Still, they must cover their expenses. Additionally, the fact that people, having experienced all the woes of the economic and political situation in our Republic, are expecting the worst scenario, has certainly played its role here. In this situation, hard currency acts as a reliable guarantee protecting people against another increase in the inflation rate. As a result, ruble deposits are being withdrawn from banks, and people are buying hard currency.

In this regard, however, the following quite logical question arises: What will be next? Are there grounds for the Belarusian ruble to plummet on the exchange? To explain these issues, a ZVYAZDA correspondent has contacted National Bank Chairman Stanislaw Bahdankevich.

"All over the world monetary systems are based on people's confidence in authorities and banks," Stanislaw Antonavich began our conversation. "In our Republic there is apparently no full confidence so far, even though," as he noted, "there are currently no grounds for the dollar's exchange rate to increase. There is no money available in correspondent bank accounts. As of today, there is only 7 billion [currency not specified] in banks: This sum can by no means affect the situation in the noncash hard currency market. The Belarusian ruble's exchange rate will thus remain stable."

[Shchuchenka] Stanislaw Antonavich, let us frankly say, however, that the current developments in the cash hard currency market are not strengthening the confidence in the ruble's stability.

[Bahdankevich] "In this regard, the point lies somewhere else. We have been issuing licenses to open currency exchanges to service the population. Certain firms, however, have interpreted this as permission to buy only hard currency. Some of them are thus creating high demand, which is unfavorable for the Belarusian ruble. Today, I have requested that 20 currency exchanges be inspected in the capital. If any violations are discovered, and if it proves that they only buy hard currency, the National Bank will annul their licenses. There is nothing unnatural here: The National Bank has previously been conducting such a policy."

[Shchuchenka] During your last news conference, you said that the National Bank will finally resort to the ruble's devaluation. To what degree is this process predictable?

[Bahdankevich] "We will devalue the ruble. I think that this process will proceed smoothly. We expect that the ruble's devaluation will not exceed 5 percent in the immediate future." [end Bahdankevich]

As for the results of the referendum on symbols and the further fate of bills that are currently in circulation in our Republic, Stanislaw Bahdankevich pointed that it would be unreasonable to remove "hares" with the "Pahonya" [state seal] from circulation, and to destroy new bills which are currently stored in the National Bank. After all, $20 million was spent on printing them. You must agree that our Republic is not so rich as to throw them away.

Moldova

Russian Duma Group Arrives for 14th Army Talks

LD2005152895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1320 GMT 20 May 95

[By Valery Demidetsky]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, May 20 (ITAR-TASS) — A delegation of the Russian State Duma headed by chairman of the Duma Committee for Affairs of the Commonwealth and Relations with Compatriots Konstatin Zatulin arrived here today for consultations on the Trans-Dniester stay of the Russian 14th Army.

"The working trip is being made because of Duma hearings of May 23 to discuss the position of the 14th Army and prospects for Trans-Dniester settlement. We consider it necessary to meet leaders of Moldavia and the Trans-Dniester region, and commanders of the 14th Army," Zatulin told Itar-Tass at the Chisinau airport.

Zatulin shares concern of Army Commander General Lebed over a possibility of aggravated situation in the Trans-Dniester region because of the army organization planned by the Russian Defence Ministry. "Russian troops in the Trans-Dniester region are the guarantee of regional safety and they should receive the peace-making status," he said.

On Sunday the delegation will go to Tiraspol to meet local leaders and the 14th Army Command.

In late April 1995 the Russian State Duma called against the troops withdrawal from the Trans-Dniester region which runs counter to the Russian-Moldavian agreement. The Moldavian leadership estimated the Duma stand as interference in internal affairs of Moldavia and called for immediate withdrawal of the Russian troops from the republic.

Zatulin reaffirmed his support to the Duma resolution's essence and called on Moldavia "to show realism and not hurry with the withdrawal of the army which helps to keep fragile peace in the Trans-Dniester region."

Lebed Disagrees with Reorganization of 14th Army

LD2105193695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1920 GMT 21 May 95

[By Valery Demidetsky]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TIRASPOL, May 21 (Itar-Tass) — Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Lebed, commander of the 14th Russian army in the break-away Dniester region of Moldavia, said he has not yet received the Defence Ministry's permission to attend parliamentary hearings on his army's fate and the Dniester conflict settlement scheduled for May 23.

Lebed was invited to attend the hearings by State Duma chairman Ivan Rybkin.

Konstantin Zatulin who arrived in Tiraspol as head of a Duma delegation met with Lebed, currently in hospital for medical treatment, to discuss the situation ahead of parliamentary debates.

The delegation was met by pickets lined in front of the 14th army headquarters to protest Lebed's removal from the post of the army commander. Zatulin, the Duma Committee for CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots [as received], told them that his efforts to persuade the Defence Ministry to allow Lebed to attend the hearings have been unsuccessful so far.

In his meeting with the deputies, Lebed confirmed his disagreement with the Defence Ministry's decision to reorganise the army command, saying that this will "behead" it, enable mafia-like paramilitary structures, such as Ukraine's UNSA-UNSO, to get hold of the army's weapons and will eventually lead to a new war in the region.

Lebed said Dniester region leader Igor Smirnov has lost control of the situation.

"I am not clutching at this post and ready to leave (Defence Minister) Pavel Grachev's army right now, but I have not found a person yet who would take the burden of responsibility for the lives of people of this region," Lebed said.

Dniester Leader Opposes 14th Army Withdrawal

LD2105095695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0949 GMT 21 May 95

[By Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TIRASPOL, May 21 (Itar-Tass) — Igor Smirnov, the leader of Moldova's breakaway Dniester enclave, opposes the withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army from the Dniester region.

If the army pulls out, it must leave its weapons and equipment in the region, Smirnov said.

"The withdrawal of the 14th Army will break the military balance of forces in the region, and may lead to a new war," Smirnov said during his meeting with the Russian State Duma's delegation.

The delegation came to Tiraspol for analysis of the situation before State Duma hearings on the army withdrawal.

The army's weapons "must be turned over to the people which lives in this region," Smirnov said, adding than the region has a modern industrial base for ammunition scrapping.

Smirnnov said the U.S. and other Western states are interested in the army's going as they want to force Russia out of the Dniester region.

Smirnov voiced dissatisfaction with sluggish progress of talks with Moldova on giving a special status to the Dniester region.

Deputy Speaker Rejects Peacekeepers' Status

LD1905140895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1319 GMT 19 May 95

[By Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CHISINAU, May 19 (Itar-Tass) — "The proposal of 14th army commander general Lebed to give the army a peace-making status is absolutely inadmissible. It runs counter to the agreement on settlement principles signed in 1992 by Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Mircea Snegur," deputy Moldavian parliament speaker Nikolay Andronik said here today.

The commander believes that the peace-making status of the army will help peace in the Trans-Dniester region and save money of Russian tax-payers. General Lebed warned about a danger of war recurrence in the Trans-Dniester region. "None can free me from responsibility for the fate of thousands of people," he said.

In the opinion of the Moldovan official, the initiative of general Lebed "aims to keep the Russian troops on the Moldovan left bank at any cost. Such variant has been used by Russian servicemen in Georgia where they became a peace-making force after the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict."

If the army gains such a status, "its withdrawal, to be held under an agreement of the Moldovan and Russian governments, will become impossible, and it will be very hard to settle the Trans-Dniester conflict," said Andronik. "We stand for unconditional withdrawal of the 14th army and think that a special legal status of the Trans-Dniester region is out of the question after the withdrawal of Russian troops."

A delegation of the Russian State Duma will arrive in Moldova on Saturday being headed by chairman of the Duma Committee for Affairs of the Commonwealth and Relations with Compatriots Konstantin Zatulin.

Zatulin told Radio Moldova today this visit is caused by the upcoming Duma hearings on the position of the 14th army, conditions and prospects for Trans-Dniester settlement. The hearings are scheduled for May 23. "In view of this discussion we consider it necessary to visit Chisinau and Tiraspol and meet the Moldovan and Trans-Dniester leaders and the 14th army command," said Zatulin. The hearings will be attended by parliament deputies from Moldova and the Trans-Dniester region.

Observers believe that the reason for this visit is the aggravated situation around the 14th army caused by the plans of the Russian Defence Ministry to reform the army and, possibly, dismiss general Lebed from the post of the army commander. The resolution of the State Duma on situation around the 14th army was estimated by the Chisinau authorities as interference in internal affairs of Moldavia. An appeal of Moldovan deputies called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the republic in accordance with the bilateral intergovernmental agreement.

Commentary on 14th Army Pullout Dispute

AU2005200995 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1913 GMT 19 May 95

["Commentary" by INFOTAG]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 19/5/1995 — A Moldovan parliamentary delegation will fly to Moscow next week to participate in hearings in the Russian State Duma dedicated to the situation around the 14th Army and to peaceful settlement of the Dniester conflict. The hearings will be held on 23 May on the initiative of the Duma's Committee for Contacts with the CIS States and Compatriots.

It was decided to include the issue into agenda after the Russian State Ministry signed an order to restructure the 14th Army Command and after the strong objection on behalf of the 14th Army commander, Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed. Exactly one week ago Lebed convened the most mass-scale press conference in recent months so that to enlist support of the media and to try and achieve cancellation of the Ministry's order. The more so that together with the media he has been fairly successful in "fighting" against the ministry in general and minister Pavel Grachev, in particular. Lebed managed, somehow, to remain unpunished for his most rough criticism against his boss, a criticism which was next to disobedience and violation of the army's sacred principle of subordination and undivided authority. All this lasted until Lebed has stepped into a "restricted zone" — big Russian politics. He was let to know immediately that "politics is a very delicate sphere," that the parliamentary and presidential election struggle in Russia will be very rough, and there are enough politicians in Moscow to participate in it — without Lebed.

Apparently, Aleksandr Lebed was planning to plunge into active political life. He never said this openly, but after the ministry's order appeared, he immediately announced his possible retirement. At the last moment, after consultations with his supporters in Moscow, Lebed understood that he was too much in a hurry with such statements, and tried to "rewind the cassette."

One of the Dniester leaders, with whom Lebed is in unyielding opposition, has commented the general's abrupt change of behavior quite peculiarly: "Moscow is very different from Tiraspol. The commander will be very reluctant to leave Dniester, because here he is a Lebed ("Lebed" means "Swan" in Russian,) and there he will be just a sparrow, one of many."

For a crucial argument to justify his reluctance to leave, Lebed used "the threat of confrontation in attempts to take possession of the arsenals of the weakening 14th Army, and, as a result of it, the possible unleashing of a new armed conflict in Dniester." "The ministry's initiative makes my further military service senseless (...) But who will spare me of responsibility over the fates of thousands of people? In case of a new war in Dniester, the entire Europe is going to have sleepless nights. When setting the neighbor's house on fire one should realize that the wind may change its direction at any moment" — that is how Lebed tried to warn against hasty decisions of the Defense Ministry.

However, no reaction followed, in defiance of the general's expectations. A few days later, Lebed commented the silence by stating that "such behavior is common in two typical cases: when there is nothing to reply, or when a verdict is final and without appeal." In this particular case, the second supposition is more probable. The Defense Ministry is very unlikely to cancel its decision. The State Duma, with its powerful pro-Dniester lobby, will most probably speak against the 14th Army's withdrawal and against the restructuring of its command, though Lebed himself may hardly hope for anybody's words of support in the room. Whatever the Duma's decision might be, it will have no principal importance for further developments in the region. The only thing the Duma can do is trigger a quarrel between Moldova and Russia, like it fruitfully did by pursuing a similar policy against other former Soviet republics, when the Duma passed rough decisions concerning the domestic problems in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Baltic states, and some other new independent countries.

Taking into consideration that, firstly, Russian parliamentarians are planning to discuss not only the 14th Army situation, but also "the problems of dual citizenship and the status of the Russian language in Moldova, and perspectives of the bilateral relations," and, secondly, that the Duma's recent resolution about the 14th Army practically contains a recognition of the legitimacy of the Dniester Republic, it is quite easy to guess that the Russian deputies wish to "teach" their Moldovan colleagues a "lesson."

Apprehending that Moscow will be "lecturing the younger brothers" again, the Moldovan Parliament was, initially, not very enthusiastic about going to Moscow, and after a positive decision was nevertheless taken, the forum formed a delegation that is far from being a representative one. The position Moldova is in at present is being further aggravated by the fact that the Army Withdrawal Agreement, signed last October, provides formal reasons to Russia to procrastinate the withdrawal infinitely. The stumbling block here is that the agreement envisages a certain procedure of ratifying the document and makes it necessary to observe the principle of synchronization of the army withdrawal with the political settlement of the conflict.

The decision to go to Moscow may be explained first and foremost by the fact that Chisinau has perceived very seriously Lebed's warning about the possibility of unleashing a new armed conflict in Dniester. And though the number of those who would like to have a new war has substantially decreased both in Chisinau and Tiraspol after the 1992 conflict, one should not neglect the fact that the last local elections in Dniester were won by radical left forces, that these forces include many representatives of the so-called "war party," and that there exists quite a real danger of stealing weapons from the army arsenals.

One more thing is worth thinking over deeply, namely Lebed's recent proposition to impose peacekeeping functions in the region on the 14th Army. This idea may be liked by Russian parliamentarians, and they may decide to remove from Dniester the Russian peacekeeping battalions. An argument in favor of that is, as Lebed stated, "the 14th Army will cope with the peacekeeping functions, and we may save Russian taxpayers' money by sending the above battalions out of here."

Everything seems very logical, but in such a case Moldova will be unable to even breathe a word about the withdrawal in observable future, which will substantially complicate the already hard situation here. To avert the undesirable development of events, Chisinau has nothing left to do, but to hope for the support of international organizations and for prevalence of common sense in Russia's top power echelons, who may abstain from the Chechen variant of solving the withdrawal problem.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Receives Uzbekistan President

LD2005123695 Almaty Kazakh Radio First Program Network in Russian 0730 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A plane carrying the president of a fraternal country, Islam Karimov, who has arrived to participate in the Days of Uzbekistan in our republic, landed today at the festively decorated international airport of the capital of Kazakhstan.

At the airport he was greeted by President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, Vice President Yerik Asanbayev, Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev and other officials.

Presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov reviewed the honor guard and, accompanied by music from the Kazakh traditional instruments orchestra named after Kurmangazy, came up to journalists, where we made this recording.

[Begin recording] [Karimov] The purpose of this meeting - not a meeting, Days of Uzbekistan in Kazakhstan - is a return event. Last year the Days of Kazakhstan took place was in Uzbekistan. I understand this as follows: first and foremost today we are living in complicated times, today we are returning to our roots, and it is important for us to understand first and foremost that our roots, which are feeding and nurturing us, - both Kazakhs and Uzbeks - are a single root. And given this, both Navoi [medieval poet] and Abay [19th Century Kazakh poet] are people who glorified this land. And the essence lies in this. The main aim is for us to manifest once again - and once again realize what the people want, either Kazakhs or Uzbeks - to spend these days together, in order to reaffirm and again demonstrate that we drink from a single spring, live on a single land, that our thoughts are similar, our aspirations are similar, and that we have one destiny. And in these difficult times we should be together in order to implement the tasks which Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are facing.

In your presence I want once again to congratulate my friend Nursultan Nazarbayev and, I would say, the entire Kazakh people in respect of that great event, the political event, which recently took place in the history of the Kazakh people: the results of the referendum which once more demonstrated not just trust in President Nazarbayev, not only trust in his policy and the policy of the government, but, I think, the most important thing: that the people of Kazakhstan have shown unity. Because in these complicated circumstances only unity, stability and mutual understanding can make those great hopes and thoughts come true, those great wishes which Kazakh people want to make come true today.

And in this respect, I think the fact that we - Kazakhs and Uzbeks - are together will be of benefit first and foremost both to Kazakhs and Uzbeks. And what is most important, those people who consider Kazakhstan their fatherland will benefit.

I think we should have no borders. We should have nothing separating us. If we have created something artificially, this is through no fault of ours. Our common aspiration is to do away with these borders. And the Days of Uzbekistan in Kazakhstan must be the main ... [pauses] may be to set as a task this wish of Kazakhs and Uzbeks to remove all borders and to live all together.

[Nazarbayev] I want to say very briefly that I am very pleased to meet with Islam Abduganiyevich today and the large fraternal delegation of Uzbek people.

I can say just one thing, the whole of Kazakhstan was preparing for this. Yesterday's meetings of the delegations here in the capital and all the cities they went to are absolutely exceptional and incomparable to anything else. The people have missed these kind of meetings. And they meetings took place in a free atmosphere. This is the genuine aspiration of two fraternal nations which have single roots.

As you will remember, Islam Abduganiyevich from the first minutes, first hours of our independence ... [pauses] this was the only leader who stated that the Uzbek people would defend Kazakhstan's independence as their own independence. No one apart from him said this. Therefore the sincere aspiration to come closer, not just come closer - this is a very weak word - the main thing is to unite the efforts of the two nations for strengthening our independence, for creating the economic conditions for improving standards of living.

I greet the first president of fraternal Uzbekistan, Islam Abduganiyevich. As always, we will hold interesting and intensive talks. A good number of workers from the world of culture, the arts and science ... [pauses] now we are going to open a large exhibition, Integration-95, between two [incomplete sentence as heard]. I want to say that we, the two states, have concluded and confirmed a program of economic cooperation until 2000. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Nazarbayev Threatens To Withdraw Troops From Tajikistan

LD2005172995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1645 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, May 20 (Interfax) — Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev said he believed that if inter-Tajik talks were not intensified he would not extend the mandate for the Kazakh battalion staying on the Tajik-Afghan border.

Nazarbayev and Uzbek President Islam Karimov said at a joint press conference in Almaty today that they both were concerned about the situation in Tajikistan and on the Tajik-Afghan border.

The Kazakh battalion participates in the CIS joint peacekeeping forces.

Karimov said the situation was so very flammable that it might lead to unpredictable and uncontrollable effects.

Nazarbayev said the statement of the Kazakh, Uzbek and Kyrgyz presidents in Chimkent (south Kazakhstan) in April influenced the activity of the Tajik parties at the talks which had been confirmed by the meeting between Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov and the opposition's leader Said Abdullo Nuri in Kabul.

Nazarbayev said Kazakhstan would create all necessary conditions for holding the next round of inter-Tajik talks planned for May 22 in Almaty. He said he wanted to contribute to the talks.

Nazarbayev said that if the Tajik leaders failed to agree with the opposition on the existing problems Kazakhstan would not seek to maintain the regime trying to survive at the expenses of "our guys' lives."

He said he believed that the Tajik official leaders must take the inter-Tajik talks seriously.

Nazarbayev said he had warned the Tajik President during a phone talk that he would refrain from extending the mandate of the Kazakh battalion on the Tajik-Afghan border in June if the inter-Tajik dialogue was not enhanced.

UN Official Arrives in Almaty To Monitor Tajik Talks

LD2005133095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1141 GMT 20 May 95

[By Amangeldiy Akhmetaliyev and Gennadiy Kulagin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, May 20 (Itar-Tass) — Ramiro Piriz Ballon, a special envoy of the UN Secretary General, arrived in Almaty today to attend the fourth round of talks between the Tajik government and the opposition, which begin here on Monday.

The two-day talks will centre around the constitutional system of Tajikistan and the formation of a coalition government, as stipulated by the agenda of intra-Tajikistan talks approved in the course of the forego-ing round in Moscow, Kazakhstan's foreign minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev told Itar-Tass.

According to Tokayev, certain headway can be expected to be made towards the settlement of the long-lasting conflict.

According to the minister, the results of the meeting in Afghanistan between President Emomali Rakhmonov and Opposition leader Said Abdullo Nouri have been favorably received by the United Nations as holding out a promise of success.

Presidents of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev and of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov told a press conference in Almaty today that they hoped for the attainment of the political settlement of the Tajik conflict in the nearest future.

The Presidents told journalists that they had brought their hopes and wishes to the notice of the present Tajik leadership. The Tajik government has been notified that unless the problem is peacefully resolved soon, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will raise a question about withdrawal of their troops from the areas adjoining the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan where they have been suffering unjustifiable losses.

Nazarbayev Forms Committee To Promote Cooperation With CIS

LD2005164395 Almaty Kazakh Television First Program Network in Russian 1400 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] With the aim of conducting more efficient cooperation with the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the president of the republic [Nursultan Nazarbayev] has issued an edict establishing a State Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Cooperation with CIS Countries.

Khaliq Abdullayev has been appointed chairman of the committee by a presidential edict; he has been released from his post of chairman of the Administrative Council of the Atakent Free Trade Zone.

Caspian Basin Countries Discuss Sea's Status in Almaty

LD1905125395 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 19 May 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The necessity to define the status of the Caspian Sea as soon as possible is becoming more acute, said representatives of the four Caspian basin countries at a conference in Almaty. They all believe that for Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan any activity, be it shipping, fishing, or exploration of natural resources, may become a source of conflict in the absence of a legal basis. The Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs had the most radical approach to the problem. It spoke in favor of a clear division of the Caspian sea into national territorial zones and continental sectors. Kazakhstan, whose proposed share of the territory contains a major part of all natural resources of the Caspian Sea, holds a similar view.

Russia and Iran, whose positions are similar to each other, oppose this view. Iran is in favor of a minimum territory for the exclusive use by a given state, and a common use of the rest of the sea. For their part, Russian experts believe...

[Begin L. Sklyarov recording, identified by caption as expert in Eastern studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences] The Caspian Sea must remain in joint ownership, rather than being divided into zones and sections. At the very least, there must be no national sovereignty over different sections. [end recording]

Launch Silo Destroyed Under START Treaty

MM1905135095 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 95 p 1

[Report by Anatoliy Ladin: "'Treaty' Explosion: Dismantling of Missiles in Kazakhstan Continues"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kazakhstan Defense Minister Army General Sagadat Nurmagambetov visited the operational launch site of an regiment of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces division in Derzhavinsk (North Kazakhstan), where he observed the blowing up of a launch silo.

The division is to be disbanded under the START-1 Treaty and this explosion is the latest one in the process of dismantling facilities.

Kyrgyzstan

Premier, Japanese Envoy Discuss Ties

LD1905201395 Bishkek Kyrgyz Television Network in Russian 1430 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, Prime Minister Apas Dzhumagulov held negotiations with a Japanese delegation in the hall of government meetings of the Kyrgyz Republic.

During the negotiations between the Kyrgyz and Japanese sides, the development of priority sectors of the Kyrgyz economy were discussed as well as questions connected with the export and import of consumer good and foodstuffs and raw material resources of both states.

In his speech, Prime Minister Apas Dzhumagulov stressed in particular that our republic is successfully implementing a three-year program of economic development. As an example, the fact was cited that the rate of inflation in 1994 amounted to 187 percent, while in 1993 this figure was 1,488 percent, and the forecast inflation rate should amount to 35, and no more than 40, percent this year.

In mid-1994, there was some economic recovery in the republic. The head of government stressed that it is therefore necessary to give priority to such sectors of the national economy as the textile, meat and milk industries, and hydro-power engineering.

During the negotiations, great importance was attributed to the natural resources of the republic, where Apas Dzhumagulov, in turn, expressed assurance that Japanese businessmen will show an interest in the construction of appropriate sites through the use of their particular expertise.

In conclusion, the prime minister praised the visit of the Japanese delegation.

In his reply speech, Japanese Ambassador Mr. Watanabe showed his characteristic friendliness and expressed the hope that our future fraternal ties will be friendly in all spheres of the life of our nations.

Commission Established To Address Expected Bankruptcies

LD2105072695 Bishkek VECHERNIY BISHKEK in Russian 17 May 95 p 4

[FBIS Translated Text] A wave of bankruptcies that will probably sweep over quite a few enterprises is approaching. At least Prime Minister Apas Dzhumagulov is very resolute about this. As the government press service reported, two enterprises—the Azim joint-stock company and the Osh cotton works—have already been deemed insolvent. The Osh cotton works, for example, has debts to the state of over 3.8 million soms. There is no light at the end of the tunnel; it is currently working at only a third of its capacity.

A state commission led by Deputy Prime Minister Abdydzhabar Tagayev is being set up that will sort things out with bankrupt concerns on the spot.

The giant has probably only a few days to live. Several enterprises will be set up in its place.

Government Approves Anticrime Program

LD2105154495 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Russian 1439 GMT 21 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At the government of the Kyrgyz Republic: With the aim of implementing the decree of the president of the Kyrgyz Republic of 10 February 1994 on urgent measures to strengthen law and order and intensify the fight against crime, and of implementing the decision of the republican conference of 25 March 1995 on intensifying the fight against crime and strengthening social order, the government of the republic has, by resolution, approved the state program of the republic on strengthening social order and the fight against crime in the Kyrgyz Republic for 1995-96.

The leaders of ministries, state committees, administrative departments, and local state administrations, and the local self-government of the cities of Bishkek and Osh are instructed to ensure implementation of all measures to strengthen social order and fight crime in the Kyrgyz Republic, as envisaged by the state program for 1995-96.

Parliament Passes Currency Law; Protests PRC Nuclear Test

LD1905192095 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program in Russian 1000 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, the deputies of the Legislative Assembly of the Supreme Council considered the 30th question on the agenda — on foreign currency operations. This draft law was worked out with the active assistance of International Monetary Fund, approved by the head of state, and has been forwarded for discussion to the members of parliament by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic.

The package of standard [word indistinct], which are consolidating the foreign currency policy of the state, are not contributing to attracting foreign investments and capital, while the bill presented for discussion, according to those who drafted it, calls for regulation of foreign currency operations, a ban on currency transfers abroad and from abroad, the setting up of a market exchange mechanism, defining the authority of the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan in conducting a unified currency policy directed toward ensuring the stability of the som and toward the subsequent development of the economy of Kyrgyzstan.

There is no doubt that there are both positive and negative aspects to the draft. For example, the advantage of the free transfer of all currencies stimulates international trade, with the help of which Kyrgyzstan will be able to develop industrial specialization, raise the productivity of its resources, and increase the general volume of production, which will in turn raise the supply and demand not only for the foreign currency which is at the disposal of Kyrgyz banks, but also for the national currency.

The introduction of currency or trade restrictions on [word indistinct] quota on imports and others will not stimulate export and import operations. In fact, it may entail retaliatory measures from other states. On the other hand, an increase in imports, connected with the involvement of currency means, will lead to a reduction in jobs in Kyrgyzstan, and our young domestic industries will not be able to compete with prosperous foreign companies.

Taking into consideration various suggestions and additions, the deputies approved the draft of the law on foreign currency operations by a majority vote.

All may have been clear with this draft, but disagreements arose over a draft law proposed by the government on the broad commencement of denationalization, privatization, and entrepreneurship in the Kyrgyz Republic, as a result of which the draft was turned down.

After lunch, the deputies prepared an appeal in which they expressed their protest at the nuclear test at the Lop Nur range in the People's Republic of China.

Today, the legislators began a plenary sitting to discuss a draft temporary regulation on the joint work of the Legislative Assembly and the Assembly of People's Representatives of the Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Tajikistan

Rakhmanov, Nuri Statement on Peace Talks in Kabul

LD2005162795 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 0800 GMT 20 May 95

[Joint statement adopted by Emomali Rakhmanov, president of the Republic of Tajikistan, and Sayed Abdullo Nuri, leader of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan, following their 17-19 May meetings in Kabul — read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Text] We, Emomali Rakhmanov, president of the Republic of Tajikistan, and Sayed Abdullo Nuri, chairman of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan, taking into consideration the highest interests of the Tajik people and of our long-suffering country, for the sake of achieving peace and accord in Tajikistan and creating favourable conditions for the real development and prosperity of our homeland, held meetings in Kabul on 17-19 May 1995.

We accomplished a great deal. We considered the main aspects of Tajikistan's problems in detail, sincerely and frankly. This was not for no reason. The fate and interests of all the Tajik people, and the people of other countries of the region, are dependent on solving these difficulties.

During the meetings, both sides proved their readiness to settle the most important problems of the country,

(?beginning now, not to permit the endless inter-Tajik conflicts for three months), to reach complete mutual understanding between the parties, to ensure the cease-fire, the return all refugees to their own homes, and fully to normalize the political situation in Tajikistan.

We consider holding such meetings to be beneficial. The results of our meetings will be [word indistinct] in detail at the fourth round of inter-Tajik talks. At the same time, we realistically and frankly state that there are still differences in viewpoints between us relating to some fundamental issues. However, we agreed that our authorized representatives should continue the peace talks to seek ways of settling the crucial issues for Tajikistan.

We consider all the agreements and accords we have achieved to be beneficial for future talks. However, the main significance of all that we have agreed upon can only become manifest in specific practical acts. If we really want to achieve good results, both sides must do a great deal of work. To this end, we state that the Tajik sides will not spare any [word indistinct] to eliminate conflicts politicall and by way of negotiation, and to create peaceful and stable conditions on the territory of the Tajik people. We state this with complete awareness of our responsibility for our people and the other peoples of the region.

The Tajik people are waiting with baited breath for a positive settlement to the issues on the agenda of the inter-Tajik talks. Our neighbors and the world community pin their hopes on this. We also hope for similarly responsible acts by all the observer states involved.

In addition, we take this opportunity to express our gratitude to the United Nations Organization, the neighboring countries and the observers who are involved in solving the Tajik issue. There is no doubt that, with their help and support, the achievements of the Kabul meetings will bring good results.

In conclusion, we wish to express our sincere gratitude to esteemed Professor Borhanoddin Rabbani, president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, for his assistance in organizing the meetings, his hospitality, and for creating favorable working conditions.

[Signed] Emomali Rakhmanov, president of the Republic of Tajikistan; Sayed Abdullo Nuri, chairman of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan

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Nuri Reports on Cease-Fire Agreement

LD2105122395 Tehran IRIB Television First Program Network in Persian 0930 GMT 21 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sayed Abdullo Nuri, the leader of the Tajik Rebirth Party who signed a three-month cease-fire with Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov in Kabul last week, has given more details about the agreement:

[Begin Nuri recording] The first achievement of the meeting was mutual recognition and good understanding. We agreed to extend the cease-fire for another three months. In the Kabul meeting, we also signed a document regarding all the issues that are to be discussed and solved by the delegations in Almaty on the 22d of the (Iranian?) month. Basically and finally, it was decided that the council will include a combination of 40 percent from us, 40 percent from the government, and 20 percent from the ethnic groups and that the council is to resolve future political issues, constitutional elections, presidential elections, parliamentary elections, and other problems of the republic. [end recording]

Russian Deputy Minister on Talks

LD2105085095 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 0500 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev arrived in Dushanbe yesterday. Our correspondent had a conversation with him at the airport. He said the following about [Tajik President] Emomali Rakhmanov's visit to Kabul and the fourth round of inter-Tajik talks:

[Begin Chernyshev recording, in Russian] We know that we are observers in the inter-Tajik dialogue process. I want to emphasize yet again that only the Tajiks can resolve their own affairs, and we are observers. We are well-disposed observers, however, who are contributing to advancing the inter-Tajik dialogue.

By the way, it is not only us; there are also other countries, including CIS countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

Incidentally, why am I mentioning this? The next round is to take place in Almaty. The approximate date is 22 May. One might say it is imminent.

We are awaiting Emomali Sharipovich [Rakhmanov], who will probably (?bring clarity to this issue). In any case, however, this meeting that has taken place is of extraordinary importance for national reconciliation. Positive or negative? Well, the fact is that I am talking about it; we do not have any information on how it all went. In any case, however, it is the first good sign that the Tajik sides are prepared to negotiate at the top level.

I would like to stress, however, that Tajik President Emomali Sharipovich occupies the highest level nevertheless. His step—or gesture, as I would call it—toward [Tajik Islamic opposition leader] Abdullo Nuri is proof that Tajikistan, both government and leadership, desire national reconciliation and accord. [end recording]

Afghan Minister Holds Press Briefing

LD2005124395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1214 GMT 20 May 95

[By Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KABUL May 20 (Itar-Tass) — Afghan Defence Minister Mohammad Konuni [name and title as received] expressed "sincere interest" in developing friendly relations between Afghanistan, Russia and Tajikistan.

On Friday evening [19 May], he held a news conference here on the results of the talks between Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov and opposition leader Sayed Abdullo Nuri.

Konuni who is also chief of the political department of the Islamic Army, said that "the Afghan government has been consistently advocating the establishment of friendly relations with all countries, including Tajikistan and Russia".

Asked by Itar-Tass about prospects for Russian-Afghan cooperation, Konuni replied that "this depends on a degree to which Afghanistan's humane strategy will be understandable for the Russian state and how it will react to the Afghan foreigh policy.

"Kabul hopes for understanding and cooperation, above all in the economic sphere."

The defence minister expressed understanding of the need for the presence of Russian borderguards on the border with Afghanistan.

"When the Tajik people settles its domestic differences through mutual understanding, and the Tajik government and the opposition reach agreement, the need for the presence of Russian troops on the Tajik-Afghan border will disappear," Konuni said.

"It is very important till the same period that all participants in the conflict should refrain from armed provocations on the border and display restraint as well as political wisdom," he added.

According to the minister, "the Afghan government exerts efforts to prevent even a single shot from the Afghan territory".

Independent analysts point to signs of some warming in the political climate between Afghanistan and Russia, which is corroborated by regular trips to Kabul by Foreign Ministry ambassador at large Alexander Oblov.

Local analysts do not preclude a chance that numerous confidential meetings between Oblov and Afghan President Rabbani and Afghan military leaders may result in an early start of work to restore the destroyed complex of the Russian embassy in Kabul.

Afghan President Hails Talks

LD2005131795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1303 GMT 20 May 95

[By Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KABUL, May 20 (Itar-Tass) — President of Afghanistan Borhanoddin Rabbani hailed the three-day talks between the Tajik President, Emomali Rakhmanov, and opposition leader Sayed Abdullo Nuri, which ended here on Friday, as "a major step forward towards easing tension between the leadership of Tajikistan and the opposition". The Afghan president brokered the talks.

Rabbani praised the final document adopted at the meeting, the joint statement of the two leaders which confirmed the will and desire of the parties to reach a political settlement to the Tajik conflict.

"Afghanistan is extremely interested in the attainment of peace and concord in Central Asia, which is a strategically important region," Rabbani said.

According to the Afghan President, Emomali Rakhmanov and Sayed Abdullo Nuri made "a very important and responsible step towards establishing mutual confidence" by sitting down at the negotiating table. In his view, this is a good precondition for the continuation of talks between the government and the opposition.

The Afghan leadership is prepared to make all efforts to facilitate the establishment of peace both in Tajikistan and the entire Central Asian region as well as in the Middle East, Rabbani said.

President of Tajikistan Emomali Rakhmanov also said in a brief interview with Itar-Tass that he was satisfied with the results of the talks even though the meeting had been very tense and difficult.

"Both of us understood that the fate of our people who have suffered so much depends on the outcome of our meeting, that Tajikistan, Afghanistan and other concerned countries were looking forward to its positive results", Rakhmanov said.

"Of course, differences remain, but we fully agreed on one thing: all disputes should be settled only on a peace field, through political negotiations. Peace is needed to create such a base for further talks. The decision to extend for another three months the terms of the accord on ceasefire and on the termination of other hostilities on Tajik territory laid down such a base," Rakhmanov said.

As is know the previously agreed term for ceasefire was due to expire on May 26.

The Tajik leader said he favoured further personal contacts at the highest possible level for the sake of progress in accelerating Intra-Tajik talks and the achievement of civil peace and return of refugees.

"The people of Tajikistan need peace as soon as possible in order to deal in full measure with the complicate economic matters," he said.

Representatives of the Tajik opposition, who were in Kabul throughout the talks between Rakhmanov and Nuri, also praised the results of the summit. Shodmon Yusuf, leader of the Democratic party of Tajikistan (whose activity is banned in the republic), described the Kabul summit as "a major breakthrough in the three-year-old war of mistrust and enmity".

Tajik politician Davlat Khudoinazarov, who ran for the Tajik Presidency but now lives in the United States, said the Kabul meeting should be seen as the first attempt at establishing trust between the first persons and the best way of settling disputes.

Along with this, he expressed disappointment that the results of the meeting were not as significant as expected.

"Mutual understanding was only just enough to decide on the extension of the terms of the ceasefire agreement. There was no indication of a common platform for the solution of the Tajik refugee problem and for the participation of the opposition forces in the county's political life," he said.

Opposition Leader Previews Talks

LD2105124295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1224 GMT 21 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE, May 21 (Itar-Tass) — Tajikistan's governmental delegation led by first Deputy Prime Minister Mahmadsaid Ubaydullayev leave for Kazakhstan's capital Almaty, where the fourth round of Tajik talks are to start on May 22.

The agenda of the talks includes Tajikistan's constitutional makeup. The items concerning the constitution were approved at a Tajik consultation which was held in Moscow in March 1995 and brokered by Russia and the U.N.

Tajik governmental sources said the delegations of official Dushanbe and the Tajik opposition would discuss results of the recent three-day Kabul meeting between Tajikistan's President Emomali Rakhmanov and the Islamic opposition's leader Said Abdullo Nuri. A mechanism is to be generated at the talks for the implementation of the leader's Kabul agreement.

Major issues are extension of Tajikistan's truce for another three months, return of refugees from Afghanistan and political stabilisation.

Deputy chairman of the Islamic Revival of Tajikistan movement, Akbar Turajonzoda, said in an interview with Itar-Tass that opposition's delegation would stick to the agenda of the talks,

Turajonzoda said the opposition saw as illegitimate Tajikistan's presidential election and constitution referendum of November 1994 and the parliamentary election of February 1995.

He said these contradicted the agreements which official Dushanbe and the opposition signed at the first round of Tajik talks in Moscow in the spring of the last year.

Turajonzoda voiced cautious optimism about the outcome of the fourth round, saying that "President Rakhmanov already is not what he was in 1993-94, he began to understand the situation somewhat better".

Turajonzoda said the opposition would cooperate with Tajikistan's present leadership to encourage it for serious constructive steps.

Talks Accompanied by 'Terrorist Acts'

MM2205151995 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 May 95 p 2

[Report by Vitaliy Strugovets: "Terrorist Acts Against Backdrop of Talks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Maybe no recent meeting between the warring sides has been as shrouded in secrecy as the talks being held in Kabul between President Emomali Rakhmonov of Tajikistan and opposition leader Said Abdullo Nuri. Nevertheless, according to information received in the editorial office, it has become known that E. Rakhmonov and A. Nuri have already discussed questions relating to lessening the tension in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, repatriating Tajik refugees, and fulfilling the agreements on a temporary cease-fire on the border and inside the republic. But as Akbar Turajonzod, first deputy leader of the

Tajikistan Islamic Revival Movement, noted in an interview with an INTERFAX correspondent, "no serious breakthrough was achieved" in the first round of talks. Incidentally, the fact that the political antagonists have stretched out a hand to each other, displaying goodwill and a readiness to work our compromise solutions, inspires hope.

But meanwhile the opposition seems not to intend to abandon the use of force. When the talks were already in progress, the same Akbar Turajonzod frankly stated that in Tajikistan specially trained opposition groups "will be used, if necessary, as a means to pressure the Dushanbe regime." As if to confirm these words, during the night of 17-18 May high-ranking government officers — Aleksandr Pivnov, Leninabad Oblast chief of staff for emergency situations and civil defense, and Kazbek Isayev, Oblast Military Commissariat deputy chief of staff — were killed in Khujand, the administrative center of Leninabad Oblast. Lieutenant Colonel Sheremet was wounded. The officers' wives were also victims of the crime.

Uzbekistan

Visiting Slovak Deputy PM Signs Agreements

AU1905155095 Bratislava SME in Slovak 18 May 95 p 5

[TASR report: "Unsatisfactory Uzbek-Slovak Relations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tashkent — The current level of economic and trade relations between Uzbekistan and Slovakia does not correspond to the potential the two countries have at their disposal. This statement was made by Uzbek President Islam Karimov in Tashkent on Tuesday [16 May] when he received Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Sergej Kozlik.

According to Karimov, Slovakia is an industrially advanced state and expanding cooperation with Uzbekistan would be in the interest of the two partners. During his visit to Tashkent, Kozlik and his Uzbek partners signed an inter-government agreement on economic, trade, and scientific-technical cooperation and also an agreement on the mutual protection of investments.

Before arriving in Uzbekistan, Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Kozlik visited Turkmenistan where he also signed several documents on expanding bilateral economic and trade cooperation.

Agreement on Coal for Kazakhstan Signed

LD2005132795 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 20 May 95 p 2

[Report by Nataliya Shulepina: "Angren Coal for Kentau and Kzyl-Orda Energy Workers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A total of 500,000 tonnes of Angren coal will be sent to the energy workers of Kazakhstan's southern regions by the end of this year, thanks to the agreement signed between the Kazakh corporation Turkiston and the Uzbekugol sales company.

These supplies are much needed for the stable production of electrical energy in Kentau and Kzyl-Orda. The thing is that at the time, their energy industry was formed on the basis of Uzbek coal, because it is closer than Ekibastuz or Karaganda. The boilers were designed for fuel with an ash content of up to 45 percent. It would now be expensive to readjust to the high-ash local coal, and would it be worth it? Would it not be better to reestablish old partnership relations?

In 1992 supplies from Angren dropped to 2,000 tonnes. In 1993 it began to show some growth and in 1994 the amount of coal Angren sent to Kazakhstan via direct channels was as much as 81,000 tonnes. The agreement recently signed by Turkiston and Uzbekugol raises cooperation to a much higher level, because it unites all the consumers. The agreement provides for payment in advance and specifies mutual responsibilities. Mutual payments will be simpler because the Turkiston corporation, having opened corresponding accounts in Uzbekistan, will pay in local currency — in soms.

Half a million tonnes in addition to what has already been sent at the beginning of the year is a considerable increase. What is more, it is a good basis for planning supplies for next year.

Growing Support for Common 'Turkestan' Reported

LD1905143695 Tashkent SAVDOGAR in Uzbek 16-22 May 95

[By Hamdam Sodiqov]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "The organization of a single economic, moral, and political zone in the Central Asian area is the most urgent issue of today. Today I think the time has come to attract the attention and initiative of the general public, above all writers, intellectuals, historians, and others, to this important question that is decisive for our life and fate." (Taken from the speech of President Islam Karimov of the Republic of Uzbekistan at the second session of the Supreme Council).

History takes many unexpected turns. However, these still operate according to inherent laws that are unrelated to people's thoughts, activities, and innermost desires.

"All of us — Kyrgyz, Kazakhstanis, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Arabs, Persians, in short all the Muslims, Jews, and Christians who live in Turkestan — should unite, and through this union make every endeavor to strive for the true arrival of this independence. If a need appears to perform our daily tasks in accordance with our shari'ah [Islamic law] and our customs, we should all abandon our temporary conflicts and pride, and sacrifice all we have for the sake of this one independence. It is unclear whether such an opportunity and epoch will ever exist again, so we should work with an awareness of the value of this."

These words were said by our great compatriot Mahmudhoja Behbudi in 1917, when the first fruits of independence appeared — independence for Turkestan. [passage omitted]

It is no secret that 70 years ago the Union of Soviets, employing the false slogan of "delimitation of national states," shattered the history, culture, life, customs, festivals, and rites that were one integral whole in Turkestan, as well as the unity of the peoples there. Moscow deliberately opened the way to dividing up the history of the Central Asian peoples and showing it in a different light. Praising one while denigrating another, the Soviet Union strove to be the sole arbiter, which generated mutual contradictions and solved all contentious issues.

Nor is it a secret that after the disintegration of the USSR, President Islam Karimov of the Republic of Uzbekistan was the first to come up with the idea of the unity of the republics of Central Asia. He strove for the concrete implementation of this idea for five years. He came up with new initiatives to create a single political, economic, and cultural home at meetings of the heads of the Central Asia states.

The prospects for future cooperation were outlined at the meeting of heads of states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, which was held in Shymkent on 14 April 1995, which especially noted that all the foundations now existed for creating a union of Central Asian states. These prospects were a concrete reflection of his efforts. [passage omitted]

History takes many unexpected turns. But reality clearly shows that cast-iron historical laws lie at the heart of them. It is really no accident that a public movement called "Turkestan — Our Common Home" is growing and uniting under the banner of independence for the whole Central Asian region. This banner bears the symbol of five powerful intertwined branches of a great plane tree. We ask God to help attain this great aim of raising this territory, which has a common history, culture, and thinkers as its forebears, to the world scene.

Armenia

Ararktsyan Backs President's 'Impartial Position'

*LD1905135595 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1241 GMT 19 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEREVAN, May 19 (Interfax) — Chairman of Armenia's Supreme Soviet [Council] Babken Ararktsyan gave his backing to the assessment which President Levon Ter-Petrosyan gave on May 18 in parliament "to the events which took place recently and in which the Dashnaktsutyun party is involved. [no quotation marks as recevied]

In an interview with Interfax, Ararktsyan underlined that thanks "to an impartial position of the president the wide masses have learned about the real threat to the security of the state and its citizens."

Ararktsyan urged to make the best efforts in order to ensure stability and normal life in Armenia.

In his address to parliament Ter-Petrosyan accused the largest opposition party Dashnaktsyutyun, whose activity was prohibited from this January for six months, of involvement in political murders and terrorist acts.

In an interview with Interfax Armenia's Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan pointed out that "the president, as the state's leader, is concerned about the problems of national development and has the right to voice such statements." "I am convinced that he had real grounds for this," Papazyan underlined.

ARF Faction Denies Accusations by President

*NC1905201195 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English
1113 GMT 19 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [no dateline as received] The rejection of the emergency suggestion put into agenda by the ARF [Armenian Revolutionary Federation] faction (on discussion of a draft resolution concerning Artavazd Manukyan's death) and the Armenian President's speech in the parliament resulted in convocation of a press conference by the ARF faction. According to the organizers of the conference, the rejection of an emergency issue brought forward by the ARF faction is a glaring proof of the fact that Artavazd Manukyan was murdered. Despite the appeal by lawyers concerning the health conditions of Artavazd Manukyan and other prisoners no response has been received from the Prosecutor's Office.

The organizers of the press conference pointed out that they possessed numerous facts, testifying to the fact that those kept in custody persons were tortured. It was pointed out that the President of the Republic assumed the role of the judicial authority, the latter becoming a puppet in the President's hands.

According to Ruben Hakobyan (ARF member), it was a counter blow before the forthcoming deputy elections to the National Assembly. And it will not be a surprise if some new documents disrupting ARF activities are created at the State National Security Department as the Party's seal was confiscated exactly after the President's decree of December 28.

"All the power is aimed at to prove what does not exist," Hakobyan stated. However, according to another ARF member Kim Balayan, lots of judicial authority's specialists refused to take up this case and even sent in their resignation.

Opposition Criticizes President's ARF Speech

*NC2005151695 Yerevan SNARK in English
1631 GMT 19 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, May 19 (SNARK) — Leaders of oppositional parties criticized today the groundless charges, as they said, of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun (ARFD) contained in the President's speech yesterday. Levon Ter-Petrosyan charged ARFD as being involved in a number of political assassinations in Armenia and called ARFD a terrorist and fascist organization. Claiming that the President has unlawfully assumed the function of a court to pass the verdict of guilty opposition called the people to give a vote of non-confidence to the ruling block during the Parliament elections in June. It also addressed the meeting to say no to the draft Constitution submitted for referendum.

Opposition leaders said they would continue the struggle for fair elections and conduct regular meetings in order to coordinate the population.

More on President's Statement on Manukyan Death

*NC1905210095 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English
1727 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On May 18, the Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan made a speech in the Parliament. The speech was caused by accusations in connection with the Artavazd Manukyan's death (he was charged with complicity to the secret "Dro" organization). The Armenian President pointed out that he could not but say "Enough". "Our silence can be wrongly interpreted". He promised to present all the documents, papers provided by the Prosecutor General and the doctor as well as the materials on repeated investigation of the corpse of the deceased.

According to the President, "lots of people, aspiring to become political figures", realizing their failure and the fact that the Republic has overcome all the significant difficulties, want just to steer the country towards the crisis.

"This is an agony of such failure persons. The press, the air, the squares are teeming with slander on the authorities. This hysteria was brought forward in order to defend the murderers. We understand when it is done by the ARF [Armenian Revolutionary Federation], however, it is just immoral when participated by other political forces", the President said.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan "pointed out with regret that the intelligentsia and sound forces of Armenia did not resent" when the ex-mayor Hambardzum Galustyan was killed, meantime, all the sound forces of Russia raised when a well known TV journalists Vladislav Listyev was killed.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan "said with all the responsibility" that "murders of Ashot Nersisyan and his wife, Gagik Sargisyan and Hambardzum Galustyan were organized by the public and political organization ARF-Dashnaktsutyun. He characterized the Party as being not a Party but just a "terrorist and fascist organization". According to him, David Vardanyan, Vazgen Manukyan and Ashot Manucharyan transmuted the Hambardzum Galustyan's murder into a subject for political speculation. And if they were just failure political figures for him nowadays "they became morally failure persons".

Drug dealing, assassinations, clandestine terrorism - these have been, in President's definition, ARF's activities for the last five years. "If we hadn't stopped this, it would eventually affect your children," - the President claimed.

The Armenian President said he was confident that if the December 28 decree had been signed earlier, Galustyan wouldn't have been assassinated. The ARF, in his opinion, has chosen the meanest kind of political terrorism - denial of responsibility. The President accused "Dashnaktsutyun" of spreading terrorism among the people, pointing out that they were close to success. However, only an insignificant part of materials on activities of ARF "Dashnaktsutyun" has been published. The essence is still to be published. It consists of protocols of ARF Bureau, all protocols of the Central Committee of Armenia which denounce the activities of people who "were on high horses" in the Parliament.

The Armenian President appeared with another serious accusation: the whole ARF bureau and nearly half of the Central Committee of Armenia are responsible for the acts of terror. He assured that the authorities would not tolerate turning of Armenia into Lebanon or a similar state. Terrorism will be exterminated in Armenia, and all the might of the law will be used to this purpose. "The 105 years old man (105 years is the age of "Dashnaktsutyun") is attempting to distribute new bills among people without paying the old ones off."

President raised a hope that ARF "Dashnaktsutyun" will start with a clean slate, and he will not be compelled to explaining to people all the danger coming from the activities of "Dashnaktsutyun" party and its political partners - the National-Democratic Union, Union "Constitutional Right" and the Union of National Self-Determination - Christianocrats.

Documents Published on Death of Manukyan

NC2005145995 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1855 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 19/05/95 NOYAN TAPAN — On May 19, the "Hayastani Hanrapetutyun" daily, the mouthpiece of the Armenian government, has published several documents concerning the case of Artavazd Manukyan, the man who was accused in having concern with the so called secret organization Dro and died in the prison hospital May 16.

According to the documents, Artavazd Manukyan, 41, father of three children, had been arrested on December 3, 1994, in Moscow by the Russian police in suspicion of being engaged in drug smuggling. He had been handed to the Armenian officials on February 28, 1995.

On March 3 a report by a prison physician stated that Artavazd Manukyan was suffocating hemorrhoids [as received] and needed urgent treatment in a hospital. The first aid was given in the prison. On May 5 his health conditions deteriorated and he was transferred to a prison hospital, where he died.

According to post-mortem examination, the death was due to a heart attack initiated by bilateral pneumonia. Also haemorrhagic anemia and brain oedema has been detected. No signs of violation has been detected, the report says.

The local office of the International Red Cross Organization and the Embassy of the USA in Armenia had refused to send their representatives to participate in the post-mortem examination.

Law Enforcement Accused of Promoting Manukyan Death

NC2005151195 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1739 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 19/05/95 NOYAN TAPAN — "Taking into account the documents presented by Levon Ter-Petrosian and those connected with Artavazd Manukyan's case one can draw a conclusion that not only did the law enforcement bodies undertake nothing to rescue his life but also promoted his murder",— such an opinion was expressed by Chairman of the Supreme Council's Commission on Juridical Issues Kim Balayan (Chairman of the Party ARF-Dashnaktsutyun).

With respect to official documents published in the newspaper "Hayastani Hanrapetutyun" Kim Balayan stated that the order for setting an expertise and obtaining its results was not observed during the expertise.

"No substantiations were made in the expertise, no order for running the expertise was set. The conclusion implied no concrete issues which must have been elicited by the expertise. Only the death reason was touched upon",— Balayan said. According to him, only the result was examined. There must be concrete questions like: What could have led towards such a state, what could have been done by law enforcement agencies to rescue his life and have they done it or not?

"In other words, deliberate inertia of the law enforcement bodies was concealed. This resulted in the fact that the Armenian President prevented the introduction of this issue on the agenda. The President knows that we have got some documents and we are going to present them for the people to know the truth", Balayan said.

According to Manukyan's relatives the corpse of the deceased was transmitted to them on May 18 (Manukyan died on May 16). They also reported that no official document on autopsy results was presented. According to them, the death reason is not clear yet. As they say Manukyan's organism was extremely exhausted, the latter's requests for medicines were not responded.

Karabakh Negotiations in Moscow End 18 May

NC1905211695 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC NEWS BULLETIN in English 0814 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan ("Azg", "Respublica Armenia" dailies), 05/19/95—Negotiations between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Mountainous Karabakh, held for political resolution of the Karabakh conflict in Moscow, have finished yesterday in the evening. The sides also met Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. A session of OSCE Minsk group, without participation of the sides of the conflict, will be held tomorrow.

According to RA [Republic of Armenia] Deputy Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan, first stage of negotiations, held in Moscow on February 6-11, came to a dead end. Co-chairmen of OSCE Minsk group made an attempt to find a way out from a dead end three months later, in order to continue negotiations. The basic problem was recognition of the status of Mountainous Karabakh by Azerbaijan. This problem was resolved after acceptance of a declaration in Prague, according to which there were three sides in the conflict: Azerbaijan, Mountainous Karabakh, and Armenia. This was a precondition to continue negotiations.

Mr. Oskanyan said: "I cannot say these three days were a success, but there was some progress". A political agreement about stopping the conflict was proposed, and the participants agreed about several important topics related with the text of the agreement. This stage is peculiar by the fact that, for the first time, the sides started to speak about the status of Mountainous Karabakh.

Every day of negotiations was beginning with a discussion of the text of the agreement, then, five central problems (security guarantees for Mountainous Karabakh, political status of Lachin, Shushi, and Mountainous Karabakh, and return of refugees to the places of their permanent living) were being touched upon. The sides expressed their general positions about these five topics. The next stage will further clarify them.

Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister stressed that the general atmosphere was significantly different from previous negotiations. Approaches of the sides were more constructive. "It is possible to say that we found a way from a dead end and are moving forwards - there is some progress regarding the text of a political agreement", he concluded.

At the same time, the Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Russia Mr. Ramiz Rizayev declared that "Our positions concerning the status of Mountainous Karabakh will never meet. This is simply impossible. They should understand that it is not possible to change the map by force in the contemporary world". According to Mr. Rizayev, the negotiations in Moscow will hardly result in any significant consequences, though he accepted that some progress in the negotiations is possible.

Karabakh Figure Discusses Lachin

NC1905132795 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC NEWS BULLETIN in English 0814 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Stepanakert ("AZG" daily), 05/19/95 — "Any demands of Azerbaijan to return Lachin, before political resolution of the conflict, are baseless", declared Head of RMK [Republic of Mountainous Karabakh] State Department of Deported People and Humanitarian Aid Mr. Lenston Ghulyan.

He said that tens of thousands tons of various cargoes, mainly building materials, medicines and food have been delivered to Mountainous Karabakh after armed forces of RMK opened the Lachin humanitarian corridor three years ago. Without this "road of life", which connects RMK with the external world, survival of RMK people would not have been possible.

Head of the department stressed that a Governmental project on rehabitation of deported people is currently being implemented with the use of the humanitarian corridor.

Mr. Ghulyan added that, since the beginning of conflict, the Azeri forces destroyed over 150 villages and deported 68 thousand people. Half of them now returned back to Mountainous Karabakh. 1/6th of private housing, that is, about 10,000 houses, have already been restored.

Azerbaijan

Another Round of Talks Results in No Progress

NC2005191095 Baku TURAN in English
0950 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow (May 20) TURAN — Yesterday another round of the Armenian Azerbaijani talks completed in Moscow. The mediators — the representatives of Russian and Finnish co-Chairman of the OSCE Minsk Conference — failed to achieve any results.

The Russian mediator thinks that Azerbaijan's refusal to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as the equal party to the talks was the main obstacle to conclusion of peace agreement. That is the comment of the Russian Foreign Ministry on the results of four-days Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations through the mediation of Vladimir Kazimirov and Rene Nyuberg.

Azerbaijani Ambassador to Russia, Ramiz Rizayev, acknowledged that another round of the talks did not introduce any changes into the negotiation process. He said that the principal issues: liberation of Azeri cities of Shusha and Lachin and discussion of Nagorno-Karabakh's status are yet to be settled.

Rizayev mentioned that Baku insists on creation of the conditions for Azeri refugees coming back to Shusha and Lachin. Azerbaijan is ready to give Autonomous status to Nagorno-Karabakh. "This can be the status of the Autonomous Republic inside Azerbaijan", the Ambassadar said.

"Liberation of Shusha and Lachin is the key subject for Azerbaijan. However, one cannot expect that these cities will be liberated in the near future", Rizayev said.

Statement Issued on Nagorno-Karabakh Talks

LD1905184395 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1528 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, May 19 (INTERFAX) — The Russian and Finnish mediators, on behalf of the co-sponsorship of the Minsk OSCE conference, have described as "an important step forward" in the cause of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the resumption of the talks on an agreement to end the conflict "following a three-month pause caused by the difference between the negotiators."

In the statement for the press Friday [19 May], special envoy of the Russian president on the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement, Vládimir Kazimirov, and Finnish diplomat Rene Nyberg said that the recent round of talks which took place in Moscow on May 15-18, had passed "in an businesslike and open atmosphere." "There was progress in the work on coordinating the draft agreement, and key problems of a peace settlement were discussed," says the statement.

The next round of talks is scheduled for June 15-19 in Helsinki. The Minsk OSCE group will meet on June 20 at the same venue.

Meanwhile, a representative of one of the delegations at the talks has told Interfax that the recent round caused "no radical progress" in terms of the preparation of a political agreement. He said that representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, with the mediation of the co-sponsorship of the Minsk OSCE conference, had managed to coordinate only some provisions of the document.

General discussions on different subjects, for example, on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, on refugees and on the towns of Shusha and Lachin, took up a considerable amount of time at the talks, said the source.

Meanwhile, an anonymous Russian diplomat believes that even despite their minor results, the talks are necessary because a base should be created on which the sides' highest leaders can rely, when they are prepared to really advance the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.

Ministry Official Views Caspian Sea Status

NC2005193695 Baku TURAN in English
0950 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (May 20) TURAN — The Chief of the Legal Management in the Foreign Ministry of the republic, Galaf Galafov, said that the scientific practical conference "Caspian sea legal status, problems and prospects for cooperation of pri-Caspian [as received] states", which was held in Almaty from May 15 through 16, was the "positive event". He said that this is the first scientific-practical conference on the legal status of the Caspian sea.

Galafov mentioned that whether the Caspian will be recognized the sea or lake, "there are all objective grounds for division of the Caspian into the sections". It has been stressed that the precedent of sectional division exists in the world practice as well as on the Caspian itself.

During the conference the Azeri side mentioned that under the USSR the Caspian was divided into two sections - between Iran and the Union. Besides that, he was divided into sections inside the USSR as well and each of the republics used its own section.

Galafov mentioned that at present there are two approaches to this problem. Russia-Iran out forward the principle of condominium, that is the Caspian must become the object of joint utilization. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan believe that sectional division of the Caspian can be the only objective and fair decision. The second position corresponds the norms of the International Sea Law and the international practice, Galafov said.

Division into section on the central line will exclude creation of common territory and its joint utilization. Galafov said that "the issue on the Caspian legal status can be settled only by consensus, not by the majority of votes".

As far as the Russian-Irani position towards the Caspian is concerned, Halafov said that "it does not correspond to the norms of the international law and the international practice. The political and economic interests of these countries form the basis of this position", Galafov mentioned.

Problems on Oil Contract, Caspian Sea Status Viewed

NC1905151395 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 18 May 95

[Unattributed commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] Azerbaijan had two objectives in mind when it agreed to sign an agreement with the Western oil consortium. The first was to attract foreign investments, which would have an important bearing on the effort it is making to improve the Republic's economy. Naturally, that will have positive effects on social life. The second was to secure political support, which is essential because of the crisis in the Republic. However, it has become obvious that the signing of the agreement has brought Azerbaijan face-to-face with the problems caused by the positions held by several countries from the point of view of their geological [word indistinct]. Obviously, the artificial problems that have been created around our Republic have increased. An effort is being made to have them affect Azerbaijan.

The countries that have complained about their share in the oil consortium have now moved to directly outline their positions. The positions held by Iran and Russia are more clear. In an effort to weaken the oil agreement, several of their officials have recalled the agreements between the former Soviet Union and Iran on the Caspian Sea in 1921 and 1940. Furthermore, they have made an effort to convince the world that the oil agreement will not have a legal basis until the Caspian Sea's status is established.

However, President Geydar Aliyev has clarified the matter several times. He has said during high-level meetings that Azerbaijan has special rights to sign agreements for the exploitation of the oil reserves in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea and that its rights comply with the norms of international law. He also has said that no one has any legal right to foster skepticism on the matter.

President Boris Yeltsin today made a statement after conferring with President Saparmurad Niyazov. It will be recalled that Niyazov is the president of one of the littoral countries. Yeltsin said: [passage omitted]

By agreeing that the Caspian Sea is an internal water basin, President Yeltsin has confirmed the oil contract's legal principles. Azerbaijan has stressed several times that it is ready to hold talks with all the littoral countries to solve the Caspian Sea's problems. That includes matters related to the Caspian Sea's status. That, however, must not be taken to mean that Azerbaijan will be definitely obliged to accept the considerations and suggestions of this or that country in the exploitation of its national resources. The problems can be solved through mutual agreements, and that is the direction our Republic has taken. All that is confirmed by the Lukoil Company's participation in the oil consortium and the concrete steps Azerbaijan has taken to cooperate with Iran to exploit our Republic's oil resources. However, several forces are trying to obstruct the realization of the oil contract. Nevertheless, the main question is the realization of the obligations the Azerbaijan State Oil Company and the Western oil consortium have undertaken without loss of time. That is the only way to achieve progress.

Regarding the agreements that were signed between the former Soviet Union and Iran, it must be stressed that the former does not exist anymore. Therefore, the agreements have lost their validity.

Tehran-Baku Stress Expansion of Bilateral Ties

LD2105093495 Tehran IRNA in English 0833 GMT 21 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, May 21, IRNA — Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan underlined the need for exploring fresh avenues to further expand Tehran-Baku bilateral ties.

In a meeting with Iranian ambassador here Mohammad Taheri Friday [19 May], Azeri head of Iran-Azerbaijan joint commission Yashar Aliyev called Iran "a close friend of Azerbaijan".

He said people in his country would never forget the assistance Iranian Government and people rendered to them during crises in recent years.

In reply Taheri outlined the viewpoints of Iranian officials on developments in the region including issues pertaining to the Azeri oil consortium and the Caspian Sea.

Taheri also had a separate meeting with Azeri parliament speaker Rasul Guliyev on Friday in which the two sides underscored the necessity for the expansion of mutual ties.

He said the expanded cultural, religious and historical commonalities between the two countries would pave the way for promotion of mutual ties.

Referring to the setting up of Iran-Azerbaijan joint commission, the Azeri parliament speaker said his country was willing to see Tehran as the venue of the forthcoming meeting.

He pointed to the location of a large number of oilfields in the Caspian Sea and voiced Azerbaijan's readiness to cooperate with Iran in the field of exploration.

Guliyev also underscored bilateral cooperation in the area of transportation.

According to Guliyev, Azeri President Geydar Aliyev has already ordered construction of Astara-Azerbaijan railway.

Upon its completion, Astara-Azerbaijan railway will facilitate transporation of cargo from the western republics of the former Soviet Union and Europe to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The first Iran-Azerbaijan joint commission was held in Baku in 1992.

Aliyev Spokesman Counters Mutalibov Claims

954F2324A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian May 95 No 20, p 5

[Article by Gabil Guseynli, state counselor of the Azerbaijan Republic: "The Other Truth About Politicians From Baku"]

[FBIS Translated Text] ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No. 5 and No. 10 for this year published interviews with former leaders of Azerbaijan A. Mutalibov and S. Guseynov, who expressed their attitude toward the republic's recent past and present.

A forum for a "retaliatory strike" is today granted Gabil Guseynli, state counselor of the Azerbaijan Republic.

Mutalibov and Guseynov are talking about the fact that they love Russia with all their might and are concerned for its interests, and the present leadership of Azerbaijan is operating in the directly opposite direction.

Mutalibov and Russia

Azerbaijan has joined the CIS. The official visit to Moscow of the president of Azerbaijan and his negotiations with the president of Russia initiated a qualitatively new stage in the history of our countries' relations. It was at the contemporary stage of this cooperation that LUKoil, Russia's biggest oil company, acquired a 10 percent share of the participation in the well-known oil contract. Naturally, it is not to Mutalibov's benefit today to recall that it was under his presidency that Russia's oil interests were ignored completely.

In the times of the USSR 106,000 tonnes of the 200,000 tonnes of cotton produced annually in Azerbaijan went for Russia's needs, 40,000 tonnes, to all-Union stocks. Under Mutalibov, when the overall production volume was maintained, the Russian share declined twofold, and the rest was sold unchecked on the side for satisfaction of the personal needs of the clique ruling in the republic. Supplies of vegetables and fruit to Russia declined steeply at that time—very many such facts could be listed.

One further point, which cannot fail to interest the Russian reader, should be mentioned. A rapid outflow of the Russian-speaking population from Azerbaijan began on account of Mutalibov's law on the immediate and universal transition to Azerbaijani.

The Slavic Cultural Center and other societies representing the interests of the 400,000-strong Russian-speaking population operate in the republic today (except for Kazakhstan, incidentally, Azerbaijan today has among the former Union republics the highest percentage Russian-speaking population and the lowest percentage of its outflow), newspapers and journals are published in Russian, and the decision to create an International Slavic University has been adopted.

A. Mutalibov should answer before the law for serious criminal offenses falling under Articles 89 and 211 of the Criminal Code of the Azerbaijan Republic. We are talking about his suspicious role in the tragic events of January 1990 in Baku, which acquired the streamlined definition "commitment of troops." In the morning of 20 January the people of Baku saw the blood-stained asphalt, dozens of corpses that had not been cleared away, and the wounded, to whom the drunken soldiery was barring even doctors. It is known for a fact that in December 1989 and in January 1990 Mutalibov, who was chairman of the republic Council of Ministers at that time, sent Internal Affairs Minister V. Bakatin and N. Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, a coded telegram requesting that troops be sent to Baku to defend the "legitimate authorities." Should there be any surprise that both then and subsequently, having become president, Mutalibov did everything to conceal the truth about his role in these events?

Upward Path of Suret Guseynov

You can surge upward by force of arms, you can hold on there for some time also, but you cannot for any length of time conceal glaring ignorance and incompetence. It was these attributes which Premier Guseynov demonstrated, having essentially become an impediment in the way of cardinal economic reforms. During his premiership the inflation of the manat reached 110-120 percent a month! Negotiations with the IMF on the granting to Azerbaijan of a soft loan totaling $240 million became deadlocked. The situation in this respect now is showing a trend toward stabilization.

On the first day of his premiership S. Guseynov promised to have put an end to the Nagornyy Karabakh problem by the power path within three months. Having by peremptory demands brought the "power" ministries under his jurisdiction, the "black colonel" embarked on the command of military operations, the results of which are well known—six districts outside of Nagornyy Karabakh were occupied by Armenian forces, and approximately 1 million inhabitants of these localities were left without shelter or means of subsistence. And Guseynov is now in Moscow newspapers expatiating on the moral climate in Baku, where Azerbaijani girls are allegedly "delighting Turkish businessmen." Even if some persons reduced to poverty have taken the path of vice, it is such Guseynovites, who brought the people to this condition, who are enormously to blame for this.

S. Guseynov's clan was one of the richest in Azerbaijan, which everyone in the republic knows. The law enforcement authorities have proven its direct connection with narcotics production—the poison produced in a drug laboratory organized near Gyandzha has been shipped in huge consignments for sale to other countries, mainly Russia.

S. Guseynov's clan fully controlled the production, sales, and exports of agricultural products constituting 60 percent of Azerbaijan's national income. Some 6,500 tonnes of wool concealed from the state, which constitutes the total amount of wool produced in the republic in the past two years, were discovered in the private storehouses of the ex-premier's brother! Millions of dollars obtained in this way went into the creation of illegal armed gangs and the preparation of a coup d'etat. But the Azerbaijani people, tired of the armed confrontation, resolutely supported at the time of trials their legitimate president and the constitution.

Georgia

Shevardnadze on Shalikashvili Visit, Other Issues

LD2205115495 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0711 GMT 22 May 95

[Weekly interview with Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze by correspondent Nato Oniani; place and date not given — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Oniani] Mr. Shevardnadze, a delegation from Azerbaijan's oil consortium visited Georgia last week. British Energy Minister [Tim] Eggar is arriving, and you will be meeting with Germany's federal minister for economic cooperation and development, [Carl-Dieter] Spranger later today. Presumably you will speak about the economic reform which is under way in Georgia, as well.

[Shevardnadze] Thank you. Good morning. The past week, as well as the whole month, was a period of intense international contacts for Georgia. Immediately after the departure of the IMF mission — I have already spoken about my meetings with the mission — John Shalikashvili, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrived here. This is undoubtedly a significant and happy event. [passage omitted] I am having a meeting with John Shalikashvili in half an hour and I will comment on it later.

The British energy minister, Mr. Eggar, and the German federal minister for economic cooperation and development, Mr. Spranger, have also arrived in Georgia. We recently had very interesting meeting with the leadership of the international oil consortium from Azerbaijan.

The visits of top officials from the leading countries of the world have just started and we will have an opportunity to speak about the effects of the visits in our future conversations. It should be noted, that this occasion is a demonstration of our increasing cooperation as equal partners with the West. This cooperation can by no means be reduced by Georgia's good relations with countries of other regions of the world.

The visits of the British and German Government delegations aim to provide us with assistance in resolving a problem of vital importance for Georgia — overcoming the energy crisis. This was the main issue on the agenda of the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers on Friday [19 May] with the participation of the Georgian head of state. A system of preparation of Georgia's fuel and power complex for the fall-winter season of 1995-96 was determined at the meeting. The system should be implemented by using rationally the financial assistance provided by the international financial organizations and the friendly countries of the West, primarily Germany. The plan also envisions personal responsibility for the heads of appropriate organizations in Georgia. Despite all the difficulties, we are able to prepare for winter, given the assistance from our friends, much better than in previous years.

At present, the most characteristic feature of Georgia's power engineering is that electrical power is being generated at hydropower stations. They generate on average 21 million kWh a day. This quantity more or less secures relatively normal life — at least, at a minimum level. With the help of the funds allocated to Georgia by international financial organizations — about $3 million — it has become possible to carry out restoration and maintenance work. It is now necessary to promptly arrange the registration of loans and aid in order to secure the full funding of this work.

It has been said repeatedly that in order to manage the power engineering system we have to settle the problem of repaying debts and settling dues. No foreign economic links and no aid will help us unless this problem is resolved. The Cabinet of Ministers focussed its attention on this issue at its meeting. Certain measures have been planned to make enterprises and the population able to pay for the electricity used. New limits and norms are to be set up for them to repay their debts so that they are able to do it and do it by all means. [passage omitted]

According to data provided by the Tax Inspectorate, over 5 trillion coupons have been paid into the budget over the past two weeks. This exceeds the amount of revenues received during the same period in April by 600 million coupons.

The Finance Ministry envisioned that budget income should have amounted to 47 trillion coupons in two and a half months of this year. However, the actual figures in the Georgian National Bank show that the total was only 33 billion coupons by 18 May. [passage omitted]

The exchange rate of the national coupon against the U.S. dollar remains stable and stands at 1.3 million coupons for one U.S. dollar. Almost 2 million dollars were sold during the latest trading at the Interbank Currency Exchange last week. [passage omitted] As for the Russian ruble [R], slight fluctuation of its rate can still be seen and this is caused by the rate set at the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange. [passage omitted]

On 19 May, R42 million were traded in Tbilisi, the rate being 236 coupons for one ruble. [passage omitted]

[Oniani] The UN Security Council adopted a resolution on Abkhazia earlier this month. While in Moscow during the VE-Day celebrations, you had an opportunity to meet with the Russian leadership and to discuss Abkhazia together with other issues. Last week, the mass media reported that the leader of Kabardino-Balkaria and the leader of Abkhazia, as the reports say, signed a treaty. They speak about a treaty usually concluded between two legal states. Not to mention anything else, this contradicts the commitments taken by Russia at the Almaty summit not to establish any contacts with separatist regimes.

[Shevardnadze] I would answer this way: This treaty has no validity at all. It contradicts the general norms set by the CIS countries and is absolutely antagonistic to the Almaty [summit] resolution, as you rightfully indicated. It is incompatible with international norms. Appropriate circles in Russia share this assessment. The first comments have already appeared in the Russian press. I shared my views on this issue with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in writing. I sent a special letter to him yesterday. This problem will naturally be discussed at the CIS Minsk summit.

I would say that this is yet another adventurous step taken by the Abkhaz separatists and is intended to bring about the failure of the process of negotiations and a political settlement of the conflict. This is an open challenge to the United Nations, the CIS, and the leadership of Russia.

[Oniani] During your recent visit to Racha [western Georgia], you said that the Rescue Corps [Mkhedrioni] started handing in weapons. You added that the Rescue Corps is not the only organization concerned — it is not the only organization that possesses weapons. There are others who also possess weapons, including political parties. The Rescue Corps has begun handing in its weapons. What do the others intend to do?

[Shevardnadze] I would draw the listeners' attention to the fact that the Rescue Corps has mainly implemented the demands of the authorities and its own commitments, with one small exception. I would like to be confident that everything has been done properly and honestly. It was a very difficult decision for them to make but it seems that they, as well as all of us, realize that this is in the best interests of the country. An urgent meeting was held at the head of state's office the other day and it was emphasized that according to the information available, a number of political groups did not give up an idea of retaining arms illegally for their armed units. It should be noted that these weapons have not been registered anywhere. An edict by the head of state has already been signed. It calls for everyone to submit weapons to the state as the Rescue Corps did. I instructed the Interior Ministry to use all means necessary to have the edict implemented. [passage omitted]

I congratulate the employees of Georgian radio and the entire population of Georgia on the Day of Georgian Radio, the 70th anniversary of the establishment of Georgian radio. It is a real national festival. Every week for the last three years, except for one failure caused by my business trip, I have been speaking to my radio listeners about the good things and the hardships of our country and plans for future. I expressed my deep respect for Georgian radio and its illustrious staff in my greetings address which will presumably be broadcast and published tomorrow.

[Oniani] Thank you.

Defense Minister Meets U.S. Chief of Staff

LD2205133795 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1200 GMT 22 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman General John Malkhaz Shalikashvili started the official part of his visit to Georgia by meeting the leadership of the Georgian Defense Ministry. Lieutenant General Vardiko Nadibaidze, the Georgian defense minister, warmly welcomed the eminent visitor and said that a meeting with an illustrious compatriot and the commander of the American Armed Forces is a great honor for the Georgian military, who are making the first steps in building Georgia's Armed Forces.

The minister briefed Mr. Shalikashvili on the activities of the ministry, which are developing successfully against the background of the increasing stabilization in the republic. He also touched upon certain problems in the settlement of which the leadership of the Russian military has rendered significant assistance. The Georgian Armed Forces would not be able to survive at this stage without assistance from the Russian partners, said Vardiko Nadibaidze. This particularly concerns armaments, material, and technical supplies, training of personnel, and other important issues, he added.

I am happy that Russia renders such significant assistance to Georgia, with which I have special relations. We do not intend to compete with Russia in this respect, but, given your consent, we are prepared to render additional assistance by providing medical equipment, training personnel, and strengthening logistics, said Gen. Shalikashvili.

The meeting proceeded in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding.

Ministry To Accept Turkish Military Assistance

LD2005164195 Tbilisi SAKINFORM in Russian 1442 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Georgian Defense Ministry is ready to accept any assistance, especially from a state like Turkey, which has one of the most powerful armies in the world, said the Georgian Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze during his meeting with Tevfik Okyayuz, Turkish ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Georgia. The ambassador suggested that the Turkish Government assist the Georgian Defense Ministry in building Georgia's national armed forces.

Shevardnadze Not To Attend Minsk CIS Summit

LD2205112195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1003 GMT 22 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tbilisi, May 22 (Interfax) — Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze will not take part in the work of CIS heads of state in Minsk on May 26. The Georgian delegation will be led by Vice Premier Otar Patsatsia.

Eduard Shevardnadze will stay in Tbilisi on May 26 because of Georgia's Independent Day, Interfax was told by the president's press service.

Kabardino-Balkaria, Abkhazia Sign Amity Treaty

LD2005160995 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 20 May 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer Yevgeniy Piskunov] Questions of stabilizing the situation in North Caucasus, including possible solutions to the

Chechen crisis, have been discussed by the leaders of Kabardino-Balkaria and Abkhazia.

[Correspondent G. Guliya] An official delegation of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, led by President Valeriy Kokov, has arrived in Abkhazia. Following a conversation between Kokov and Vladislav Ardzinba, president of Abkhazia, the leaders of the two republics signed a treaty on friendship and cooperation between the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. Both sides declared their intention to build their relations on the basis of equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and to cooperate in order to strengthen peace and stability in the Caucasus. Plans were made to set up the offices of the two republics' plenipotentiaries in Sukhumi and Nalchik. In the words of Valeriy Kokov, the agreement is based on the wish of the two fraternal peoples. In the opinion of Vladislav Ardzinba, this is a further step towards strengthening stability in North Caucasus.

Shevardnadze Sends Message to Yeltsin

LD2105193595 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1700 GMT 21 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze sent a message to Russian President Boris Yeltsin about the signing of a friendship and cooperation treaty by Kabardino-Balkaria and Abkhazia. The message states that the signing of such a treaty indicates the lack of respect on the part of the constituent part of the Russian Federation for the official course taken by Moscow or the threat of separatism. In connection with this, Shevardnadze recalled that the CIS countries pledged at the Almaty meeting to take all necessary measures to curtail separatism.

Chikvaidze: Georgia 'Not Ready' To Revive War

LD1905182695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1625 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, May 19 (Interfax) — Georgian Foreign Minister Aleksandre Chikvaidze said that Georgia "is not ready today to revive the war for Abkhazia and so must use all opportunities to bring about a peace settlement to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict."

At the same time, Chikvaidze said in Georgia's parliament today, when answering questions by lawmakers, that "the entire history of humanity shows that what was lost during a war can be gained back only the military way."

Chikvaidze quoted Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze as saying that "the key to settlement of the Abkhaz problem is in Russia." Chikvaidze said he was in favor of extending the mandate of the Russian peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia.

Chikvaidze said Georgia was insisting on expanding peacekeepers' powers, in particular by giving them police functions to include control over respect for human rights in the conflict zone.

Chikvaidze said that the UN Security Council's latest resolution on Abkhazia was "acceptable in all senses." He said the UN Security Council had unanimously condemned the actions of the Abkhaz separatist leaders who did all they could to torpedo a peace settlement.

Chikvaidze emphasized the provisions of the resolution in fact recognizing that "ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Georgian population" had taken place in Abkhazia.

Supreme Council Discusses Territorial Issues

LD1905125795 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 1130 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi (IPRINDA) — At the evening session of the Georgian Supreme Council on 18 May, deputies started discussing the issue that was not on the agenda — the territorial arrangement of Georgia. MP Jaba Ioseliani submitted to bitter criticism the appointment by Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze of his personal representative-administrators in various regions of the country (the parliamentary opposition stressed many times that Shevardnadze had appointed his representatives, as well as regional prosecutors, without asking parliament).

In Ioseliani's opinion, a basis is being created for dividing the country according to the administrative regional principle (such division has been included in the new draft constitution). All this, Ioseliani continued, will destroy Georgia, and added that Shevardnadze was taking roots of dictatorship in Georgia. All this is being done against democracy. Georgia is not Shevardnadze's laboratory for carrying out tests. Some deputies agreed with him.

Nodar Natadze, co-chairman of the United Republican Party, said that the above actions carried out by Shevardnadze will split not only the country, but also the nation. All this (the federal arrangement), Natadze continued, was prompted by Russian Defense Minister Grachev. Vice Speaker Vakhtang Rcheulishvili (supporter of Shevardnadze's course) suggested to Natadze he meet Grachev and discuss the issue personally. However, Natadze answered that he will only meet Grachev on the battlefield.

Jaba Ioseliani suggested there be a vote on the expediency of the institute of head of state's personal representatives in various regions of the country. Rcheulishvili suggested that the issue not be discussed in a hurry, as it will, in his opinion, amount to a coup. Rcheulishvili cut short the parliament session due to the nonavailability of the quorum.

Nadareishvili Criticizes Russian Peacekeepers

LD1905170295 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 1430 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi (Iprinda) — On 19 May, at an evening session of the Georgian parliament, [chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and vice-premier of Georgia] Tamaz Nadareishvili addressed parliament on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. He subjected to harsh criticism actions of the Russian peacekeeping forces in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone and noted that in effect, the Russian peacekeepers have merely demarcated the border between Abkhazia and Georgia. In Nadareishvili's words, the refugees will not be able to return home as long as [Abkhaz leader] Ardzinba remains in power. Besides, according to Nadareishvili's data, 700,000 mines have been planted in Gali District alone. Nadareishvili noted that some subunits of the Russian peacekeeping forces have no moral right to be part of peacekeeping forces (servicemen of airborne assault regiment No 345 participated in storming Sukhumi).

Deputy (from Abkhazia) Geno Kalandia read out to parliament a letter by the 19 February Faction [of deputies from Abkhazia], signed by 70,000 refugees, demanding that the Georgian government refuse Russian participation in peacekeeping operations and that Russia withdraw the peacekeeping contingent from the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone. Besides, the signatories of the letter demanded that Russia's aggression toward Georgia in Abkhazia be recognized.

The parliament session continues.

Arms Handover Said To Depend on Prisoner Release

LD1905181895 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 1430 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi (Iprinda) — Member of the Georgian Rescue Corps Dodo Gugeshashvili read out an announcement to parliament saying that despite the promise given by the head of state, and despite the fact that the Rescue Corps members have been handing over arms voluntarily, the arrests of the Rescue Corps members and the searching of their apartments are still continuing. Gugeshashvili declared that the members of the Kakheti branch of the Rescue Corps will not hand over their arms unless the recently arrested Corps members are released from prisons (the Kakheti branch must hand over arms by 20 May), as for the possible provocations, everybody will be held responsible for them.

Statement Issued by Abkhazia Supreme Council

LD2005182495 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1700 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia [based in Tbilisi] disseminated a statement on 19 May. The statement says:

The office of a so-called representative of Abkhazia has been functioning in Moscow for some time. Protected by certain criminal and influential figures, the so-called plenipotentiary envoys representing Ardzinba's illegal regime are engaged in propaganda against Georgia in the Russian capital and spread slanderous rumors to near and far foreign countries.

This has repeatedly been brought to the attention of the Russian Foreign Ministry with the hope that this illegal office will be closed down. This happened once in response to the Georgian Foreign Ministry's note. However, Ardzinba's emissaries, posing as Abkhazian diplomats, have recently found a new building and continued slanderous assaults against Georgia.

Questions arise in this connection: Are these people really regarded as diplomats in Moscow? If so, what state do they represent? What is their legal status? Who provides them with offices and funds?

The Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia hopes that the Russian Foreign Ministry will be attentive to our request and ban any activities of an illegal separatist organization on Russian territory.

[Signed] The Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.

Abkhazia 'Categorically' Rejects Inclusion

LD2005163795 Tbilisi SAKINFORM in Russian 1442 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] No accord has been achieved on the issue of Abkhazia's political status at the current Moscow round of Abkhaz-Georgian negotiations on the settlement of the conflict. Representatives of the Abkhaz side categorically refused to sign a document stipulating the inclusion of Abkhazia in a Georgian federative state and granting of broad autonomy to it. Commenting on the results of the negotiations, Russian Deputy Foreign

Minister Boris Pastukhov said the Abkhaz side had so far failed to get rid of the "victor's syndrome." Meanwhile, the victory in the war is by no means equal to the acquirement of state independence, Pastukhov said.

Abkhazia Accused of Blocking Political Solution

LD1905185895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1754 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, May 19 (INTERFAX) — Georgia has accused Abkhazia of trying to thwart a political solution to the Abkhazian conflict. This is the essence of a statement by the Georgian embassy to Russia on the results of the meeting of the quadrilateral commission on return of refugees to Abkhazia, held in Moscow Friday.

The meeting was attended by Russian officials, UN High Commission for Refugees and OSCE representatives, as well as Georgian and Abkhazian negotiators.

"The other side did all it could to make compromises impossible and keep the refugees away. It also rejected the UN appeal to consider the High Commission for Refugees-compiled schedule for the return of refugees, which was supported by Russia," the embassy said.

It declared that the Abkhazian authorities seem to deliberately lead the negotiations into a blind alley so as to thwart a comprehensive political solution to the conflict in Abkhazia.

Gas Pipeline to Armenia Blown Up in Southeast

LD2205063795 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0600 GMT 22 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The press center of the Georgian Interior Ministry reports that the gas pipeline carrying gas to Armenia was blown up on the right bank of the Mtkvari River near the village of Kesalo in Marneuli district last night. The fire was extinguished this morning. The cause and extent of the damages are being investigated.

Estonia

Cooperation Protocol Signed With Ukraine

LD1905134895 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1200 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A Ukrainian Government delegation led by (Vadim Vyashev), a deputy minister for machine-building, the military-industrial complex, and conversion, is currently in Estonia. Today members of the Estonian and Ukrainian Government delegations' Cooperation Commission signed a protocol on the commission's work. The protocol on cooperation between the Estonian and Ukrainian Governments pays key attention to the future of the two countries' economic relations. It also recognizes a need to speedily conclude an agreement on avoidance of double taxation between Estonia and Ukraine. Commission members also recommend that trade fairs should be arranged in Estonia and Ukraine on a mutual basis. [passage omitted]

Estonia and Ukraine have so far concluded nine agreements. The most important among them are the Interstate Friendship and Cooperation Treaty and the Intergovernmental Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement.

Sinijarv Downplays Kozyrev Russian Rights Remarks

LD1905215795 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1700 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ten minutes ago, Foreign Minister Riivo Sinijarv arrived from Gdansk in Poland where a conference of foreign ministers of the Baltic Sea States took place. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Mall Malberg] What did you discuss at your one-to-one meeting with Andrey Kozyrev?

[Sinijarv] Kozyrev and I spoke about many issues. This was our first meeting and we discussed all kinds of issues and each other's views on various matters. Finally, we came to the conclusion — as we had spoken for more than half an hour or nearly three-quarters of an hour — that all things cannot be discussed during such a short meeting. So, Andrey Kozyrev invited me to Moscow.

[Malberg] Is the exact date of the visit known?

[Sinijarv] The exact date has not been set. We agreed, as I did not have my diary with me, that we would set it through diplomatic channels. In principle, we planned it for June.

[Malberg] Your discussion took place after a session where he made outspoken remarks.

[Sinijarv] No, his statements were not outspoken at all, I think. He was, so to speak, constructive, calm, and businesslike.

[Malberg] According to our information, he very bluntly accused Estonia and Latvia of violating the rights of Russians.

[Sinijarv] No, he didn't. He made no accusations that rights are being violated. He said that they are intently observing, and are concerned about, the situation in Estonia and Latvia regarding citizens' rights specifically And later, at a news conference, he emphasized that — let me recall his exact words — he said that Ole Espersen, the high commissioner [for democratic institutions and human rights of the Council of the Baltic Sea States], is working on this and that one should look at Espersen's findings.

Well, we know what Espersen has found so far: He has not found anything wrong with us. I myself do not believe there is anything wrong, either.

[Malberg] Thank you. [end recording)

Immigration Official on Domestic Threat From Russians

LD1905184995 Tallinn Estonian Television Network in Estonian 1500 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to current data, 71,700 citizens of the Russian Federation live in Estonia. The Citizenship and Immigration Department intends to hinder any attempt to build a Russian state within the Estonian state, Andres Kollist, director general of the Citizenship and Immigration Department, told the press today.

[Begin Kollist recording] Again, Russia's policy is to continue keeping compatriots in the near abroad; the Russian Government even has a program for this purpose. [end recording]

According to Kollist, implementation of this program is being made easier by our own short-sightedness and our inadequate re-emigration policy. The most drastic example is Narva where there are significantly more citizens of the Russian Federation than citizens of Estonia. Kollist said that the current rules and regulations force non-Estonian citizens of the former Soviet Union to take the citizenship of the Russian Federation. He thinks it is time to start issuing aliens' passports to those who either do not want or cannot take Estonian citizenship. Kollist said that the 12 June deadline, before which noncitizens have to submit applications for residency and work permits, must not be extended because this may become a threat to state security.

Approximately 25-50,000 people live in Estonia illegally. Over recent years, nearly 80,000 people have returned to their historic homeland in the east. [passage omitted]

Admission of Refugees Said Currently Beyond Means

WS2205104895 Tallinn BNS in English 1600 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, May 19, BNS — Admission of refugees is in the present situation beyond Estonia's means, Citizenship and Migration Department Director General Andres Kollist told BNS Friday [19 May].

Meanwhile, he stated that Estonia, like any other normal state, must in future be prepared to receive refugees and join the UN convention on refugees. "Our neighbors to the north and the west are also interested that Estonia should be able to admit refugees," Kollist said. "They're even prepared to allocate money for this."

President Lennart Meri, too, said Wednesday Estonia is ready to readmit in future all illegal immigrants who use this Baltic state as a springboard to reach other countries. Meri gave assurances during his visit to Finland that Estonia strives to resolve the refugees issue and establish total control over its borders to achieve this goal.

"Estonia must not become a corridor for the movement of illegal immigrants, drugs, and weapons," the president said.

Estonia and Finland are at present preparing a bilateral agreement on readmission of illegal immigrants. Finland set conclusion of this accord as a precondition for the eventual introduction of visa-free travel between the two countries.

German, Russian Firms Purchase Natural Gas Company

LD2205110695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1003 GMT 22 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, May 22 (PIA-Interfax) — The German Ruhrgas concern has purchased part of the government shareholding in Eesti Gaas natural gas purchasing and distributing company. The deal worth 62.7 million Eesti kroonas is the biggest German investment in the Baltic state.

The agreement on the sale and redistribution of shareholdings in the authorized stock of the company was signed in Tallinn last Saturday [20 May] by the leaders of Eesti Gaas, Ruhrgas and Gazprom (Russia).

Eesti Gaas was set up in 1992 by the Estonian government (70% in the authorized stock) and Gazprom (30%). Under the new agreement the Estonian government will hold 30.33% of the stock, Gazprom - 30.64%, Ruhrgas 14.69%. The rest will belong to a number of Estonian legal entities and private individuals. The turnover of the company in 1994 was 570 million kroonas, net profits - 11.85 million.

Russian natural gas is the third most important source of energy in Estonia after coal and fuel oil. This year gas consumption is expected to grow 20% following the transfer of several manufacturing and heating companies to this fuel. Last year Moscow delivered 644 million cubic meters of gas.

Ruhrgas is the biggest German customer of Gazprom which annually exports over 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Germany.

Latvia

Swedish Prime Minister Arrives for One-Day Visit

LD1905121095 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 0900 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning Ingvar Carlsson, prime minister of the Kingdom of Sweden, arrived in Riga for a one-day visit. In Riga the Swedish prime minister will meet State President Guntis Ulmanis and Prime Minister Maris Gailis. In the talks they will discuss questions of European integration, prospects for Latvian - Swedish economic links, and the promotion of cooperation in the spheres of defense and internal affairs. They will also discuss the refugee problem. The Swedish Goverment is considering the possibility of expelling illegal refugees back to the countries from where these persons arrived in Sweden.

Ties, Europe Discussed by Premiers

LD1905182595 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1300 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Official talks took place today between Latvian Prime Minister Maris Gailis and Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson. The heads of government discussed bilateral relations, Latvia's entry into European economic and political structures, and our country's relations with Russia.

They also discussed cooperation between the Swedish and Latvian Interior Ministries. In the view of the two prime ministers, special attention should be paid to combating crime and illegal immigration. In this context, they also dealt with the possibility of introducing a mutual visa-free regime. Ingvar Carlsson noted that in principle Sweden welcomes the introduction of a visa-free regime with the Baltic countries. For that to happen, however, the situation with crime and illegal entry first has to improve.

During the talks, the two prime ministers addressed to the curent situation in the Latvian banking and finance sector. Ingvar Carlsson stated that a similar situation evolved in Sweden three years ago.

Defending Baltics Discussed

LD2005090095 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 0500 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Although Sweden is a neutral country, it will not remain indifferent if threats are expressed against the Baltic countries. This was stressed in Latvia yesterday by Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson. He explained that in such a case Sweden would react to what might happen through the mediation of the European Union, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Good relations have been established between Latvia and Sweden, not only between governments but at all other levels, too, Carlsson believes.

Meeting with Latvian Premier Maris Gailis, the Swedish prime minister discussed the two countries' bilateral relations and cooperation in the defense, internal affairs, social, and economic spheres. Speaking about the possibility of introducing a mutual visa-free regime, Carlsson explained that Sweden supports this idea, but first Latvia ought to improve the situation in combating crime and illegal immigration.

Kozyrev 'Alarmed' at Rights Situation in Baltics

LD2105193095 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1700 GMT 20 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today a delegation of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs returned from Gdansk, where the fourth session of the foreign ministers of the Council of Baltic Sea States was held. A report by representatives of the Commission of the European Union on the European Union's development program for the Baltic region was discussed during the session. The work of the past year was also assessed there. The session was also deciding on the accession of a new member state, Iceland, to the Council. During the session Valdis Birkavs also had several meetings with foreign ministers of other Baltic states.

At the conference in Gdansk Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev again expressed his dissatisfaction with the situation regarding human rights in Latvia and Estonia. We are still seriously alarmed by the situation which has evolved in Latvia and Estonia as regards the provision of full civil rights for Russian-speaking residents, Kozyrev stated.

Losses From Failure To Control Vacated Bases

WS2205135895 Riga RIGAS BALSS in Latvian 2 May 95 p 5

[Report by Leonida Kala: "The Enormous Losses Are Even Difficult To Imagine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Imants Grikis, director of the State Economic Activities Revision Department, has said that it is not possible to calculate, even approximately, the enormous losses which Latvia has suffered by not assuming control over military sites left by the Russian Army in due time and letting them be robbed.

Although a number of state and parliamentary legislative acts have been adopted to secure interception of former property of the Russian Army and to maintain control over the process, in reality these laws and instructions have not been observed. Even now, there is still no precise record of the military bases which have been taken over. From the 69 facilities taken over by the Ministry of Defense, as many as 57 have not yet been formally handed over by government order.

In this situation, when sites left by the Russian Army were not taken over in due time, circumstances were created which allowed for them to be robbed and demolished. In many of them, complete devastation can be observed; whatever was there was taken away and stolen. For example, due to uncoordinated action of the Ministry of Defense and the Kurzeme District Council, the Sea Club Sports swimming pool in Riga was not taken over in time. The Russian Army had left it in good condition. The facility was not taken over and was not guarded. As a result, everything there was devastated, robbed, and broken between February 1992 and July 1994. Even the construction elements of the building and the communication installations were taken away. The losses amount to 75,000 Lats [Ls].

Unfortunately, this is not the only facility which has been neglected and destroyed, and the army which left it cannot be blamed.

To create an institution which will realize the state policy on supervising state property, including property recovered from foreign military forces, the Saeima [parliament] accepted, in February 1994, the law "On State Property Foundation." This Foundation, however, did not begin operating until 1 September 1994. At present, the Foundation has not yet begun to fulfill its complete duties — to investigate and make a record of all the real estate which belongs to the Latvian state. The Foundation also has the task of preparing plans on how state property should be effectively used and maintained.

A large part of the blame should be put on local authorities and respective ministries, which did not undertake the supervision of their facilities in due time.

There is still the custom that state property is being lent out to business enterprises almost free-of-charge, or for a symbolic fee. For example, the pulling down, without official consent, of buildings in the Daugavgriva military harbor resulted in a loss of Ls37,500.

The State Control Office has requested that both the Ministry of Finance and the State Property Foundation implement supervision over state property according to the existing law.

Sea Border Memorandum Signed With Lithuania

LD2105175495 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1700 GMT 21 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Latvian and Lithuanian presidents and prime ministers met at the Lithuanian border town of Maisiagala on 20 May. They signed there a memorandum of an agreement on the demarcation of the sea border in their economic zone.

The leaders of the two states recognized that it was a progressive step in the process of the talks on these problems. An agreement was also reached that, at the beginning of June in Brussels, Latvia and Lithuania will sign association agreements with the European Union at the level of prime ministers.

Cooperation between the two countries in the power engineering sphere was also discussed. The leaders of the two countries noted with satisfaction that the issue of granting citizenship to Lithuanian citizens in Latvia has been tackled positively.

Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis also accepted Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas's invitation to visit Lithuania on 5-6 July.

Gailis Urged To Deny Finance Minister Resignation

WS1905142995 Tallinn BNS in English 1203 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, May 19. BNS — Latvian Prime Minister Maris Gailis should not accept resignation of Finance Minister Andris Piebalgs, say representatives of the Saeima (parliament) factions.

Latvia's Way faction Deputy Chairman Indulis Berzins expressed regret over Piebalgs' decision to resign and said it will even more deteriorate the financial situation in the state and create unnecessary agiotage among the Latvian residents.

Berzins noted that Piebalgs' only mistake is inability to cope with the ministry's personnel.

Latvian Farmer Union's deputy Gundars Berzins thinks that, if Gailis accepts finance minister's resignation, he should announce about resignation of the whole government. By appointing a new finance minister, chances to overcome the state budget crisis will decrease. Prime minister's mistake, when forming the government, was that he liquidated positions of state ministers in the Finance Ministry. These ministers would have divided responsibility for the financial situation of the state, said Berzins.

Latvian National Conservative Party LNNK faction deputy Aristids Lambergs foresaw that the prime minister will not accept Piebalgs' resignation.

Finance minister's decision to resign shows that "he is a conscientious politician," said Lambergs.

Equality of Rights faction Chairman Filips Stroganovs said that Piebalgs cannot be blamed for the financial crisis, as it is the result of the government's wrong economic policy.

Democratic Party Saimnieks (Master) faction Chairman Aivars Kreituss and Popular Concord Party (TSP) deputy Igors Bukovskis have proposed not to allow Piebalgs to resign saying that the resignation will only make the financial situation worse.

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